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Well, I dreamed I saw the silver 
Space ships flying 
In the yellow haze of the sun, 
There were children crying 
And colors flying 
All around the chosen ones. 
All in a dream, all in a dream 
The loading had begun. 
They were flying Mother Nature's 
Silver seed to a new home in the sun. 
Flying Mother Nature's 
Silver seed to a new home. 
-- 
Look at Mother Nature on the run 
In the nineteen-seventies. 









‘After the Gold Rush’ was one of the very first songs by a major artist that dealt 
specifically with environmental themes. It was released in 1970 and reflected a 
growing international sentiment of stewardship towards ‘Mother Nature’ in light of 
several environmental problems that we only just started to fathom. All of which were 
a direct consequence of the steep rise of consumerism and industrial expansion after 
the Second World War, depicted by Young as a contemporary gold rush. The lyrics to 
the song depict a post-apocalyptic scene, in which a group of ‘chosen ones’ and ‘silver 
seeds’ is launched into outer space, with the aim of establishing a new colony in order 
to save mankind from imminent environmental destruction. In hindsight, the song 
was a definite requiem for the idealistic 1960s, and a prelude to many of the 
environmental problems that would manifest themselves in the following years and 
decades.  
In the 48 years that have passed since the song was released, Neil Young has altered 
the lyrics to the song on several occasions. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, climate 
change quickly became known as one of the most pressing global issues of our time. 
New scientific and political structures were erected, international agreements were 
forged, but little changed in terms of halting the warming of our planet. Neil Young 
was thus forced to alter his lyrics in order to reflect this stalemate: 
Look at Mother Nature on the run 
In the twentieth century 
The twenty-first century began, and Neil Young slowly became the ‘old man’ he 
described so tellingly on his album Harvest. On two separate occasions, he saw his 
government withdraw from international agreements that were created to put a stop 
to climate change. He saw the rise of new international powers like China and India. 
Countries that aspire the same level of welfare as their Western counterparts, and quite 
possibly also the same level of consumption. He saw the first signs of climate change 
manifesting itself in the intensifying pace and impact of various natural disasters that 
devastated different parts of his country. Once again, he witnessed all of this, and was 
forced to alter his lyrics accordingly: 
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Look at Mother Nature on the run 
In the twenty-first century 
I myself, being 27 years old, am considerably younger than Neil Young. Yet, I can 
already say that throughout my entire lifespan, there have been international 
negotiations taking place with the goal of designing concrete policies in order to 
prevent climate change from growing worse, and in order to help countries within the 
Global South to adapt to its effects. If the urgency inherent to climate change would 
have been reflected in the speed and ambition of international policy making, this PhD 
would have been redundant a very long time ago. Yet, here we are. It’s 2018, and 
Mother Nature is still on the run.  
Being optimistic does not come naturally for me, which might explain the pessimistic 
tone of the above paragraphs. Yet, there have been some reasons for cautious optimism 
in the last four years, both in terms of political evolutions and evolutions on a more 
personal level. Despite the coming of a blond-‘haired’ (the brackets are intentional), 
notoriously climate-sceptic president in the White House, climate awareness is higher 
than ever. The 2015 Paris agreement brought a renewed international can-do attitude 
towards tackling the problem once and for all. Although it is clear by now that 
agreeing upon it was much easier than implementing it, I am still hopeful that the Paris 
Agreement will indeed cause the international community to make drastic decisions 
in order to tackle climate change and to generate goodwill and financing to help the 
most vulnerable countries in adapting to its effects.  
Personally, these four years were also a fantastic growth process. This despite all the 
times I thought I was not right for the job and would never be able to finish it, all the 
times when I came home thinking I had wasted yet another day scanning through 
articles searching for ideas, and all the times I was unable to give a satisfactory answer 
to the most common question of all from people with a non-academic background for 
PhD students: “So what do you do exactly?” Despite the occasional personal crisis and 
some severe cases of imposter syndrome, I did have a lot of fun in the end. I became 
more engaged myself by becoming a vegetarian and by trying to actively promote 
vegetarianism within the walls of our university. I had the chance to teach and give 
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lectures on international climate change politics, in which I always tried to transmit 
both academic insights as well as a sense of activism and moral indignation. I really 
hope that, just as I quite suddenly became aware of the magnitude of climate change 
during a class on the topic in my Master’s year, I too have inspired some people to 
become more climate-aware and to live a bit more sustainably themselves. Although 
teaching was only a minor part of my activities, I have always considered this at least 
as important as the writing process. 
Of course, I was lucky enough to be surrounded by some truly inspiring people, both 
within the Centre for EU Studies as well as outside of it. First and foremost, there are 
simply not enough words in any language to describe how important Laura has been 
to me throughout this entire process, and in my entire life for that matter. No matter 
how gloomy my mood or how endless my rants on whatever it is I rant about, you 
have always been there for me and made me into someone better than I could have 
ever been without you. I would need an infinite amount of lifetimes to thank you 
enough for just being who you are, for putting up with me, and for being the best 
possible partner to come home to. I love you and I will spend the rest of my life trying 
to make you happy, because you deserve nothing less.  
I would also like to thank some family members and people who have become like 
family to me over the years. Sebastian, Marleen & Patrick: I cannot thank you enough 
for being a factor of stability, friendship and genuine kindness in times when I needed 
it the most. When everything seemed to be falling apart, you guys were there and 
helped me to get back on my feet with something as simple as a weekly Tuesday night 
get-together. I will forever be grateful for that. My (unofficial) parents-in-law Marthe 
& Julien: thank you first of all for raising such a beautiful daughter, and for being 
among the nicest and most hospitable people I have ever met. Mathias, Joris and 
Yannick: we have been through a lot together, and I am grateful that we have pulled 
through and got out stronger in the end. Special thanks to Mathias for a lot of 
interesting discussions over the years and for inspiring me to study political sciences 




My friends: I could go on for several pages thanking each of you individually, but you 
probably all know who you are and what you mean to me. Thank you for being a 
constant source of inspiration in my personal life. Special thanks to Koenraad for 
proofreading my introductory chapter, for introducing me to some really interesting 
academic work, and for spicing up several Cieters-parties with interesting discussions. 
I look forward to reading your PhD!  
My office of sunshine co-workers, who also became friends over the course of these 
last four years: I could not have wished for better colleagues than you guys. Thank you 
for creating a nice, humorous and at times slightly crazy (Bop-it!) working 
environment. Sarah and Jan: thank you for gently pushing me over the course of these 
four years to always go the extra mile. From discussing my PhD proposal to 
commenting on my concluding chapter, you guided me through the process with 
support, professional advice, countless pages of feedback and a lot of interesting 
discussions. Thank you so much for believing in me. Special thanks to Yelter for using 
his artistic talents (just one of many) to create the cover artwork for this dissertation. 
And of course a big thanks to all of my CEUS-colleagues with whom I shared the office 
over the course of these four years. Thank you for constantly inspiring me, challenging 
me, pursuing me to walk 100 kilometers and for being a genuinely nice bunch of 
people. I had a blast . 
Finally, I am grateful to all my interviewees for making time for me and providing me 
with many of the insights that in the end lead to this dissertation. Also special thanks 
to the jury for reading this dissertation so carefully, and for all your interesting and 
constructive comments and feedback.    
On with the show! 
 
Frederik 
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This PhD dissertation aims to assess the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation in 
the development cooperation efforts of the European Union (EU). Adaptation and aid 
activities are inherently interlinked for three reasons: (i) the disproportionate impact 
of climate change on developing countries, (ii) the potentially negative impact of 
climate change on poverty reduction efforts and (iii) the role development cooperation 
can play in reducing vulnerability to climate change. Integrating or mainstreaming 
climate change in aid activities is the prime response of aid donors in order to address 
these linkages.  
Approaching the nexus between climate change adaptation and development 
cooperation from multiple theoretical angles, this dissertation aims to generate a 
pluralistic and multi-faceted understanding of this integration process. More 
specifically, the two main perspectives that guide this dissertation are an 
institutionalist approach and a critical approach towards the nexus. Regarding the 
former, article 1 draws from the literature on environmental- and climate policy 
integration (EPI and CPI) in order to assess how and to what extent climate change 
adaptation is mainstreamed in the current development policy cycle (2014-2020). 
Regarding the latter, article 2 and 3 are aimed at problematizing this integration 
exercise by looking specifically at the power effects encapsulated in the discursive 
representation of climate change as a challenge for development cooperation, as well 
as in the concrete policy techniques that are being used in this regard. In article 2, this 
is pursued by employing a critical frame analysis in order to analyze the discourse 
surrounding the climate-development nexus within the EU. In article 3, I use a 
governmentality perspective to problematize the discursive constructions and policy 
techniques employed within the EU’s thematic agency for providing adaptation 




All three articles point to a mainstreaming rationale in which adaptation is retrofitted 
in EU development cooperation, ignoring its transformational potential in aid 
activities. Discursively, adaptation is framed within the parameters of existing 
development paradigms, such as security and economic growth. Moreover, the 
responsibility for change in this regard is almost entirely projected upon EU partner 
countries. Third, mainstreaming is also predominantly imagined and pursued in a top-
down fashion, in which meaning and implementation modalities are transposed from 
HQ-level towards EU delegations and partner countries alike. These political 
underpinnings of adaptation mainstreaming generate an institutional reality in which 
adaptation is ‘just another requirement’ within EU delegations, to be implemented 
through procedural and organizational adjustments. However, capacity is lacking in 
order to elevate adaptation mainstreaming to a level in which it could evoke a system 
change in development cooperation. 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Dit onderzoek behandelt het mainstreamen van klimaatadaptatie in de 
ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsactiviteiten van de Europese Unie (EU). 
Klimaatadaptatie en ontwikkelingssamenwerking zijn inherent verbonden met elkaar 
omwille van de volgende drie redenen: (i) ontwikkelingslanden zullen 
disproportioneel blootgesteld worden aan de gevolgen van klimaatverandering, (ii) 
klimaatverandering kan ook een negatieve impact hebben op armoedebestrijding en 
(iii) ontwikkelingssamenwerking heeft een belangrijke rol te spelen in het 
verminderen van klimaatkwetsbaarheid. De integratie of mainstreaming van 
klimaatadaptatie in ontwikkelingsactiviteiten is dan ook de belangrijkste manier 
waarop donoren gehoor proberen te geven aan deze uitdaging.  
Door de nexus tussen klimaatadaptatie en ontwikkelingssamenwerking te benaderen 
vanuit verschillende theoretische invalshoeken probeer ik een pluralistisch en 
veelzijdig beeld te schetsen van dit integratieproces. De twee dominante theoretische 
perspectieven die gehanteerd worden in dit onderzoek zijn institutioneel en kritisch 
van aard. Artikel 1 valt binnen het institutionele luik en baseert zich hoofdzakelijk op 
de literatuur omtrent environmental- en climate policy integration (EPI en CPI). Vanuit 
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deze theoretische invalshoek wordt de manier waarop en de mate waarin 
klimaatadaptatie wordt geïntegreerd in de huidige beleidscyclus (2014-2020) binnen 
de Europese ontwikkelingssamenwerking onderzocht. Het kritische luik bestaat uit 
twee artikels. Beiden zijn erop gericht om dit integratieproces te problematiseren door 
specifiek te kijken naar de machtseffecten die vervat zitten in de discursieve 
representatie van klimaatadaptatie binnen het Europees ontwikkelingsdiscours én 
naar de concrete beleidstechnieken die in dit kader gebruikt worden. In artikel 2 wordt 
een critical frame analyse gebruikt om het discours omtrent de klimaat-
ontwikkelingsnexus binnen de EU te bestuderen. In artikel 3 gebruik ik een 
governmentality perspectief om de discursieve constructies en beleidstechnieken te 
problematiseren die gebruikt worden binnen het Europees thematisch agentschap dat 
instaat voor adaptatie-gerelateerde hulp in ontwikkelingslanden: de zogenaamde 
Global Climate Change Alliance. 
De drie artikels wijzen op een mainstreaming logica waarbij de Europese 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking rekening houdt met klimaatadaptatie, maar waarbij het 
transformatieve potentieel van adaptatie wordt genegeerd. Qua discours wordt 
adaptatie geframed binnen de parameters van bestaande ontwikkelingsparadigma’s, 
zoals veiligheid en economische groei. Daarnaast wordt de verantwoordelijkheid voor 
verandering grotendeels afgeschoven op partnerlanden. Ten derde wordt 
mainstreaming ook vooral benaderd vanuit een top-down logica, waarin zowel 
betekenis als implementatiemodaliteiten getransponeerd worden vanuit Brussel naar 
EU delegaties en partnerlanden. Deze politieke onderbouwing van adaptatie 
mainstreaming creëren een institutionele realiteit waarin adaptatie een ‘zoveelste 
vereiste’ is dat moet worden geïmplementeerd via procedures en organisatorische 
aanspanningen binnen EU delegaties. De capaciteit om adaptatie mainstreaming naar 
een niveau te brengen waarop het een systeemverandering binnen ontwikkeling kan 
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1. Structure of the introduction 
This introduction aims to provide the reader with the necessary background in order 
to fully grasp the three research articles constituting this dissertation, as well as to 
further explain the overall research design and research questions that have steered 
this research. First of all, section 2 starts by outlining the basics of the climate-
development nexus. This includes (i) a short historical trajectory of how this nexus was 
established within international climate change and development governance, (ii) an 
exploration of how climate change is interlinked with development assistance, (iii) an 
elaboration on why this dissertation focuses specifically on climate change adaptation 
in the context of development cooperation and (iv) an overview of the evolution of the 
climate-development nexus within the EU. Section 3 introduces the two main 
theoretical approaches used within this dissertation: an institutionalist perspective, 
based on the concepts of environmental- and climate policy integration, and a critical 
perspective, incorporating both a framing- and a governmentality approach to the 
climate-development nexus. Finally, section 4 is dedicated to outlining the 











2. Introducing the climate-development nexus 
This section is dedicated to outlining the basic context in which this PhD dissertation 
is situated: the nexus between climate change and development cooperation. First of 
all, I will provide a short historical oversight of its inception by describing how climate 
change as a policy problem became entangled with the concept of development and 
development cooperation. Second, I will explore the linkages between climate change 
and development cooperation in order to provide the reader with a basic 
understanding of the imperative behind the idea of integrating climate change in aid 
activities of donors. Finally, I will end this section by describing the evolution of the 
climate-development nexus within the context of the European Union.  
2.1 A tale of two regimes 
Climate change is not a new phenomenon. The biochemical process that invokes the 
so-called greenhouse gas effect was already identified in the 19th century. However, 
the problem remained somewhat in the margin until 1979, when the first World 
Climate Conference took place (Gupta 2010a). This sparked an evolution in which 
climate change would be translated from a purely ‘scientific’ problem, to a complex 
and interlinked policy challenge on a global scale, often labeled with the term ‘wicked 
problem’ (Levin et al. 2012). The pinnacle of this evolution from a purely scientific 
problem to a science-based policy issue was the 1987 World Conference on 
Environment and Development. The report that followed from this conference – 
entitled ‘Our Common Future’, yet commonly referred to as the Brundtland report – 
for the very first time articulated the concept of ‘sustainable development’. In what 
would later become a landmark definition, sustainable development was described as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 1987). 
Apart from introducing the concept of sustainable development, the Brundtland 
report also further cemented the links between environmental degradation and 
climate change on the one hand, and the political, social and economic aspects of 
societal development on the other. Thus, sustainable development allowed for long-
term policy planning to take environmental and climate-related impacts into account. 
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Later on, however, the concept would effectively become a leitmotif for a wide variety 
of policy domains. As a result, its conceptual limits are stretched to such an extent that 
its initial potential for generating sensibility for environmental- and climate issues has 
become increasingly overshadowed by alternative conceptions (see for example 
Redclift 2005). Recently, a similar critique was formulated in the process of creating 
the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). According to these accounts, its 
broad focus on seventeen individual goals runs the risk of over-stretching the concept 
of sustainable development to the point where they are no longer governable. In the 
words of Easterly (2015), “the SDGs are so encyclopedic that everything is top priority, 
which means nothing is a priority”. 
With the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 
1988 and the 1992 UN Earth Summit, the international architecture for governing 
climate change as we know it today took shape. While the former serves as a scientific 
pillar, providing the basis for policy makers to develop policies for both climate change 
mitigation and adaptation through influential reports on long-term projections of the 
consequences of climate change, the latter established the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Over the years, the UNFCCC became the 
pinnacle of the international climate change regime. For one, it introduced a platform 
for global negotiations on mitigating the escalation of climate change and to a lesser 
extent on adapting to the consequences it invokes. Even more interesting for the 
purpose of this dissertation is the fact that it divided the world in Annex I countries – 
consisting out of ‘developed’ or industrialized nations, responsible for causing climate 
change through their historical emissions – and non-Annex 1 countries – consisting 
mostly out of developing1 countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDs), which 
have little or no responsibility in causing climate change, but are most vulnerable to 
its effects (Gupta 2010a; UNFCCC 2018). From the onset of UNFCCC activities, Annex 
1 countries promised leadership in tackling climate change, through decreasing their 
                                                          
1 In lack of a better catch-all term, I will often refer to ‘developing countries’ throughout this 
PhD. I am however fully aware of the pejorative connotations this term harbours and I want 
to emphasize that I by no means want to reproduce the power imbalances that might be 
implied through its use.  
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own emissions and by providing financial and technical assistance towards non-
Annex 1 countries to ensure their right to sustainable development. This setup became 
known under the concept of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (cf. Brunnée 
& Streck 2013).  
Hence, the idea of climate change and development being interlinked concepts was 
already inscribed in the early conceptions of climate change as a political problem, 
through the concept of sustainable development and the principle of CBDR. Despite 
anchoring these principles in the very foundations of the international climate change 
regime, tensions between industrialized and non-industrialized countries on what this 
right to sustainable development exactly entails have become common in UNFCCC 
negotiations. Historically, developing countries have continuously emphasized the 
need for equity in global climate governance by reiterating the need for adequate 
transfers of financial and – to a lesser extent – technical resources (Morgan & Waskow 
2014). Over the years, this has led to a plethora of different instruments in order to 
operationalize these guiding principles. Examples are plentiful, and include market-
based flexibility mechanisms (such as the Clean Development Mechanism, initiated 
under the Kyoto Protocol) as well as international funds like the Global Environmental 
Fund, the Adaptation Fund and – more recently – the Green Climate Fund.  
Despite a growing international architecture for climate-related financial and 
technological assistance towards the South, tensions remain. For one, the principle of 
CBDR became increasingly contested over the years, partially due to new rising 
economies (like China and India) operating within a ‘grey zone’. Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, their non-Annex 1 statute exempted them from any emission reduction 
obligations, while their rapid economic growth caused the CO2 intensity of their 
economies to surge (Kasa et al. 2008). Hence, under the Paris Agreement – as agreed 
upon in 2015 – the Annex 1/non-Annex 1 dichotomy was replaced by a system of 
voluntary contributions (cf. Falkner 2016). Every country now specifies its own 
mitigation and adaptation targets through so-called Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs). As this system no longer differentiates between countries 
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based on their status as a (non-) industrialized country, the Paris agreement has erased 
the explicit Annex 1/non-Annex 1 divide in international climate negotiations.  
Yet, notwithstanding this observation that a clear-cut demarcation between 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries can be considered a thing of the past under the 
Paris Agreement, debates on climate equity within UNFCCC are more salient than 
ever (Chan & Mogelgaard 2017). At COP15 in Copenhagen, parties agreed that from 
2020 onwards, financial compensations for climate change should amount to 100 
billion dollars per year (Buchner et al. 2011). However, due to an incredibly 
complicated institutional landscape – including endless amounts of both public and 
private sources of climate financing – and ongoing debates on the additionality2 of 
climate finance in relation to Official Development Assistance (ODA), the question 
remains whether the international community will actually achieve this target (see for 
example Roberts & Weikmans 2017). Hence, recent negotiating rounds were 
characterized by developing countries asking for more clarity and assurances in this 
regard.  
In addition to sustainable development becoming a fundamental building block of the 
international climate change regime, it also emerged as a leitmotif for international 
development cooperation. Interestingly, despite sustainable development establishing 
firm linkages between climate change and development, both regimes developed 
separately for a considerable amount of time (Huq et al. 2006). According to Wapner 
(2003), one explanation for this is developing countries being particularly wary of 
limiting their scope for industrialization and economic development in the wake of 
climate- and environmental concerns. These concerns go far back: for example, at the 
1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, developing countries already 
warned that their entitlement towards the same levels of economic growth as 
                                                          
2 The concept of ‘additionality’ stems from the principle embedded within the international 
climate regime that financial resources provided from industrialized countries towards their 
non-industrialized counterparts in order to mitigate and adapt to climate change should be 
‘new and additional’ (UNCTAD 2015). This implies that the former group of countries cannot 
simply re-convert ODA-streams in order to fulfil their obligations in this regard. However, the 
exact definition of additionality, and thus the relation between climate financing and ODA, is 
still widely debated. I will return to this discussion in the concluding remarks.  
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industrialized countries might be hampered by an emerging threat of ‘environmental 
neocolonialism’ (Linnér & Selin 2013: 979). Hence, integrating climate change in ODA 
was also seen as bearing the risk of diverging already limited ODA-funding to climate-
related activities, at the expense of poverty reduction efforts and socio-economic 
development (Klein 2010).  
Hence, until the early 2000s, linking climate change and development cooperation 
remained a somewhat marginal policy issue. Although the 1990s marked a shift from 
a development rationale based on overtly neoliberal development recipes towards a 
so-called ‘human’ development paradigm, including a broader conception of poverty 
as being linked to – among others – gender issues and environmental degradation 
(Doidge & Holland 2015), climate change initially fell outside this paradigm shift. This 
was strongly apparent in the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in which climate change was a non-issue, largely because certain actors 
opposed the inclusion of climate change as a challenge for development (Fankhauser 
& Schmidt-Traub 2011).  
Despite climate change falling largely outside the overarching framework of the 
MDGs, the international salience of the climate-development nexus did eventually 
gain pace. The 2002 World Conference on Sustainable Development (also known as 
Rio +10) reaffirmed the impact of wicked problems like environmental degradation 
and climate change on poverty reduction efforts. Second, a number of major donors 
released a paper on poverty and climate change at the 8th Conference of the Parties 
(COP8) in 2002, which firmly stated that “climate change is a serious risk to poverty 
reduction and threatens to undo decades of development efforts” (Huq et al. 2006: 9). 
The early 2000s also saw an increasing attention towards the climate-development 
nexus from both academic circles as well as policy think thanks, leading to major donor 
agencies (e.g. the EU, the World Bank and the OECD) to fully acknowledge this link 





In recent years, the link between climate change, sustainable development and 
development cooperation has been internationally cemented in the new overarching 
framework for international development cooperation, being the SDGs. The SDGs 
specifically aim to “take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” 
(United Nations 2015: 13), and explicitly link the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development to the Paris Agreement and the NDCs. Hence, the fact that both 
international regimes are coming together through these overlapping functionalities 
indicates that the climate-development nexus is becoming increasingly anchored 
internationally. Moreover, although often criticized (cf. supra), its holistic aspirations 
and structuration of the goals also show promising signs in terms of policy coherence 
and mainstreaming cross-cutting development issues (like climate change) in sectoral 
aid activities (Le Blanc 2015).  
Having outlined the increasing entanglement of the international regimes for climate 
change and development cooperation, the question remains how both concepts 
influence and impact each other. Therefore, the following section is dedicated to 
consulting the literature in order to outline the interlinkages between development 
cooperation, climate change mitigation and adaptation3.  
2.2 Linking climate change and development cooperation 
It is worthwhile to note that the growing body of literature in this regard deals with 
two separate aspects of climate change as a development challenge: mitigating further 
climate change and adapting to its consequences. First of all, scholarly work on 
mitigation to climate change can be further categorized as focusing on (i) integrating 
climate mitigation in development activities and (ii) linking development cooperation 
to international mitigation mechanisms. The former deals specifically with the pursuit 
of so-called ‘green growth’ in the Global South. At the risk of over-generalizing, most 
of the knowledge in this regard deals with the role development aid can play in 
avoiding CO2 emissions by providing support in energy or transport sectors (Kok et 
                                                          
3 Mitigation is defined by the IPCC as “An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources 
or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases”, while adaptation is defined as “Adjustments in 
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, 
which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 2007). 
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al. 2008). For example, development assistance can play a role in reducing emissions 
through applying clean technologies in a country’s energy facilities, or by supporting 
the transition to renewable energy systems altogether (ibid.; Kruckenberg 2015; 
Marquardt et al. 2016). Regarding transport, development cooperation can play a role 
by for example supporting and maintaining public transport systems. In their turn, 
such improvements in a country’s energy infrastructure can create co-benefits for 
development, such as new employment opportunities, enhanced infrastructure and 
increased energy security (Kok et al. 2008).  
Alternatively, some mitigation-oriented studies focus specifically on some newly 
created global market mechanisms aimed at emission mitigation in the Global South. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was introduced 
as one of three ‘flexibility mechanisms’, with the specific aim of establishing a market-
based cooperation mechanism for emission reductions between Annex 1 and non-
Annex 1 countries. In short, companies within Annex 1 countries could acquire 
emission reduction offsets by investing in climate mitigation projects in non-Annex 1 
countries (Streck 2004). This mechanism was presented as a win-win opportunity for 
both sides involved, providing an opportunity for Annex 1 countries to achieve their 
quantified emission targets, while also supporting sustainable development in non-
Annex 1 countries (ibid.; Minang et al. 2007). The role of development cooperation in 
this regard was mainly envisaged in terms of building the capacity of actors in non-
Annex 1 countries in order to implement CDM-related projects (Minang et al. 2007; 
Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2006). However, the CDM arguably never lived up to its 
initial expectations, and was frequently criticized for mainly targeting middle-income 
countries and therefore failing to achieve any meaningful sustainable development in 
countries which could most benefit from its support (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 
2006).  
Another example of an international market mechanism for mitigation in the Global 
South is the so-called Reducing Emissions From Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) initiative. In essence, this mechanism aims to financially incentivize these 
countries in preserving and protecting forest resources, in order to benefit from their 
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mitigation potential as carbon sinks (Somorin et al. 2014). Once again, this UNFCCC-
initiated carbon offsetting scheme became increasingly entangled with development 
cooperation to the extent that international funding for REDD+ projects now mainly 
comes from ODA (Angelsen 2013). As a result, REDD+ evolved from being a 
mechanism solely aimed at providing payments for ecosystem services of forests, to a 
tool that pursues a broader development-based agenda. Nowadays, its goals also 
include protecting biodiversity, reducing poverty and enhancing livelihoods in the 
Global South (Angelsen 2013: 3). Thus, REDD+ activities increasingly made the 
connection between international development assistance on the one hand, and 
international mitigation initiatives under UNFCCC on the other hand.  
Apart from the pursuit of mitigation objectives through development cooperation, a 
bulking strand of research also looked into the link between adaptation to climate 
change and international development assistance. Indeed, it has become a well-known 
fact that developing countries will generally be impacted the most by the effects of 
climate change. Based on their geographical position, these countries are inherently 
more vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The intensification of climate 
variability through climate change is therefore expected to put additional pressure on 
already vulnerable societies (Schipper 2007).  
However, visions on how development cooperation can play a role in helping societies 
adapt to the consequences of climate change tend to differ widely. Already in the use 
of terminology within the literature, this can easily be deduced: scholarly work in this 
regard not only refers to ‘adapting to climate change’, but also revolves around 
similar-but-different concepts like climate vulnerability (e.g. Klein & Möhner 2011), 
adaptive capacity (e.g. Smit & Wandel 2006) and resilience (e.g. McEvoy et al. 2013) to 
climate impacts. Moreover, the challenge of integrating climate change in 
development cooperation has also been linked to the concept of disaster risk reduction, 
which even relates it with the literature on humanitarian aid (Schipper & Pelling 2006).  
One the one hand, the literature linking adaptation to disaster risk reduction is more 
inclined towards ‘technical’ visions of the nexus. The main aim in this regard is to use 
aid assistance to build capacity for mitigating the physical impacts of extreme weather 
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events – such as flash floods, prolonged droughts etc. – and to develop hazard 
forecasting and early warning systems to minimize the impact of such extreme events 
(cf. Thomalla et al. 2006). Arguably, such visions present a narrow conceptualization 
of the link between development cooperation and adaptation, focusing solely on the 
ability of societies to monitor extreme weather phenomena to better anticipate on their 
effects. Related to these technical conceptions is the fairly recent concept of ecosystem-
based adaptation, which is mainly preoccupied with ecosystems and biodiversity in 
relation to building adaptive capacity (Wamsler 2015).  
On the other hand, broader conceptions of the nexus tend to also look at socio-
economic determinants of adaptation and adaptive capacity (Adger et al. 2003). Often, 
such studies start from the concept of ‘vulnerability’ and incorporate a wider 
perspective on what precisely renders societies vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change. Thus, these conceptions incorporate a broad range of sectoral activities in 
which development cooperation can play a role in terms of adaptation. These range 
from more ‘obvious’ sectoral activities which are still linked to ecosystem services and 
natural resource management (e.g. sustainable agriculture) to more political and 
societal interpretations of the concept. Such conceptions are aimed at understanding 
the unequal distribution of climate impacts within societies, thus perceiving 
adaptation as tackling vulnerabilities already inscribed in socio-economic processes 
(O’Brien et al. 2004; Yamin et al. 2005: 4). Ayers & Huq (2009) provide the example of 
ensuring water rights to different societal groups when confronted with climate 
change-induced droughts. This goes beyond a mere technical response – such as 
installing early warning systems in order to anticipate such droughts – and focus on 
the underlying factors that render people vulnerable in the first place. Some 
interpretations in this regard therefore consider adaptation to climate change in the 
context of aid activities as simply pursuing ‘good development’, as an increase in 
welfare of societies also enhances their adaptive capacity (cf. Cannon & Müller-Mahn 
2010). Others go even further and tend to perceive adaptation in terms of enhancing 
well-being and reducing socio-economic inequalities within societies. Such 
interpretations are arguably more ‘transformative’ for development aid, as they are 
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able to alter the classic development paradigm, focused on poverty reduction and 
economic growth (ibid.).  
This initial exploration of the literature on the link between adaptation and 
development is by no means exhaustive, as there are far more variables that are 
subjected to different interpretations. Questions like on what level adaptation should 
be pursued and how to integrate long-term perspectives and potential uncertainties in 
adaptation policy also continue to stir debate within a growing body of scholarly work. 
Moreover, these different conceptions should not be perceived – and generally do not 
perceive each other – as mutually exclusive. Many studies recognize that their work is 
but a part of a broader effort aimed at using development aid to help countries prepare 
for the consequences of climate change. However, once again, this diversity – of which 
I have merely scratched the surface – does point out that the relation between 
adaptation to climate change and development cooperation is indeed a very broad one, 
and that integrating adaptation in aid assistance is a complex and challenging 
endeavor.  
Within this PhD thesis, I focus specifically on the nexus between adaptation to climate 
change and development cooperation. The reason for this is twofold: first of all, as the 
broader conceptions of the adaptation-development nexus already signify, linkages 
between the climate vulnerability of developing countries and sectoral aid activities 
are preeminently multi-faceted. This implies that integrating the former into the latter 
is particularly challenging for donors, arguably even more so than mainstreaming 
mitigation – which is more confined in terms of sectoral overlaps. Indeed, while 
mainstreaming mitigation is mostly related to sectoral aid activities in terms of energy 
security, transport and possibly trade and finance, adaptation touches upon the core 
of poverty reduction and development cooperation itself (Kok & De Coninck 2007; 
Lauer & Eguavoen 2016). Therefore, adaptation is expected by some to be “an 
opportunity for social reform, for the questioning of values that drive inequalities in 
development and our unsustainable relationship with the environment” (Pelling as 
cited in Lauer & Eguavoen 2016: 88).  
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The fundamental interconnection between adaptation and development thus provides 
the former with a transformative potential in relation to the latter. In other words, 
adaptation is able to invoke a system change in the conception and pursuit of 
development, which makes the task of properly integrating it all the more challenging. 
As apparent in the quote above, transformative adaptation in the context of 
development is strongly preoccupied with power structures within societies that 
render them vulnerable to climate change in the first place (cf. Kates et al. 2012; Lauer 
& Eguavoen 2016). Hence, transformational adaptation focuses strongly on the 
political-economic drivers of vulnerability to climate change (Bassett & Fogelman 
2013). It is based on the belief that people’s exposure to the effects of climate change is 
strongly influenced by their access to resources and decision-making structures within 
a given societal context. Hence, adaptation responses should strive to generate more 
equity in this regard, in order to erase the social and structural causes of climate 
vulnerability (ibid.).  
In addition, these different visions on what exactly constitutes mainstreaming 
adaptation in development cooperation, show that adaptation not only poses 
challenges in terms of implementing institutional and organizational changes, but also 
in terms of the meaning that is provided to adaptation as a development challenge. 
This is the fundamental assumption behind this PhD project, and also implies the use 
of different theoretical perspectives for the study of the adaptation-development nexus 
within the EU. Before introducing these theoretical perspectives, I will first proceed by 
introducing the nexus between climate change and development cooperation within 
the European Union.  
2.3 Exploring the nexus within the European Union 
In this section, I will elaborate on the EU as the central actor within this dissertation. 
More specifically, I provide an overview of how the link between climate change and 
development cooperation became established within the EU. The normative objective 
to integrate environmental- and climate concerns in all aspects of development 
cooperation has been a legal requirement since the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Adelle 
et al. 2018). It is explicitly stated here that “environmental protection requirements 
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must be integrated into the definition and implementation of all the community 
policies and activities […] in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development” (European Union 1997: 25).  
This legal obligation was further implemented through the Cardiff Process, which led 
to a first review and report exercise on how to integrate environmental issues in nine 
policy domains, including development cooperation (Adelle et al. 2018). A first specific 
communication on assisting developing countries in their fight against climate change 
was issued in 2003. It contained four distinct policy objectives in this regard: raising 
the policy profile of climate change (through agenda setting in high level meetings 
regarding EU development cooperation agreements), supporting adaptation and 
mitigation efforts, capacity building (regarding impact assessments, coordination 
between developing countries in international negotiations and the dissemination of 
relevant knowledge) and monitoring/evaluating the implementation of the Action 
Plan (European Commission 2003). These objectives were formally confirmed in the 
European Consensus on Development (2006), which redefined the underlying 
principles of European aid efforts. In 2011, reducing developing countries’ exposure 
to climate change and environmental degradation was also included as a key priority 
in the Agenda for Change, which became the main guiding document for EU 
development programming (European Commission 2011).  
In recent years, the EU re-affirmed its commitment towards mainstreaming climate 
change on several occasions. For one, the renewed Consensus for Development (2017) 
re-affirms that “The EU and its Member States will integrate environment and climate 
change throughout their development cooperation strategies, including by promoting 
a sound balance between mitigation and adaptation” (European Union 2017: 9). Also 
considering the negotiations leading up to the new SDGs, the EU took an ambitious 
stance by emphasizing the need for an approach which enabled environmental policy 





Institutionally, climate change is to be considered in both the EU’s geographical and 
thematic development instruments. Regarding the former, the two main funding 
instruments in this regard are the European Development Fund (EDF) – focused on 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as well as overseas countries and 
territories – and the Development Cooperation Initiative (DCI) – targeting Latin 
America, Asia, Central Asia, the Gulf and South Africa (CONCORD 2014). While the 
DCI is fully funded by the EU budget, the EDF is an intergovernmental instrument 
funded by member states (ibid.). The integration of climate change within this 
geographical pillar of EU aid activities is further elaborated upon in article 1.  
In addition, the EU also established thematic budget lines in order to address climate 
change in aid activities. Currently, the most important one is the Global Public Goods 
and Challenges programme (GPGC). It is aimed at supporting the three dimensions of 
sustainable development in an integrated and holistic way and includes climate 
change as one of its key areas (European Commission 2014). The GPGC programme 
was established as a unifying programme in response to the fragmented architecture 
of EU thematic budget lines on these issues in the previous aid cycle (2007-2012). It is 
also the main source of funding for multi-dimensional and cross-cutting ‘flagship 
initiatives’ (CONCORD 2014). The most relevant initiative for this PhD project is the 
so-called Global Climate Change Alliance (cf. infra). Another recent commitment is to 
be found within the current Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU has 
pledged to make 20% of its spending climate compatible for the period 2014-2020. 
According to Adelle et al. (2018: 83) this implies a threefold increase in climate 
spending within EU aid activities compared to the 2007-2014 period, amounting to a 
net spending of 14 billion EUR. In article 1, I will further elaborate on what impact this 
financial incentive has on climate mainstreaming in EU aid activities.  
Based on the above, it is safe to say that the salience of climate change as a development 
issue has grown in recent years. This coincides with the evolution of the EU as an actor 
within both the international climate change regime and the international 
development regime. Regarding the former, an important contextual element for this 
dissertation is the fact that the EU has been perceived (and has perceived itself) as a 
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leading actor within the international climate change regime ever since the 
negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol. The literature identifies different sources of EU 
climate ‘leadership’, like the creation of ambitious internal policies (e.g. the Emission 
Trading System), the use of climate diplomacy and the power derived from material 
sources such as the size of the internal market (Gupta & Ringius 2001; Bäckstrand & 
Elgström 2013; Kilian & Elgström 2010). Relevant for this research is the observation 
that this climate leadership role evolved towards what the literature dubs a ‘leadiator’ 
role in recent years (Bäckstrand & Elgström 2013). This leadership conception implies 
a stronger emphasis on building diplomatic alliances with other actors and serving as 
a bridge-builder between industrialized and non-industrialized countries (Bäckstrand 
& Elgström 2013). For example, the EU has in recent years invested in building 
diplomatic ties with countries within the Global South through its Green Diplomacy 
Network, situated within the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Torney & 
Cross 2018). Moreover, the creation and growth of thematic agencies like the GCCA 
also show an increasing sensitivity towards issues related to adaptation and climate 
financing within EU external climate action. As a result of the EU’s leadiator role and 
the growing attention towards the impact of climate change in the Global South, 
development cooperation also becomes an important tool for embodying this 
increasing awareness. Hence, mainstreaming climate change adaptation in EU aid 
activities can be considered an important indicator for determining whether this shift 
towards a leadiator role within the UNFCCC regime also trickles down into very 
concrete forms of policy making.  
Regarding the EU’s role in the international development regime, we can also perceive 
this inclusion of ‘horizontal issues’ to be integrated in EU aid activities as a strife for 
carving out an EU approach to development. The EU can be considered a peculiar 
development actor, combining a role as a bilateral donor – appearing as an aid 
provider in its own regard – and a multilateral donor – being placed ‘above’ the 
individual aid efforts of its member states (Carbone 2007). Whereas EU development 
policy was already set out as a policy area since the 1972 Memorandum on a 
Community Development Cooperation Policy, it was not until the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty that a formal legal framework was established in this regard (van der Grijp et 
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al. 2010). It was here that EU objectives for development cooperation were outlined as 
primarily focused on sustainable economic and social development, integration in the 
world economy and poverty reduction. Yet, despite this legal anchoring, the EU has 
continuously struggled in determining an effective EU strategy, combining both an 
effective and efficient delivery of EU aid with a visible and relevant substance that 
would provide an added value vis-à-vis its member states (ibid.). In other words, the 
evolution of EU development cooperation in the last three decades has been a constant 
quest for asserting itself as a distinct actor, seeking to promote its own norms (Orbie 
et al. 2017). Hence, the increasing salience of sustainable development and climate 
change in the development rationale of the EU should also be interpreted in light of 
the increasing manifestation of the EU as a norm-maker in international development 
cooperation. 
In sum, the EU can be considered a ‘most likely case’ in finding a transformational 
approach towards adaptation mainstreaming. In both development cooperation and 
climate governance, the EU has profiled itself as an ambitious actor that (i) pursues a 
norm maker role by aspiring to implement innovative internal policies and promoting 
these towards third actors, and (ii) aims to uphold a strong sense of dialogue and 
partnership vis-à-vis countries within the Global South. Due to climate change 
mainstreaming standing at the intersection of these two international leadership roles, 
the EU represents an exceptionally interesting case in finding a strong and innovative 
conceptualization and implementation of its mainstreaming rationale. In other words, 
I argue that, if traces of transformative mainstreaming were to be found anywhere, it 
would be in this context. Having outlined my choice for the EU as the central actor in 
this PhD dissertation, the next section is dedicated to introducing the theoretical 







3. Theoretical approaches to the climate-development 
nexus 
This PhD is based on a strong notion of theoretical pluralism, incorporating different 
perspectives for studying the climate-development nexus within the EU. In short, the 
sequence of different articles constituting this dissertation represent an evolution from 
an institutionalist to a critical perspective. One the one hand, institutionalist or 
organizational theory-based perspectives on the nexus focus on the organizational and 
procedural challenges of a mainstreaming process. Research in this regard is 
particularly focused on the tools and organizational adjustments developed by aid 
donors in order to properly mainstream adaptation in their development activities. 
More recently, scholarly work in this regard is also increasingly bridging the gap 
between theory and policy practice, looking into the effectiveness of such 
mainstreaming processes. To what extent are mainstreaming tools and adjustments 
effective in terms of generating sensitivity towards adaptation among development 
practitioners? And what are the barriers that hinder mainstreaming effectiveness?  
In addition, critical perspectives to the nexus start from the idea that mainstreaming 
also triggers a process of providing meaning to adaptation as a challenge for 
development cooperation. Therefore, mainstreaming is not ‘neutral’ or technocratic, 
but a political exercise that implies a certain way of discursively representing or 
‘framing’ the concept, thereby delineating the range of possible policy options for 
mainstreaming. Hence, determining what constitutes adaptation as a development 
challenge generates real power effects. Is incorporating adaptation in development 
work merely including more sectoral activities on natural resource management or 
sustainable agriculture? Is it continuing a business-as-usual approach in the sense that 
economic growth automatically means a higher adaptive capacity? Or does adaptation 




3.1 Institutionalist perspectives on the nexus: environmental- and 
climate policy integration 
The first article of this dissertation fits within the literature rooted in institutionalism 
and organizational theory. Scholarly work in this regard approaches the climate-
development nexus from the concepts of environmental policy integration (EPI) and 
climate policy integration (CPI). Environmental policy integration specifically targets 
the integration of environmental considerations into third policy domains of policy 
making, in order to become better able to achieve environmental objectives (Lafferty 
& Hovden 2003). More recently, as the salience of climate change as a wicked problem 
grew, the concept of Climate policy integration also found its entrance in academic 
literature (cf. Adelle & Russel 2013; Ahmad 2009; Dupont 2016). The origins of this 
strand of literature are commonly traced back to the work by Underdal (1980) on 
integrated marine policy, which introduced the concept of ‘policy integration’ within 
the academic literature. Conceptualizations of EPI and CPI tend to differ between 
policy integration as an overarching policy principle, a policy process or a policy 
outcome.  
First of all, when considering EPI/CPI as a normative policy principle, the main 
conceptual discussions in the literature deal with the extent to which environmental 
and climate change concerns should prevail when integrated in third policy domains. 
Early explorations of EPI (e.g. Collier 1997; Liberatore 1997) pointed at its necessity to 
ensure sustainable development, and conceptualized EPI mostly in terms of removing 
contradictions between policies in this regard. Thus, EPI in such conceptualizations is 
mainly aimed at finding synergies between environmental- and other sectoral 
objectives. In contrast, a more elaborate and ambitious conceptualization of EPI was 






“The incorporation of environmental objectives into all stages of policy-making in 
non-environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition of this goal as a 
guiding principle for the planning and execution of policy; accompanied by an 
attempt to aggregate presumed environmental consequences into an overall 
evaluation of policy, and a commitment to minimize contradictions between 
environmental and sectoral policies by giving principled priority to the former 
over the latter.”  
This definition is more far-reaching, as it includes the principle of principled priority, 
implying that a mere balancing act between environmental- and other sectoral issues 
is not sufficient. In other words, granting principled priority to environmental 
objectives distinguishes EPI from other forms of policy integration. It allows for the 
maintenance of the carrying-capacity of nature to become an overarching societal 
objective (Lafferty & Hovden 2003).  
Also with regards to CPI, conceptual discussions on the scope of the concept have 
characterized the existing literature. Due to its inherent link with EPI, the conceptual 
boundaries between both concepts are rather hard to pinpoint. For example, some 
authors have argued for also normatively premising principled priority for CPI in the 
literature, in order to allow for conceptual comparability between EPI and CPI 
(Ahmad 2009; Mickwitz et al. 2009). In this sense, CPI becomes nothing more than 
replacing the word ‘environmental’ with ‘climate’ in order to conceptually delineate 
CPI (Adelle & Russel 2013). In contrast, other authors dispute granting principled 
priority to CPI and once again advocate ‘weaker’ interpretations of the concept. In their 
view, giving principled priority to CPI is at risk of conflicting with socio-economic 
interests in certain cases, or even with environmental objectives – given that both 
should be prioritized simultaneously if ‘strong’ conceptions of EPI and CPI are upheld 
in policy making (Adelle & Russel 2013; Dupont 2016).  
In my view, the added value of these conceptual debates lies not in trying to impose 
superficial boundaries between EPI and CPI. In contrast, such discussions should 
provide researchers with a ‘yardstick’ according to which empirical accounts of 
EPI/CPI can be evaluated (Dupont 2016). In other words, conceptually delineating the 
extent to which EPI/CPI could influence other sectoral policy activities provides 
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researchers with the possibility of assessing to what extent EPI/CPI is already 
integrated in certain sectoral activities and whether the found integration endeavors 
can be perceived as far-reaching or not. Hence the analytical benefit of including 
principled priority in the conceptualization of CPI, as this allows for an 
operationalization that includes a broader range of possible CPI manifestations in 
policy practices. Thus, I choose to adhere to the idea of CPI as a mere extension of the 
EPI concept –including both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of CPI – albeit with a sharpened 
analytical lens in order to empirically ‘zoom in’ on climate change specifically (Ahmad 
2009).  
When considering the literature on development cooperation, the concept of CPI is 
commonly known under the name of climate change ‘mainstreaming’4 (cf. Huq 2004; 
Ayers et al. 2014; Klein 2007; 2008). Also here, we find similar forms of conceptualizing 
mainstreaming that seem to distinguish between weak and strong variants of 
mainstreaming. For example, the idea of ‘climate proofing’ development cooperation 
corresponds with weak conceptions of CPI. According to a typology by Gupta (2010b), 
climate proofing once again implies looking for synergies between climate change and 
development cooperation, thus implying an equal weighing of both objectives and 
striving towards a win-win approach. In contrast, climate mainstreaming according to 
this typology implies the redefinition of development cooperation through a climate 
lens, thus corresponding to the idea of granting climate change principled priority in 
aid activities (ibid.; cf. article 1). 
Second, conceptualizing CPI as a policy process relates to the policy measures that are 
taken by practitioners in order to ensure that climate-related concerns are taken into 
account in sectoral policy making. A detailed understanding of CPI as a process thus 
allows for researchers to operationalize the concept for research and specify what they 
are looking for when assessing CPI in a certain empirical context. Such an 
                                                          
4 A possible explanation for this rather confusing use of concepts is the fact that 
‘mainstreaming’ resonates more within a development aid context, as it links up to similar 
topics like for instance gender mainstreaming. 
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operationalization is a multi-dimensional endeavor and includes – among others – 
organizational and procedural aspects.  
In terms of organizational aspects of the CPI process, this implies organizational 
restructuring by means of a shift from sectoral compartmentalization to more 
integrated forms of policy making (Persson 2004). In general, the literature describes 
both vertical and horizontal techniques for CPI. Vertical techniques concern the 
interaction between different levels of government, in which mainstreaming is driven 
by a hierarchically powerful agency (e.g. cabinet/parliament), which establishes 
climate change as a cross-cutting issue at lower level of government. In contrast, 
horizontal integration focuses on sectoral departments on a single governmental level. 
The main driver of the mainstreaming effort here is a less powerful environmental 
‘champion’ (e.g. environmental ministry), which tries to generate responsiveness 
towards climate issues in other thematic agencies (Nunan et al. 2012; Persson & Klein 
2008; Lafferty & Hovden 2003). It is important to note that these two approaches are 
not mutually exclusive policy options, but are instead interdependent parts of a 
broader integration strategy. In practice, CPI strategies are rarely completely aimed at 
vertical or horizontal coordination. Instead, they often combine the two approaches, 
in which central planning agencies create guidelines and provide knowhow to 
departments (e.g. through trainings), which then translate this input to a workable 
integration strategy within their organizational context (Nunan et al. 2012).  
Another strategy is also to introduce new procedures aimed at generating increased 
sensitivity for climate-related issues in policy making. Of course, the list of possible 
procedural tools for enhancing CPI in third policy domains is almost limitless, and is 
very much dependent on the organization and the policy domain in which it is active. 
Within the realm of development cooperation, often cited examples are the use of ex-
ante Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) at the program/sectoral level and 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) at the project level, as well as the use of 
environmental profiles (Persson 2009: 414; Wende et al. 2012). Although these are 
originally tools for EPI, they can be adjusted to include climate-related concerns as 
well (Gupta 2010b). Other examples include the use of special ‘green’ budgeting 
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indicators (Nilsson et al. 2007), portfolio screening exercises (Klein et al. 2007) and the 
use of audits and check-lists (Gupta 2010b). 
Finally, CPI can also be conceptualized as a policy outcome. In this conception, 
research focuses on the impact CPI-related measures have on the state of mitigation 
and adaptation in a particular context (e.g. in terms of avoided greenhouse gas 
emissions or strengthening of adaptive capacity) as opposed to merely evaluating CPI 
based on adequately mapping out how climate-related objectives are integrated in 
sectoral activities (Adelle & Russel 2013). Although certainly valuable, adequately 
measuring the impact of CPI measures on the mitigation and/or adaptation potential 
of certain actors is in essence a transdisciplinary endeavor. Therefore, assessing CPI as 
an outcome falls beyond the scope of this PhD project.  
In paper 1, this institutionalist approach is used in order to assess the integration of 
climate change adaptation in the aid activities of the European Commission. It is 
specifically aimed at (i) providing an analysis of the organizational and procedural 
adjustments made by the European Commission in order to mainstream climate 
change adaptation in EU aid activities and (ii) evaluating their effectiveness in 
generating climate-awareness among EU policy makers on the ground throughout 9 
different EU Delegations in Sub-Sahara Africa. Data-wise, this research was mostly 
based on interviews with policy officials (both in Brussels and in the field) and an 
analysis of EU policy documents. 
3.2 Critical approaches to the climate-development nexus 
As the previous part made clear, institutionalist perspectives – encapsulated in the 
literature on EPI and CPI – tend to focus mostly on the technical and policy-related 
implications of integrating climate change in development cooperation. Central are 
questions on how far policy integration should be asserted and what tools and 
organizational adjustments should be made to facilitate EPI/CPI. Throughout the 
research project, I evolved away from this literature and towards more critical 
perspectives on this integration process. Such perspectives consider the implications 
of CPI not only to be merely technocratic, but also political. On the one hand, the 
integration of climate change in third policy domains like development cooperation 
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also has the potential to alter the intervention rationale within them. Because of the 
fact that adaptation and development interrelate on such a fundamental level, 
integrating adaptation in development has the possibility to serve as a mechanism to 
alter some of the meta-narratives that shape aid activities (Ireland 2012). Therefore, 
some authors also point to a ‘reframing’ exercise as part of the CPI process, in order to 
re-establish problem and solution definitions in light of the specific climate-related 
challenges within a certain domain of policy making (e.g. Nilsson & Nilsson 2005). On 
the other hand, CPI might be nothing more than a discursive construction in order “to 
conceal the repetition of pre-existing development practices” (Ireland 2012: 94; 
Methmann 2010). 
Critical perspectives thus start from the idea that CPI is by no means a neutral exercise. 
It also very much plays on the discursive level, as the way in which adaptation is 
presented in development discourse also plays a distinct role in how the CPI process 
is implemented in policy practices. Within development cooperation, there is no 
preconceived meaning as to what integrating adaptation in aid assistance exactly 
entails. Providing meaning to CPI is arguably the most important act in the CPI 
process, as it precedes and influences the technical and organizational policy measures 
which are taken in this regard. As a result, it puts the actor that has the ability to do 
this in a powerful position (cf. Dewulf 2013). Indeed, anyone able to discursively 
construct adaptation as a development challenge, is also in the position to determine 
how the issue is perceived among policy makers and what range of policy option is 
deemed eligible in order to put CPI into practice. Hence, although it is certainly 
valuable to describe what works and what does not in terms of integrating adaptation 
in aid activities, it is also necessary to take a step back and to reflect on what happens 
in the name of CPI, and problematize it by identifying the power effects that might 
follow from this. Therefore, this dissertation has incorporated a critical perspective 
towards the adaptation-development nexus by (i) performing a critical frame analysis 
of the discursive representation of climate change adaptation in the development 
discourse of the European Commission and (ii) by using a Foucauldian 
governmentality perspective for the study of the EU Global Climate Change Alliance.  
24 
 
This critical perspective on the nexus has inspired three articles in this dissertation. 
Article 2 concerns a critical frame approach of climate change adaptation in EU 
development discourse: this part of the dissertation focuses specifically on the 
discursive representation of climate change adaptation in the development discourse 
of the EU. For this research, I employed an epistemological stance rooted in social-
constructivism, which starts from the assumption that the way certain issues are 
discursively represented will influence the manner in which they are rendered 
governable. In other words, using framing analysis for critically engaging with the 
climate-development nexus within a EU-context allowed me to take a step back and 
look at the discursive foundations that shape the impetus to mainstream climate 
change in aid activities. I will not further elaborate on the concept of framing in this 
introduction, as the article using this perspective is already self-explanatory in this 
regard.  
In article 3, a governmentality approach is used in order to further critically engage 
with the climate-development nexus in the EU. Inspiration is drawn here from post-
structuralist, and more specifically Foucauldian, accounts of international climate 
change governance. In this article, I specifically engage with the power effects that lie 
hidden in discursive representation and policy techniques within the EU’s thematic 
agency for adaptation assistance towards partner countries: the Global Climate 
Change Alliance (GCCA). Moreover, a theoretical article can be found in Annex 1 to 
this dissertation, in which the case is made for using governmentality as a tool for 
analysis in the study of EU external relations. As this does not concern the main topic 
of this PhD directly, namely the climate-development nexus within the context of the 
EU, I chose not to include it in the main corpus of this dissertation. However, readers 
are encouraged to read this article before reading article 3, as it provides them with a 
comprehensive introduction to the theoretical foundations of governmentality, as well 
its analytical benefits.  
Contrary to the concept of framing, I will dedicate some extra space in this 
introduction in order to further outline the concept of governmentality. One the one 
hand, governmentality and the Foucauldian conception of power have been 
25 
 
profoundly influential in the last two years of my PhD project. On the other hand, due 
to inherent word constraints that come with the format of articles, the conceptual 
elaboration on governmentality in the two dedicated articles (one theoretical, one 
empirical) is still rather limited. Therefore, the following subsection is dedicated to 
properly introducing Foucauldian post-structuralism and the concept of 
governmentality, in order to provide the reader with some additional context in this 
regard. 
3.2.1 Introducing governmentality 
“Though his self-selected title at the College de France was professor ̀ of the history 
of systems of thought, Foucault was himself far from being a systematic thinker. 
He once described his work as a Swiss cheese: readers found themselves in the 
holes and it was up to them to find their way out, choosing their own direction” 
(Willcocks & Mingers 2004: 239). 
The above quote eloquently captures the pitfalls of immersing oneself in the works of 
Foucault. Although highly thought provoking, his work doesn’t exactly provide a 
research with a ready-made schedule of how to translate his ideas into analytical tools 
for research. The same goes for the concept of governmentality, which became a central 
idea in my own research in the last two years of my PhD project. In short, 
governmentality deals with the power effects rooted in the interplay between the 
discursive construction (~rationality) of a particular policy issue, and the way in which 
it becomes operationalized through concrete policy techniques (~government). 
Foucault’s work, including governmentality, can be situated within a post-
structuralist tradition. In essence, post-structuralism is based on an anti-essentialist 
ontology, which denies objects having an ‘essence’ outside of their social construction 
in discourse. Foucauldian post-structuralism is more ‘material’ than the pure 
textualism of post-structuralist thinkers like Derrida. Although incorporating a notion 
of contextuality of discourse and reality, it pays attention to both the discursive 
construction of political issues, as well as non-discursive practices that follow from it. 
It is post-structuralist in the sense that it trades in the deterministic for the dynamic, 
the overarching for the local and the objectifiable for the contextualized. However, 
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Foucauldian research is not ‘purely’ poststructuralist either, as it accepts the existence 
of an extra-discursive realm in the form of political, economic and social practices. 
When taking a bird’s eye view on the works of Foucault, it is possible to summarize 
them as a genealogy of the idea of what it has meant to ‘govern’ throughout history. 
In Security, Territory and Population, Foucault gives numerous examples of evolutions 
in ways of governing the environmental planning of cities, the fluctuations in grain 
prices etc. (Foucault 2007). What his elaborations boil down to is that the ‘art of 
government’ is an ever-expanding activity, constantly incorporating new issue areas 
as possible objects of governing. Therefore, governing not only becomes more 
complex, but what it means to govern also shifts from the classic idea of a 
Machiavellian ‘prince’, external and transcendent to his principality, to what Foucault 
calls ‘the art of government’. This is a far more subtle and complex form of governing 
which in essence introduces the notion of ‘the economy’ at state level (Foucault 2007).  
Etymologically speaking, economy in its original meaning comprises the governing of 
a household, or making sure that a household is properly managed and flourishes. 
Thus, the ‘art of government’ implies properly managing the state like a household. 
This entails an extensive supervision and control over inhabitants and ‘the conduct of 
all and each’ (ibid.). Government no longer means governing over a territory, but the 
art of governing “the complex of men and things” (Foucault 2007: 135). In this sense, 
the idea of governing a ‘population’ is highly important and comes to serve a lot of 
functions that allow for the art of government to prosper. For example, it serves as a 
framework in which people are expected to behave in a proper fashion, in order not 
be excluded from it. Thus, this attenuates the need for large-scale disciplining, and 
gives leeway to processes of individualization and self-government. 
However, this does not mean that this subtle art of government entirely replaces the 
‘old school’ techniques of sovereignty and discipline. Quite the contrary, they become 
more necessary than ever in order to effectively manage the population. Thus, the 
‘governmentalization of the state’ as Foucault calls it, is in fact an evolution from a 
Machiavellian notion of governing the territory through coercion and domination, to 
a complex interplay of “sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which 
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has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential 
mechanism” (Foucault 2007: 107-108).  
In the Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault comes closest to providing an overview of how this 
art of government plays out in contemporary times. In this work, he traces the art of 
government from the introduction of ‘political economy’ as a way of establishing the 
relation between the state and the market in the 19th century to the rise of neoliberalism 
after the Second World War. Indeed, after the Second World War, Foucault identifies 
the rise of a neoliberal governmentality – both in Europe (Germany and France) as well 
as in the United States. The European variant of this governmentality (first articulated 
by German ordo-liberals like Von Hayek) changed two things to the classic liberal 
governmentality: First of all, it no longer accepted the ‘natural’ functioning of the 
economy, instead perceiving capitalist functioning as a construct which can be altered 
by political intervention. Second, it inverted the relation between the state and the 
economy. Instead of a self-legitimized state granting space for the ‘naturalized’ 
economy to exist, the well-functioning of the economy became the main source of 
legitimization for the state to be allowed existence5. In other words, the existence of 
the state was only legitimate as it set out the social conditions which allowed the 
market to function properly, that is without reciting to anti-competitive tendencies 
(Lemke 2001; Foucault 2008).  
American neoliberalism – first conceptualized by the Chicago School – took this idea 
of the state only existing to serve the economy even further. In essence, it expanded 
the economic sphere into the social sphere, by re-defining the social in terms of 
economic principles. Rules that applied within economics became the blueprint of 
human action and even existence itself (Foucault 2008: 242; Lemke 2001). In line with 
the German ordo-liberals, American neoliberalism was also based on the idea that 
market functioning and competition were not natural states of being. Instead, these 
ideas were to be installed and maintained as political rationalities in the social sphere 
                                                          
5 This should be interpreted in the context of the West-German state after the Second World 
War. There was a dire need for a legitimization of German statehood which was in no way 




by political intervention (Hamann 2009). Therefore, governmental action was to be 
aimed at providing the legal and regulatory conditions for these economic principles 
to become the very foundation of individual practices and thought. 
Hence, we arrive at what is arguably the famous definition of governmentality as “the 
conduct of conduct” (e.g. Lemke 2001: 191). Linked to neoliberalism, this implies an 
inversion of the relation between the state and the market: instead of governing the 
social sphere in order for the economic sphere to flourish, principles of market 
functioning become expanded into the social sphere (Foucault 2008). Although many 
examples can be given on how market principles have influenced the course of 
individual conduct, Foucault himself provides the example of ‘human capital’ and the 
power effects it has on an individual level. Not only does it effectively reframe social 
policies in terms of ‘investments’ in human capital, it also labels individual actors as 
entrepreneurs of themselves and human conduct as a form of enterprise in charge of 
human capital (ibid.). This has far-reaching consequences: as individual and collective 
enterprise become the basic entities of societal functioning, success or failure also 
exclusively become a personal matter. Thus, this effectively depoliticizes all structural 
conditions within society that co-determine whether one succeeds in life or not.  
The fact that the man himself died over 30 years ago, leaves the task to new generations 
of researchers to re-interpret his work and apply it to new manifestations of ‘the art of 
governing’ in order for the idea of governmentality to remain relevant. Linking back 
to the quote in the beginning, some scholarly work tends to escape the cheese that is 
Foucault’s work rather quickly in this regard. In less metaphorical terms, they tend to 
only refer to Foucault’s insights on neoliberalism and thus blindly equate 
governmentality with it. As I will further explain in the articles using a 
governmentality perspective, the strength of governmentality as a tool for analysis lies 
precisely in the fact that it allows a researcher to immerse him/herself in a specific 
empirical setting and to uncover complex sets of power relations. Hence, 
governmentality is not only the idea of ‘the conduct of conduct’ or power operating 
through practices of freedom, but a concept referring to the complexity of power that 
lies contained within the art of governing. 
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3.2.2 Governmentality and the climate-development nexus 
Moving on to the climate-development nexus, the concept of governmentality is also 
highly relevant in this regard. Indeed, some studies inspired by post-structuralism 
have already used the concept in order to problematize some of the discursive 
constructions and policy practices related to international governance structures 
related to climate change in general (Stephan et al. 2013; Bäckstrand & Lovbrand 2006) 
and on climate mainstreaming in third policy domains in particular (Methmann 2010). 
Often, they refer to the term ‘green governmentality’ to signalize a way of governing 
nature and climate through what Methmann has dubbed a system of “planetary 
management” based on four pillars: globalism, scientism, growth ethics and efficiency 
(2010: 12-13). In other words, managing climate change is based on a technocratic 
approach in which nature becomes infrastructuralized and its value determined in 
terms of the resource outputs it can deliver (Luke, 1999). Therefore, instead of 
recognizing that nature encompasses economic production and capital, nature 
becomes a factor in capital itself and has to be managed in order to ensure that resource 
outputs are maintained (ibid.). This is pursued through large-scale scientific 
monitoring schemes that predict and mitigate climate risk and environmental 
degradation (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006; Luke 1999).  
Apart from this notion of ‘green governmentality’, some authors also identify 
discursive constructions and policy techniques rooted in neoliberalism. This 
introduction of advanced liberal government within international climate politics has 
been commonly labeled ‘ecological modernization’. In essence, it is based on the idea 
that capitalism is expected to modernize itself, evolving towards a climate-neutral 
state (Buttel 2000; Mol 1997). Governing climate change in ecological modernization is 
built around the creation of fictitious commodities, which cause nature to be reduced 
to an economic asset (ibid.). The most prominent examples in this regard are emission 
trading and the practice of carbon offsetting6.  
                                                          
6 Principle under which actors can compensate for their own emissions by investing in projects 
aimed at reducing emissions elsewhere (cf. Bellassen & Leguet 2007). 
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In sum, this section has introduced the two main theoretical perspectives that are used 
in this PhD in order to study the climate-development nexus within the EU. As an 
overarching contribution, the combination of both institutionalist and critical 
perspectives on the nexus can be considered unique and generates a holistic and multi-
layered account of adaptation as a development challenge in the context of the 
European Union. Furthermore, each of the articles also in itself fills a void in the 
existing literature. Empirically, this research for example contains an investigation into 
the workings of the Global Climate Change Alliance, an agency which has so far been 
understudied in the existing body of scholarly work. Theoretically, this dissertation 
does not only provide an added value in terms of the incorporated research results. 
The constructed analytical frameworks in paper 1 and 2 can be used for further 
research as well, and can therefore be seen as contributions to the literature in their 
own right. Having outlined the different theoretical perspectives and their place 
within the overall research dissertation, the final section is dedicated to outlining the 
methodology and methods that were used in order to employ these different 














4. Methods and methodology 
This fourth and final part of the introduction will be dedicated to reflecting on the 
methodological and epistemological choices made, as well as the main methods used 
in the course of this PhD project. For the sake of clarity, I conclude this part by 
providing a schematic overview of the different articles constituting this PhD 
dissertation, including their main theoretical approach, research questions, 
epistemological grounds and incorporated methods.  
4.1 Combining positivism and post-positivism 
On an overarching level, this entire PhD dissertation is based on qualitative 
methodologies. Yet, in terms of epistemology, the different papers reflect an evolution 
from positivism to post-positivism. In my application of institutionalist theory for 
studying adaptation mainstreaming in EU Delegations (cf. article 1), I depart from a 
positivist epistemology. In a nutshell, this research is implicitly based on a notion of 
an objective truth ‘out there’, which can be uncovered through scientific and empirical 
inquiry (Ali & Chowdury 2015). In my critical explorations of power effects rooted in 
the discursive constructions and policy arrangements surrounding the nexus within 
the EU, I was mainly inspired by a post-positivist epistemology. While positivism 
limits the role of scientific investigation to uncovering reality without questioning it, 
post-positivism stands for a form of science that is fundamentally reflective and 
problematizing. Moreover, it postulates a method of inquiry that is inherently 
normative: knowledge cannot be solely aimed at knowing for the sake of knowing, but 
must also serve a practical purpose aimed at human emancipation in circumstances of 
domination and oppression (Bohman 2005). The role of the researcher should therefore 
not be purely aimed at problem solving, but rather at asking how existing social or 
world orders have come into being, how norms, institutions or practices therefore 
emerge, and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform 
the prevailing order (Bieler & Morton 2004: 86).  
This evolution toward post-positivism also implies an evolution in methodology from 
positivist to interpretivist qualitative research. Article 1 is firmly based on a positivist 
form of qualitative methodology: an analytical framework is constructed based on 
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existing theoretical insights regarding CPI in development cooperation, which is then 
empirically tested in order to come to generalizable statements about the reality of 
mainstreaming adaptation. In contrast, the interpretivist application of qualitative 
research does not start from the assumption that objective data can be obtained and 
generalized to make claims about larger populations. It does not seek to find objective 
truth, but rather aims at untangling patterns of subjective understanding (Roth & 
Metha 2002: 132). Moreover, researchers are not perceived to be neutral actors in 
relation to this kind of empirical inquiry. They are driven by certain assumptions, by 
a certain theory, which in its turn influences their research and findings (Mir & Watson 
2000). In metaphorical terms, knowledge is not excavated based on gathering data 
representing an objective reality, but sculptured by the interaction between the 
theoretical presumptions and the empirical findings (ibid.: 943). Validity of findings in 
this regard is not based on the potential for generalization or the replicability of the 
empirical findings, but on the consistency and coherence of the empirical description 
(Roth & Metha 2002). This interpretative methodology is the common reference point 
for both article 2 and 3, while the theoretical assumptions behind this interpretation 
exercise differ between a more general critical perspective on the nexus in article 2 and 
a governmentality perspective on the nexus in article 3.  
Finally, article 2 is based on the method of critical frame analysis. In essence, this 
method is aimed at discovering how a certain form of communication through text 
exerts power. The focus lays on the construction of ‘frames’ or particular discursive 
constructions that determine what is relevant or irrelevant regarding a specific issue 
or subject (ibid.). Frames determine the boundaries within which an issue is perceived 
by the audience, whether something is considered problematic and on what account, 
and what range of possible policy solutions are ought to be considered to serve as a 
response to this problem definition (Entman 1993). Hence, looking for such frames in 
documents requires a careful inquiry into the nuts and bolts of a certain text. In relation 
to the other approaches constituting this dissertation, the application of critical frame 
analysis can be considered as occupying the middle-ground between positivist and 
post-positivist epistemology. Although it is based on the social-constructivist premise 
that discursive constructions are constitutive to reality, it is still based on a positivist 
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methodology. Within the article, I depart from an analytical framework of three 
possible frames to be identified, and then look for the manifestation of these frames in 
EU discourse. Hence, linking back to the analogy made before, this application of 
critical frame analysis is still very much based on a notion of excavating knowledge, 
rather than sculpturing it.  
In retrospect, the combination of positivist and interpretative methodology bears a 
number of strengths, despite the fact that they are often portrayed as incompatible due 
to their different ontological and epistemological basis. The way in which this 
combination is described by Roth & Metha (2002: 137), perfectly sums up my own 
stance towards this pragmatic combination of these different positions: 
“Compatibility can be found between positivism and […] interpretivism, which 
focuses on why and how individuals come to understand events as they do, yet 
recognizes that those understandings may be influenced by an objective reality 
that, while difficult to discern, is potentially knowable. Under this framework, it is 
possible to simultaneously accept that there is both a single objective truth of 
factual events and multiple subjective views of the truth that reveal much about 
the worldviews and perspectives of those who hold them.”  
Hence, instead of being incompatible, the combination of positivist and interpretive 
approaches in this dissertation should be perceived as two sides of the same coin. On 
the one hand, the institutionalist approach in article 1 meticulously sketches the reality 
of the climate-development nexus within the EU by uncovering the modus operandi 
for mainstreaming climate change adaptation in EU development assistance. Article 2 
and 3 then build on this knowledge and add to it by engaging with the subjective 
understanding of the nexus: what does the particular constellation of discourse and 
policy measures tell us about how adaptation is perceived as a development challenge 
within the EU? And more importantly, what does this reflect in terms of power 
relations vis-à-vis EU partner countries. In sum, combining the two approaches allows 




I realize that, despite making this theoretical case for combining positivist and post-
positivist epistemology, it is still possible to point out the ontological inconsistencies 
of this approach. Hence, I would like to end this section by expressing my strong belief 
in such a pragmatic combination of seemingly incompatible perspectives in research, 
rather than dismissing their combined use for the sake of ontological consistency. 
Especially the use of post-structuralist inspired concepts like governmentality seems 
to automatically generate questions on one’s stance regarding the nature of reality and 
its implications for research. I deliberately chose not to lose myself in these debates, 
because they divert energy and attention away from what actually matters, being the 
research itself. In my view, the primary yardstick for evaluating the combination of 
such approaches should be whether they can bring new and innovative research 
insights to the table. Since this particular constellation of research proved to be an 
effective way for me to arrive at what I am fully convinced are innovative insights, I 
am confident that this approach was the right one.  
4.2 Methods and case-selection 
In terms of methods, article 1 (institutionalism) and article 3 (governmentality) both 
rely on a combination of document analysis and semi-structured interviews, although 
based on different epistemological grounds. First of all, semi-structured interviewing 
is a specific form of inquiry that stands in between structured and unstructured 
interview techniques. Semi-structured interviews are structured in the sense that it is 
based on a corpus of key questions that determine the course of the conversation. Yet, 
at the same time, this method of inquiry is flexible enough to allow for both the 
interviewer and the interviewee “to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in 
more detail” (Gill et al. 2008: 291). This is a major advantage, as it allows for new and 
insightful data to pop up without having previously been considered by the 
interviewer. Moreover, semi-structured interviewing is also more lenient towards 
probing techniques by the interviewer in order to obtain more information or 
additional clarification of certain answers (Barriball & While 1994). This flexibility 
during the course of the interview could invoke new and interesting insights that 
would not come up during structured interviewing, while also still maintaining a clear 
pathway that guides the interviewee along the different themes to be covered.  
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In total, 16 interviews were conducted in the course of this PhD project, both at 
headquarters level as well as in EU delegations in nine Sub-Saharan African countries. 
At headquarters (article 1 and 3), interviewees were active within DG DEVCO, DG 
CLIMA and the EEAS. Respondents were generally selected based on their affiliation 
to relevant thematic units, as well as through snowball sampling. Possibly interesting 
respondents were contacted via email, while most of the interviews themselves were 
conducted face-to-face. In case a face-to-face interview was impossible (due to the 
respondent not being in the country or to difficulties with finding a right moment for 
an appointment), interviews were conducted via telephone.  
For article 1, interviews were also conducted with policy officials in EU delegations in 
nine different Sub-Saharan African countries7. My particular focus on Sub-Saharan 
African countries can be explained by its peculiar development context. Not only can 
the region be considered among the most climate-vulnerable in the world, countries 
here also represent the most complex constellations of development challenges in the 
Global South. Problems of environmental degradation and climate vulnerability 
strongly overlap with socio-economic challenges related to economic production, 
inequality and governance (see for example Davidson et al. 2003). Hence, this makes 
the task of properly mainstreaming climate change in aid activities and pursuing a 
transformative approach in this regard all the more necessary and challenging. In 
terms of the mutual comparability of the nine selected country cases, the individual 
country contexts were far less important than the comparability of the EU’s role as a 
development actor in each of these countries. In this sense, all nine countries are very 
much comparable, as the EU can be considered an important donor in each of them. 
Within EU delegations, respondents were selected based on their function within the 
agency and their expected knowledge of the mainstreaming process. As such, I mainly 
targeted Heads of Section active in sustainable development, sustainable agriculture, 
rural development and food security. This information was retrieved from 
organizational charts to be found on delegation websites. Targeted officials were 
subsequently emailed in order to invite them for an interview via telephone or Skype. 
                                                          
7 Ghana, Niger, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Zambia, Uganda and Chad. 
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In case of non-response, a reminder email was sent after a week, and then again after 
two weeks. When receiving no answer after two reminder emails, officials were 
dropped from the list of potential interviewees. In some cases, this information could 
not be retrieved from the delegation website (e.g. when an organizational chart was 
absent or did not include names and contact details). If this was the case, an email was 
sent to a general contact email address from the delegation or to the Head of 
Cooperation, asking for contact details of the most relevant official within their 
respective delegation.  
In the end, 9 out of 16 targeted delegations were included in this research8. Hence, 7 
delegations9 were not included for several reasons: a non-response after two reminder 
emails, technical difficulties when establishing a Skype/telephone call and a 
subsequent inability or unwillingness by the respondent to reschedule, a 
postponement due to agenda conflicts which were then not respected etc. Even when 
interview appointments were confirmed, it was still relatively easy for respondents to 
call it off. In retrospect, this was the main disadvantage of choosing to conduct 
interviews via Skype and telephone. However, I am confident that, in the end, the 
conducted interviews were sufficient in order to get a good overview of 
mainstreaming efforts in EU delegations. For one, many respondents were 
surprisingly open and often voiced roughly the same issues in their respective 
mainstreaming efforts, which in the end provided me with a good sense of the 
differences between the EU mainstreaming rationale as described in policy documents 
and as implemented on the ground. Moreover, all interviewees were well-informed 
regarding the mainstreaming initiatives taken within their respective delegation, even 
outside of their own sectoral activities. In general, they also considered themselves to 
be the central focal point for climate change. Hence, it is safe to say that this selection 
procedure was effective for me in order to get the information I needed, and that data 
saturation was reached in the end.  
                                                          
8 Important to note is that two interviews were conducted face-to-face in the EU delegation 
in Ghana by Sarah Delputte during a field research stay in 2015.  
9 Liberia, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, the DRC, Rwanda, Swaziland, Kenya.  
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At the start of the interview, respondents were always informed about the topic of my 
PhD and the confidentiality of the gathered data. Moreover, they were always asked 
permission to record the interview, which they refused in a few cases. In case the 
interview was recorded, the audio was fully transcribed and then coded using NVivo 
software. In case recording was not allowed, a schematic representation of the 
interview was made during and after the conversation, which was then also used for 
coding purposes in NVivo. The software was used for both interview data as well as 
for document analysis, thus allowing me to bring structure and expose recurring 
patterns in the general pool of data.  
Switching to document analysis, although this is often perceived as an ‘additional’ 
research method in order to acquire background information or some historical 
insight, it can also be seen as much more than that. They are a rich source of data in 
themselves, able to give a researcher a better view on technicalities in their specific 
field of expertise, as well as giving a broad overview of changes and developments in 
this regard (Bowen 2009). In combination with interviews, they can be considered a 
source for triangulating data of respondents in various forms. Among others, they can 
serve as a way of generating new interview questions, cross-checking some of the 
claims made by interviewees, as well as filling in some of the specifics that respondents 
might not be able to recollect during the course of an interview (ibid.). Thus, especially 
in triangulation with other research methods, document analysis can prove to be a real 
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Abstract 
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of mainstreaming efforts 
regarding climate change adaptation (CCA) in EU development cooperation. By 
constructing and operationalising an analytical framework capable of tracing the 
level of mainstreaming throughout different phases of the policy cycle, we provide 
an answer to the question ‘what works and what doesn’t’ in the integration of 
climate change in development cooperation. We combine a document analysis 
with semi-structured expert interviews, encompassing both HQ level in Brussels 
as well as EU aid activities in nine different developing countries. Our findings 
indicate that the Commission envisions a harmonisation approach towards CCA 
mainstreaming, targeting aid activities related to sustainable agriculture, food 
security and rural development. Although the toolbox for mainstreaming allows 
for a prioritisation of CCA, the procedural approach is currently ineffective due to 
limited staff and mainstreaming fatigue. In contrast, the growing political salience 
of CCA mainstreaming can be considered the main driver of mainstreaming efforts 
in the Commission.  
Keywords: Climate change adaptation; environmental policy integration; 

















Aid donors increasingly perceive climate change adaptation (CCA) and development 
cooperation as a two-way street: CCA demands ‘climate proofing’ of development 
activities to ensure their sustainability, while aid can also strengthen partner countries’ 
resilience to climate change (Gupta 2009). As a leading international donor, also the 
European Union (EU) has acknowledged the need to ‘mainstream’ climate change into 
its bilateral aid policies in its guiding documents on international cooperation 
(European Union 2006; 2011; 2017). 
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of CCA mainstreaming within 
EU development cooperation for the current policy cycle (2014-2020). For this purpose 
we operationalise an analytical framework that traces the level of mainstreaming in 
different policy phases. Despite the growing literature on environmental policy 
integration (EPI) and climate policy integration (CPI) (Lafferty & Hovden 2003; Adelle 
& Russel 2013), empirical evidence regarding their implementation and influencing 
factors remains scarce (Persson et al. this issue). There is thus a need for taking stock 
of what is already being done under the banner of EPI, by evaluating its performance 
in different contexts. Such efforts can lead us to generalizable knowledge on effective 
EPI strategies (ibid.; Nilsson & Persson 2017). Second, we aim to contribute to the EU 
foreign policy literature. Despite the EU’s image as the world’s largest development 
donor and international climate leader, the inclusion of climate concerns in EU 
external relations is still largely uncharted territory (notwithstanding notable 
exceptions: Peskett et al. 2009; Gupta & van der Grijp 2010). 
We will start by constructing an analytical framework that distinguishes between four 
phases of the policy cycle: agenda-setting, the policy process, policy output phase and 
implementation. Within every phase, we will further differentiate between three 
‘levels’ of mainstreaming: coordination, harmonisation and prioritisation. This allows 
examining how and to what extent the cross-cutting issue of CCA mainstreaming is 
being translated from a general policy commitment to a concrete issue in EU 




In analysing the policy cycle, we first examine how CCA is represented in some of the 
main EU development policy documents. Subsequently, we provide an overview of 
the mainstreaming ‘toolbox’ designed by Commission agencies, being the Directorate-
Generals for Development Cooperation (DEVCO) and Climate Action (CLIMA). This 
is combined with an inquiry into mainstreaming within EU aid activities in nine 
developing countries: Ghana, Niger, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Zambia, 
Uganda and Chad. We identify typical cases for the sake of generating a representative 
image of mainstreaming efforts. For every country, an analysis is made of the 
programming and implementation documents of EU aid: National Indicative 
Programmes (NIPs) and Annual Action Programmes (AAPs). In addition, 12 semi-
structured expert interviews with EU officials were conducted, both at headquarter 
level in Brussels as well as within EU delegations10 in all selected countries. 
Our analysis is followed by a discussion linking back to the broader EPI/CPI literature, 
followed by a number of policy-relevant recommendations. We conclude by providing 
some potential paths for further research. 
2. Analytical framework 
Literature on mainstreaming climate change in development has expanded in recent 
years (cf. Klein et al. 2007; Lauer & Eguavoen 2016). Overall, existing work strongly 
focuses on incorporating climate adaptation in development cooperation. Whereas 
mitigation measures are mostly confined to specific sectoral aid activities like energy 
infrastructure, adaptation relates to reducing the vulnerability to adverse climate 
change impacts, implying a broad spectrum of affected sectors and policy responses 
(Huq & Reid 2004). Thus, linkages between CCA and activities of donors are plentiful 
and development cooperation has a distinct role to play in increasing the adaptive 
capacity of societies within the Global South, targeting the underlying drivers of 
climate vulnerability (Klein et al. 2007).  
Existing literature can be situated in the broader body of work on environmental 
policy integration (EPI) and climate policy integration (CPI). EPI is considered to be 
                                                          





an indispensable part of sustainable development, and is generally defined as the act 
of “incorporating environmental concerns in sectoral policies outside the traditional 
environmental policy domain” (Runhaar, Driessen & Uittenbroek 2014: 233). This 
paper will focus on CPI, which emerged as a specific form of EPI because of the 
growing international attention towards climate change (Adelle & Russel 2013).  
The literature is less straightforward on conceptual delineations of the terms 
‘integration’ and ‘mainstreaming’. Some ascribe the difference in terminology to 
merely differences in context. Yamin (as cited in Adelle & Russel 2013: 3) argues that 
the term ‘climate mainstreaming’ simply resonates more within development studies, 
as it lines up with other topics like mainstreaming gender and disaster risk reduction. 
In contrast, Gupta (2010: 79) does make a conceptual distinction, arguing that 
mainstreaming implies climate change “becoming the overriding objective” and that 
there is a proactive engagement with the issue. In contrast, ‘integration’ according to 
her refers to a more reactive approach, in which climate change is being taken into 
account as an “add-on, end of pipe solution”. This links back to a similar typology 
within the EPI literature: according to Lafferty & Hovden (2003), EPI can be separated 
from conventional notions of policy integration, because EPI ideally implies 
environmental objectives to be given ‘principled priority’, thus installing 
environmental objectives as overarching priorities in other policy domains (ibid.). In 
sum, the typologies of both Gupta and Lafferty & Hovden differentiate between 
‘weak’ policy integration – a reactive, add-on approach to integrating CCA in 
development – and principled priority or mainstreaming – when CCA becomes the 
overriding objective in development cooperation.  
More specifically, we will distinguish between four levels of policy integration: no 
integration, coordination (removing contradictions between policies), harmonisation 
(realising synergies between policies), and prioritisation (favouring CCA-related 
objectives) (Lafferty & Hovden 2003; Persson et al. this issue). While ‘coordination’ and 
harmonisation’ can be placed under the banner of ‘weak’ policy integration, 




Within this paper, we aim to provide a comprehensive oversight of CCA 
mainstreaming efforts within EU development cooperation, by tracing it through 
various phases of the policy cycle. Already in 2006, the European Court of Auditors 
hinted at an implementation gap regarding climate mainstreaming in EU aid activities. 
This is a recurring observation within the existing literature: despite growing attention 
for climate change within the development community, mainstreaming commitments 
often do not result in adequate changes in policy practices (cf. Lauer & Eguavoen 2016). 
Somewhere along the line, the normative mainstreaming commitment thus becomes 
diluted and fails to materialise in development projects. However, no efforts have been 
undertaken to look into the persistence of this implementation gap within EU aid 
activities over the years. This study wants to fill the void by looking at mainstreaming 
efforts within the current aid cycle (2014-2020).  
Such an inquiry also creates added value within the broader EPI/CPI literature. As 
Persson et al argue in this special issue, research increasingly moves beyond 
conceptual studies into the empirical realm, by taking stock of what is being done 
under the EPI/CPI banner and to answer the question “what works where, when and 
how?” (Persson et al. this issue: 113). Answering this question requires a detailed 
knowledge of the initial normative commitment to mainstreaming, the institutional 
setup, the available policy tools and their usage among policy makers. Thus, tracing 
mainstreaming efforts throughout the policy cycle is the best approach to find out 
what can be considered ‘effective’ policy interventions and to identify possible glitches 
in this regard.  
We will focus on four different phases of the policy cycle (based on Persson et al. this 
issue): 
1. Agenda-setting: to what extent is the initial need for mainstreaming articulated?  
2. Policy process: what are the administrative routines and procedures available 
to facilitate mainstreaming?  





4. Policy implementation: To what extent are CCA-objectives included in the 
project design?  
Thus, linking our policy cycle-based approach to our distinction between four ‘levels’ 
of CCA mainstreaming, our analytical framework allows us to track the level of CCA 
mainstreaming in each of the four phases of the policy cycle.  
Table 2: CCA mainstreaming in different phases of the policy cycle 
Level of integration  
No 
integration 
‘Weak’ integration Principled 
priority 



















Of course, mainstreaming CCA in other policy domains is a complex endeavor and is 
bound to face difficulties. According to Uittenbroek et al. (2013), the mainstreaming 
process should be perceived as fundamentally dynamic, with its scope being 
constantly reconsidered due to new opportunities and/or barriers. Examples of such 
influencing factors are the availability of information and financial resources, the 
organisational and institutional setup for mainstreaming, and social and cultural 
differences resulting from differences in worldviews between groups (Adger et al. as 
cited in Uittenbroek et al. 2013; Moser & Ekstrom 2010). After tracking CCA 
mainstreaming in the different policy phases, we will discuss the influence of such 








3. Methods and operationalisation 
First of all, we will operationalise the level of CCA mainstreaming by examining its 
framing in different stages of the policy cycle. Coordination will be operationalised as 
representing mainstreaming as an add-on component in aid activities. Put simply, 
CCA could just be incidentally mentioned in EU policy documents, without 
considering its influence on development activities. At best, coordination implies 
mainstreaming CCA in terms of end-of-pipe solutions, focused at mitigating the 
potentially negative impact of aid activities (Runhaar, Driessen & Soer 2009). 
Harmonisation implies that CCA is on equal terms with development activities in 
different phases of the policy cycle. Thus, mainstreaming would be framed as the need 
to find synergies between both. In the policy output- and implementation phase, 
harmonisation would be apparent if CCA is clearly interlinked with the projected aid 
activities, including references to how it affects the focal sector in question and how it 
can be addressed through planned interventions. Finally, prioritisation implies that 
the development rationale of the Commission is reframed in light of CCA (Gupta 
2010). In later phases of the policy cycle, CCA would become the central reference 
point for designing sectoral intervention priorities and development projects. A full 
operationalisation per phase in the policy cycle can be found in Table 3.  
In order to track CCA mainstreaming in different phases of the policy cycle, different 
data will be examined. Within the agenda-setting phase, we analyze how the 
Commission makes the case for CCA mainstreaming, by assessing the inclusion of the 
issue in the main policy documents underpinning EU development assistance, 
complemented with targeted expert interviews within the European Commission’s 
DG DEVCO and DG CLIMA. For the policy process phase, we provide an overview of 
the available mainstreaming tools and look specifically at their usage by practitioners 
in the field. In order to map out this toolbox, we consulted the Commission guidelines 
for environmental- and climate mainstreaming, while again adding data from targeted 
expert interviews. Its actual use was assessed through semi-structured interviews with 




Within the policy output phase, we examine the integration of CCA in the multi-
annual policy frameworks for each of the nine countries (NIPs). These illustrate EU 
development priorities, disseminated per focal sector. Finally, within the policy 
implementation phase, we investigate CCA mainstreaming within the design of 
concrete development projects, reflected in AAPs11 12, once again complemented with 
data from interviews with climate focal persons in delegations.  
Our research can be considered explorative in nature, aimed at investigating 
representative cases for EU mainstreaming efforts as a whole. Therefore, our case 
selection strategy is based on a typical case design (Seawright & Gerring 2008). The 
nine selected countries constitute typical examples of EU development efforts in which 
CCA should be mainstreamed: all are vulnerable to the effects of climate change and 





                                                          
11 All consulted National Indicative Programmes and AAPs were extracted from the 
EuropeAid website: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-
programming/nipspins_en 
12 Our operationalisation of the implementation phase thus only includes an assessment of 









Weak integration Principled priority  
Consulted Data 




- No mentioning of 
CCA 
mainstreaming 
- CCA mainstreaming 
framed in guiding 
policy documents as 
add-on component in 
aid activities.  
 
- Focus on promoting 
end-of-pipe measures.  
- CCA mainstreaming framed 
in guiding policy documents 
as standing on equal terms 
with aid activities.  
 
- Focus on finding win-win 
solutions between aid 
activities and CCA-
measures.  
- CCA mainstreaming framed in 
guiding policy documents as 
absolute priority within aid 
activities.  
 
- Focus on installing CCA as 
overriding objective for aid 
practitioners.  
- Guiding policy documents  
- Expert interviews within 








- Mainstreaming tools 
intended and used for 
climate proofing 
sectoral aid activities 
(e.g. EIAs).  
- Mainstreaming tools 
intended and used for 
finding synergies between 
sectoral aid activities and 
CCA.  
- Mainstreaming tools intended 
and used for redesigning 
sectoral aid activities in order 
to prioritise CCA (e.g. 
environmental profiles).  
- EU Guidelines 
- Expert interviews within 
DG CLIMA and DG DEVCO 









- CCA mainstreaming in 
outlining of sectoral 
activities limited to 
incidental mentioning. 
Not interlinked with 
sectoral policy 
priorities.  
- Clear image of how CCA 
affects sectoral activities 
and/or how sectoral 
activities can improve 
climate resilience.  
- CCA as central priority along 
which sectoral activities are 
structured.  
- NIPs 





- No CCA 
mainstreaming in 
project designs  
- CCA mainstreaming in 




project designs.  
- Clear image of how CCA 
affects the project design 
and/or how project can 
improve climate resilience. 
- CCA as central priority along 
which project design is 
structured.  
- AAPs 





4. CCA mainstreaming in the 2014-2020 cycle 
4.1 Agenda setting 
The 2014-2020 policy cycle was initiated in an international setting that increasingly 
emphasised the importance of sustainability within development assistance. Yet, the 
baseline documents that shape the agenda setting predate this dynamic. The European 
Consensus (2006) confirms EU commitments to combat climate change through 
development assistance, while CCA mainstreaming is framed as a central component 
in the support to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing 
States (SIDs) (European Commission 2006: 37). While this centrality already shows a 
high level of salience for integrating CCA in aid activities, it also becomes clear that 
this policy discourse still is in in its infancy, with no clear elaborations on how the issue 
affects EU development efforts. Thus, CCA integration here can still be perceived as 
merely ‘coordinative’, as the importance of centralising CCA in aid activities is 
mentioned without outlining a clear vision on how to pursue this. 
The Agenda for Change (2011) also displays a high level of attention towards CCA, 
with a more elaborate vision on mainstreaming. Sectoral aid activities within 
sustainable agriculture and energy are linked to improving climate resilience in 
partner countries, by promoting capacity building and technology transfers (European 
Commission 2011). This focus was clearly incorporated in the instruction notes sent to 
EU delegations prior to the formulation of the new NIPs (2012). Within these notes, 
CCA was again linked to a range of specific focal sectors like sustainable agriculture, 
fisheries and food security. Moreover, these sectors were (among others) to be 
prioritised in the choice of new aid priorities by EU delegations. Also included in the 
instruction note was a reference to the agreement to make 20% of the spending under 
the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework climate compatible (European 
Commission 2013). This norm is applicable to all policy domains, and thus has also 
become a general benchmark in EU development cooperation (Interview 1). It serves 
as an extra incentive for EU delegations to adopt the vision outlined in the Agenda for 




Thus, the agenda-setting prior to the programming of the 2014-2020 aid cycle shows 
clear signs of harmonising CCA within EU development assistance. In contrast to the 
2006 Consensus on Development, the Agenda for Change outlined a clear vision on 
how a win-win relationship between CCA and aid activities can be established and 
which sectoral aid activities could specifically benefit the overall climate resilience 
within partner countries. This vision was clearly communicated to EU delegations and 
further strengthened by introducing the 20% norm for climate compatible financing.  
4.2 Policy process 
The programming process initiating a new aid cycle is led by EU delegations within 
partner countries. They are responsible for submitting a NIP-proposal to the relevant 
geographical desk officers at DG DEVCO and the External Action Service (EEAS). It 
contains a first outline of the EU’s development priorities for the new aid cycle, 
structured along a series of focal sectors. These priorities are identified based on 
consultations with governmental agencies and non-governmental stakeholders.  
The Commission has created policy tools in order to assist delegations in 
mainstreaming environmental objectives – among which CCA – in this initial outlining 
of development priorities. These guidelines for example recommend delegations to 
create a country environmental profile. These should contain an analysis of the 
country’s key climate-related challenges and serve as blueprint for the inclusion of 
CCA in the NIP and concrete projects (European Commission 2016).  
The Commission also created sector scripts for “providing practical guidance on the 
link between climate change and specific sectors” (European Commission 2009: 2). For 
CCA specifically, the sector scripts are intended to play a role in “applying a climate 
change lens to specific policies and planned interventions in order to avoid 
maladaptation” (ibid.: 8) and thus propose entry points for climate change in a wide 
range of focal sectors13. This should in the end culminate in a multi-sectoral 
                                                          
13 The sectors with specific mainstreaming scripts include agriculture and rural development, 
biodiversity, education, energy, health, infrastructure and transport, waste management, 




mainstreaming effort, aimed at enhancing societal adaptive capacity through aid 
activities.  
But are these procedural tools actually used in practice? The presence of a country 
environmental profile is quite rare, and if a delegation does have such a profile at its 
disposal, it is usually outdated to the point of being irrelevant (Interview 5; 6; 7; 11). In 
other cases, the availability of a country-owned environmental analysis made a CEP 
obsolete (Interview 8; 10). Yet, sometimes such analyses within the partner country are 
also grossly outdated (Interview 6). In addition, our analysis of CCA mainstreaming 
in different NIPs reveals that sector scripts are not being used to their full extent in 
order to redesign sectoral activities.  
Procedural tools related to coordination are environmental impact assessments (EIAs) 
and climate risk assessments. Their purpose is to assess the climate impact or to look 
at the effect of climate change on the programme/project. Screening exercises should 
be carried out to see whether such assessments are necessary and whether they have 
already been conducted by another actor. However, also for these procedures, 
examples are scarce and perceived added value is low. In most cases, they are not 
deemed beneficial for mainstreaming, but as “just another requirement” (Interview 
11). 
We can thus conclude that the Commission provides tools that – if fully implemented 
– could instigate the prioritisation of CCA in aid activities: country environmental 
profiles and sector scripts can inform EU delegations early on in the design of new aid 
priorities how climate change could be mainstreamed and how these activities could 
enhance the adaptive capacity of partner countries. In other words, they could invoke 
policy makers to use a ‘climate-lens’ to define their priorities for a broad spectrum of 
potential focal sectors. However, their actual use in practice is low, as can be said for 
procedures linked to coordination (e.g. EIAs). Although impact assessments are often 
only a legal requirement for infrastructure projects, we find that they are not perceived 
to be a real added value for mainstreaming. Regarding the climate risk assessments, 




This discrepancy between the objectives of the mainstreaming toolbox and its actual 
usage has to be perceived in light of a lack of human resources in many EU delegations. 
Officials frequently voiced a need ‘to prioritise’ in the context of such constraints, and 
are thus more preoccupied with general issues (e.g. maintaining a good relation and 
dialogue with the partner country) rather than specific checklists and procedures 
(Interview 9). Thus, the technicality and workload that these procedures imply, tends 
to undermine their use. 
4.3 Policy outcome 
Our findings from the previous phases of the policy cycle are confirmed in the choice 
of focal sectors in the final versions of the NIPs: all NIPs include one or two focal 
sectors that fall under the scope of CCA-relevant sectors as intended by the 
Commission. According to Herrero, Galeazzi & Krätke (2013), this applies to the whole 
of EU bilateral aid programming. This implies that the harmonisation effort in the 
agenda-setting phase bears fruit, as delegations pick up on this increased salience of 
CCA, something that was also apparent throughout our interviews. Regarding 
sustainable agriculture and food security, the discourse used within NIPs echoes the 
argumentation for CCA mainstreaming in the agenda-setting phase: activity in these 
sectors is perceived beneficial for improving climate resilience and adaptation capacity 
for local populations. Yet, evidence of prioritising CCA is much more scarce, as the 
main priority within these sectors remains the increase of agricultural output and 
economic growth. The evidence provided in the appendix shows that CCA measures 
are mostly framed as one of the preconditions for this to succeed, but are almost never 
the main priority of sectoral interventions.  
In focal sectors that are not linked to CCA mainstreaming in the agenda-setting phase 
but covered by the Commissions’ sector scripts (e.g. governance and educational 
support), our research shows more variation in CCA inclusion. These range from 
harmonisation to no CCA-reference at all. In some sectors, only a coordinative effort 
can be distinguished: introducing a standard sentence in which mainstreaming is 
ensured through impact assessments in accordance with EU guidelines. As explained 




question, and it might be the case that a standard sentence is added in order to what 
one respondent called “keeping Brussels happy” (referring to DEVCO) (Interview 4). 
Moreover, clear views of how climate change affects these sectors and what 
interventions would be feasible in this regard are often lacking. 
4.4 Implementation phase 
Our analysis of Annual Action Programmes (cf. table 5 in Appendix A) once again 
indicates that CCA mainstreaming is most likely to be upheld in projects situated 
within focal sectors related to agriculture and rural development. In other words, the 
level of CCA mainstreaming is most likely to remain ‘stable’ between the design and 
implementation phases in these sectors. Climate change is almost standardly included 
in such projects as a factor that could undermine sectoral activities. Therefore, projects 
almost always include a component that specifically targets resilience building or the 
introduction of climate-smart technologies. In other focal sectors, evidence suggests 
that mainstreaming efforts have an increased chance of becoming diluted in the 
formulation phase (e.g. projects within secondary education sector in Malawi, within 
the good governance sector in Uganda, and within the energy sector in Zambia). 
5. Discussion and policy relevance  
Several notable insights can be drawn from our analysis. First, the Commission 
harmonises CCA in EU aid activities by emphasising the link between aid activities 
related to sustainable agriculture, rural development, food security and climate 
resilience in partner countries. This win-win approach is incorporated in the Agenda 
for Change and the instruction notes sent to EU delegations in the early stages of the 
policy cycle. This harmonisation dynamic is generally upheld throughout the different 
policy phases. Indeed, the nine selected EU delegations all include these focal sectors 
in their aid activities and structure their intervention logic based on the link between 
these sectoral activities and climate resilience.  
Interestingly, the Commission goes beyond this harmonisation effort in the procedural 
phase: we described an elaborate toolbox to take mainstreaming the extra mile. The 
use of a country environmental profile could trigger a broader redefinition of aid 




which could lead to the prioritisation of CCA. The same goes for sector scripts, which 
envisage a broader mainstreaming effort than apparent in the agenda-setting phase. 
However, these tools are far less effective than they should be. Together with other 
procedures like EIAs and climate risk assessments, their use and perceived added 
value can be described as low or even non-existent. 
This leads us to a first answer on the question ‘what works’ in the EPI/CPI literature 
(Persson et al. this issue): procedural tools do not seem to be of particular importance 
for current mainstreaming efforts. The question then remains what drives this high 
level of mainstreaming. The most suitable explanation is that the political will to 
mainstream CCA is high within the Commission and seems to be growing still. The 
normative commitment towards CCA mainstreaming was clearly incorporated in the 
agenda-setting, despite the fact that the guiding documents predate the 2030 agenda 
for sustainable development. The renewed Consensus for Development (2017) further 
confirms that the attention towards CCA mainstreaming is still growing: a lot of 
emphasis is put on linking the Paris Agreement on climate change with the Sustainable 
Development Goals, and to “maximise synergies” between these two global agendas 
(European Union 2017: 20). This tightening link between the Paris Agreement and the 
SDG agenda seems promising in light of mainstreaming CCA, and could further boost 
the impetus within delegations for prioritising the issue in their aid activities.  
The EU also actively pursues diplomatic relations with third countries in the context 
of the international climate negotiations. These ‘green diplomacy’ efforts are 
coordinated by the EEAS and implemented by EU delegations and member state 
embassies, which engage in dialogue with partner countries, organising outreach 
events etc. These diplomatic efforts also positively influence development 
cooperation: the EU reinforced its dialogue with African countries in order to assist 
them in formulating their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions14, which 
also led to a better knowledge of its impacts in different development sectors 
(Interview 6, 7, 8, 11). In the future, NDCs could serve as a bridge between both 
                                                          
14 INDCs outlined the commitment regarding climate action of a country in the run up to 
COP21 in Paris. As soon as a country ratifies the Paris Agreement, it formally commits to its 




international regimes if they are embedded in national development plans and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (GCCA+ 2016: 7). This could drastically improve the 
knowledge of CCA effects within EU delegations, and could be a promising alternative 
for the environmental profiles, which are irrelevant in current mainstreaming efforts. 
Linking back to the CPI/EPI literature (cf. Persson 2008), the normative approach – 
articulating the political will for mainstreaming through high level policy 
commitments and the reallocation of resources – thus can be considered an important 
driver of current mainstreaming efforts. This compensates for the ineffectiveness of 
the procedural approach. Respondents frequently pointed at institutional and 
organizational barriers for explaining this ineffectiveness: delegations often need to 
operate in a context of constraints in terms of staff and expertise, while the oversupply 
in procedural requirements generates competition between different tasks and 
thematic issues within delegations, and adds to a sense of mainstreaming ‘fatigue’ 
(Interview 8; 11).  
Yet, additional barriers – although not as explicit – can be identified on the delegation 
level. In terms of expertise for example, every delegation currently has a climate focal 
point at its disposal. Officials functioning as ‘climate focal persons’ generally also hold 
sectoral responsibilities related to agriculture and food security. This again adds up 
with the high level of mainstreaming in these focal sectors in different delegations. 
These focal persons can also play an important role in facilitating climate-awareness 
within these settings. Yet, some respondents explicitly stated that climate change was 
a non-issue in their delegation before their arrival (Interview 4, 8). This indicates the 
existence of cognitive barriers – related to normative convictions and values among 
policy makers – outside of these focal points. In other words, policy officials outside 
of these focal points may be less convinced of the need for CCA mainstreaming, which 
could also explain why a ‘broader’ mainstreaming effort – in a wider range of focal 
sectors – has not yet materialized.  
Currently, technical and financial assistance for delegations is provided through the 
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA+). However, its impact remains limited, with 




ranged from receiving actual coaching and expertise (Interview 7) to more ‘shallow’ 
relationships based on annual reporting of projects (Interview 12) or financial support 
(Interview 9). Although the GCCA+ is a promising for becoming a ‘hub’ for expertise 
on CCA mainstreaming (GCCA+ 2015), these different levels of cooperation – together 
with the differences in mainstreaming efforts observed in our analysis of NIPs and 
AAPs – indicate that mainstreaming efforts tend to vary among EU delegations (cf. 
Appendix). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to pinpoint the factors that 
lead to this variation, it confirms Moser & Ekstrom’s (2010) argument that feasible 
strategies for further improving mainstreaming are always context-sensitive, and 
cannot be reduced to a simplistic call for ‘adaptive capacity building’. Therefore, 
although the GCCA+ can play an important role in further strengthening capacity and 
expertise in delegations, it seems justified to argue that the effectiveness of efforts to 
further improve mainstreaming in EU delegations will not only be achieved through 
such initiatives. Strengthening mainstreaming will also be determined by some 
specific factors within delegations, related to political leadership and the will to 
mainstream CCA among policy makers. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provided a comprehensive analysis of CCA mainstreaming in EU 
development efforts for the 2014-2020 policy cycle. Already in its early stages, we find 
clear harmonisation efforts by the Commission: the guiding documents explicitly 
envision a win-win approach between development cooperation and CCA, by linking 
aid activities related to sustainable agriculture, rural development and food security 
to support for climate resilience. This harmonisation approach was upheld throughout 
the policy cycle: all assessed NIPs contain a focal sector in this regard and all of these 
in their turn show high levels of mainstreaming. We can draw similar conclusions on 
the project design. Linking back to the EPI/CPI literature (e.g. Persson 2008), we can 
conclude that the normative approach towards CCA mainstreaming within the EU is 
well-developed. The political will to mainstream CCA in aid activities is apparent in 
high-level commitments by the Commission, and is further reinforced through the 




The fact that we perceive a top-down political will for CCA mainstreaming in 
combination with a reallocation of resources already nuances many of the described 
barriers in the EPI/CPI literature (cf. Uittenbroek et al. 2013). This can be explained by 
strong functional overlap between CCA and development cooperation: both domains 
are increasingly interlinked and aid can contribute to building adaptive capacity. This 
leads to an increasing connection between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development with countries’ NDCs under the Paris agreement. This could very well 
provide further impetus to the CCA mainstreaming effort within EU development 
cooperation, as NDCs could become the ‘climate-lens’ through which development 
activities could be redesigned. The fact that these NDCs are country-owned also 
ensures that mainstreaming efforts are jointly agreed upon, in order to prevent CCA 
mainstreaming becoming some kind of conditionality (Gupta 2009). 
However, at the delegation level, we determined a sense of procedural overburdening 
in the wake of limited staff, and a lack of expertise among different officials with 
different sectoral responsibilities. Past assessments of climate mainstreaming in EU 
development already pointed at insufficient in-house capacity for mainstreaming, 
leading to practitioners not using available mainstreaming tools (Olearius et al. 2008). 
The presence of focal points for mainstreaming is already a positive development and 
can be linked to the harmonisation effort by the Commission within a well-defined set 
of focal sectors. Prioritisation would however imply that policy makers use a climate 
lens to redesign sectoral activities in the wake of CCA. Although sector scripts and 
environmental profiles are part of the procedural toolbox, they are currently 
ineffective in generating a broader mainstreaming effort.  
The efforts of the GCCA+ to becoming a hub for expertise regarding climate 
mainstreaming could take away many of these obstacles. The GCCA could further 
centralise ownership and expertise for CCA mainstreaming, and could strengthen its 
ties with EU delegations in order to provide them with the expertise necessary. So far, 
the role and functioning of the GCCA has not yet received any serious academic 




regarding the link between development cooperation and CCA could make it an 
interesting case for further research into potential CPI/EPI strategies.  
However, the observed variation between mainstreaming efforts throughout different 
delegations indicates that the context in which these efforts are implemented also plays 
a role. Further research could therefore extend empirical knowledge in this regard by 
scrutinising mainstreaming efforts in the field. Such research could for example focus 
on how the political leadership in delegations and the awareness towards CCA in the 
heads of policy officials influence mainstreaming. Furthermore, researchers could 
contextualise these efforts in the country in which they are implemented and also 
examine how partner countries’ agency influences mainstreaming efforts of donors.  
Finally, since the current development cycle is still ongoing, this research only 
represents a partial overview of CCA mainstreaming throughout the policy cycle. This 
article identified a number of obstacles regarding CCA mainstreaming efforts, as well 
as possibilities to improve these efforts even within the current policy cycle. Future 
research could complement this by looking at the entire policy cycle, including the role 
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8. Appendix A: CCA inclusion in policy output and implementation phase 
Table 4: Level of CCA mainstreaming in policy output (based on NIPs, disseminated per focal sector) 
Country No CCA 
inclusion 
Coordination Harmonisation Prioritisation 
Focal sector Evidence Focal sector Evidence Focal sector Evidence 
Angola  Water & Sanitation Use of Environmental 
Impact Assessments “in 
accordance with the 
provisions of the EU 
guidelines” (p. 20) 
 
Support for technical and 
vocational training 
Specialised CCA courses in 






context of climate 
change as main 
priority. Support for 
climate-smart 
technologies in 




Energy Road infrastructure Standard sentence on the 
need to mainstream 
environmental concerns.  
 
Sustainable agriculture 
and food security 
Production growth, yet 
with attention to 
strengthening resilience in 








Climate change “affecting 
both social and 
environmental 
determinants of health” 







   
 
Productive investments 
for agriculture in Savannah 
Ecological Zones 
Rapid increase of 
production output and job 
creation. Attention for 
climate change adaptation 
in order to ensure an 
“inclusive and sustainable 
rural economy” (p. 20)  
 










Yield increase of 
agricultural production in 
order to combat 
malnutrition and to 
increase commodity 
exports. Resilience of local 
populations against 





Use of environmental 
impact assessments and 
climate risk assessments 
mentioned (p. 21) 










Improve access to conflict-
prone regions  







 Food security and 
resilience 
Enhancing resilience 
and food security in 















 Government and civil society Use of Environmental 
Impact Assessments and 
Strategic Environmental 
Assessments.  
Education Climate change awareness 
should be promoted 
through educational 
curricula. Incorporating 
climate risk in the design 
of educational facilities.  
 
Agriculture and Food 
Security 
Recognition of long-term 
negative impact of climate 
change in the sector. 
Focus on production 





Chad  Support for the rule of law Use of Environmental 
Impact Assessments. 
Food security Weakness of production 
and purchasing power 
within agricultural sector 
linked to climate change. 
Changing climate 
recognised as context in 
which food security needs 







degradation due to 
climate change 
acknowledged as 
overarching context for 




Uganda  Transport infrastructures Use of Environmental 
Impact Assessments 
Food security and 
agriculture 
Supporting the green 
economy and production 
growth with attention 
towards climate resilience 
 




 Support to energy sector Decreasing climate 
vulnerability through 
access to non-biomass 
energy sources and 
increasing 
access to electric energy 
(p. 9). 
 
rural poverty, food 
security and sustainable 
agriculture 
Increasing CCA through 








Table 5: Level of CCA mainstreaming in implementation phase (based on AAPs, disseminated per project) 
 
Country 
No CCA inclusion Coordination Harmonisation Prioritisation 
Project (‘corresponding 
focal sector in NIP’) 
Evidence Project (‘corresponding 
focal sector in NIP’) 
Evidence Project 
(‘corresponding 
focal sector in NIP’) 
Evidence 
Angola   Revitalização do Ensino 
Técnico e da Formação 
Profissional (‘Support for 
technical and vocational 
training’) 
Pledge to mainstream 
climate change in all 
technical and professional 
trainings – as mentioned in 















 Agricultural Growth 
Programme (‘Sustainable 
agriculture and food 
security’) 




smart agriculture is cross-
cutting issue throughout 
project design. Concrete 
measures include for 
example enhanced small 







CCA dubbed main 
priority in this 
project, through a 








Ghana Ghana employment 




Anti-corruption, rule of law 
and accountability 
programme (‘Governance’) 
Climate change not 
interwoven in project 
design. But small part on 
providing ‘some support’ to 
National Committee for 
Civic Education to promote 
climate change vis-à-vis the 
EPA (p. 7).  
Civil Society Organisations 
in Research and 
Innovation for Sustainable 
Development15 
CSOs (e.g. farmer’s 
organisations, university) 
framed as partners in 
sectoral activities regarding 
climate-smart agriculture.  
 




Rural roads improvement 
programme (‘Sustainable 
agriculture’) 
Climate proofing of road 
design in order to mitigate 
expected intensification of 
rainfall patterns.  
KULIMA – promoting 
farming in Malawi 
(‘Sustainable agriculture’) 
Agricultural growth central 
objective, but needs to be 
climate-smart/resilient. 
This will be addressed by 
 
                                                          










targeting soil-fertility, land 
degradation and 





acknowledged as an 
immediate cause of 
undernutrition. Therefore 
linked to actions on 
climate-resilient 
agricultural production.  
Niger No Annual Action Plans published 
Sierra 
Leone 
Support for the 
education sector 
(‘Education’) 
 Boosting agriculture and 
Food Security (BAFS) 
Specific objective to 
“Promote innovative and 
integrated farming 
concepts adapted to 
climate change” (p. 2) 
 
Chad No Annual Action Plans published 






Society in Uganda 
Support Programme 
(‘Civil Society’) 
Support for further 
development of the 
Northern Corridor road 




Climate-proofing of project 
design.  
Development initiative for 
Northern Uganda (cross-
cutting, all focal sectors 
targeted) 
Building resilience to 
climate change through 
sustainable farming 
practices. + Climate 
proofing of infrastructure 




building for transport 
sector (‘Transport 
infrastructures’) 
Building climate resilience 
by developing tools for 
improving adaptation 






value chain in Uganda 
Adaptation interventions 
based on conducted SEA. 
Adopting climate-smart 





(‘Food Security and 
Agriculture’) 
Promoting commercial 
aquaculture in Uganda 
(‘Food security and 
agriculture’) 
Climate change impacts on 
aquatic ecosystems 
considered a risk. Climate 
resilient production as one 
of main objectives of 
activities. 
Zambia Aviation sector 
support programme 
(not linked to 
specific focal sector); 










Support for Zambia energy 
sector (‘Energy’) 
Some notion of impact 
assessments to mitigate 
climate risk and indirect 





9. Appendix B: List of interviews  
No Date Function 
1 16/1/2015 official DG DEVCO 
2 10/2/2015 official DG CLIMA 
3 12/2/2015 Delegation staff 
4 16/2/2015 Delegation staff 
5 8/6/2016 Delegation staff 
6 9/6/2016 Delegation staff 
7 13/6/2016 Delegation staff 
8 13/6/2016 Delegation staff 
9 14/6/2016 Delegation staff 
10 23/6/2016 Delegation staff 
11 23/6/2016 Delegation staff 
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This paper aims to assess the framing of adaptation in the development discourse 
of the European Union (EU). Theoretically, three frames (security, growth and 
justice/equity) are constructed. Overall, we find clear traces of the EU’s normative 
aspirations as a global actor. Instead of framing climate change as a national or 
global security threat, human security implications of climate change are 
emphasised, representing it as a threat to individual livelihoods. Justice/equity 
considerations are also voiced, acknowledging the disproportionate impact of 
climate change on developing countries. In terms of agency, we find mostly a 
global, top-down framing of adaptation in developing countries. 
Keywords: development cooperation; climate change; climate adaptation; framing 
























In recent years, the international development community has increasingly 
emphasised the importance of integrating climate change in international 
development. This is due to its multidimensional nature, meaning it can potentially 
impact a wide range of development activities.16 The broad spectrum of affected 
sectors creates many linkages with development policies, especially when it comes to 
climate change adaptation.17 This was recently reconfirmed by the adoption of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, which include in their mandate the need for 
international climate action to promote mitigation and adaptation in the Global South. 
The emergence of the climate-development nexus has given leeway to a growing body 
of literature on the integration of adaptation in the aid architecture of donors.18 
However, these studies tend to approach the nexus in a technical manner, by listing a 
range of procedural and organisational adjustments that allow donors to take climate 
change into account.19 In contrast, some emerging studies use a more critical 
perspective by introducing a broader conceptualisation of adaptation as a complex 
political and social process influenced by power relations, rather than a linear and 
neutral response to change.20  
This paper situates itself within these critical approaches. It aims to analyse the 
different frames that are used to represent adaptation in development discourse. A 
frame can be defined as an ‘organising principle that transforms fragmentary or 
incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution 
is implicitly or explicitly included’ and the act of framing as ‘the process of 
constructing, adapting and negotiating frames’.21 Frame analysis allows these 
                                                          
16 Persson & Klein, Mainstreaming Climate Adaptation into ODA, 2-3 and Kok et al., ‘Integrating 
Development and Climate Policies’, 104-105. 
17 Huq & Reid, ‘Mainstreaming Adaptation in Development’, 16-17. 
18 Agrawala & Van Aalst, ‘Adapting Development Cooperation’, 183-193; Ayers & Huq, 
Supporting Adaptation, 675-692 and Fankhauser & Schmidt-Traub, ‘Climate Resilient 
Development’, 1-26. 
19 Klein et al., ‘Portfolio Screening’, 23-44 and Agrawala et al., ‘Incorporating Climate Change’, 
1-38. 
20 Eriksen, Nightingale & Eakin, ‘Reframing Adaptation’, 523. 




discursive constructions to be examined. Critical variants often start from a 
Foucauldian interpretation of discourse, labeling it as a power mechanism which 
favors dominant frames while excluding alternative ones.22 Therefore, we will look for 
different framings of adaptation, while also incorporating the power dimension 
behind these frames. Existing research has already addressed the discursive 
dimension of global climate governance,23 and different frames regarding climate 
adaptation in particular.24 A critical inquiry into its discursive linkage with 
development cooperation is, however, largely absent.  
This paper assesses the framing of climate adaptation within the development 
discourse of the European Union (EU). 25 Although the EU combines its leadership role 
within the international climate change regime26 with its status as the largest aid donor 
in the world, virtually no attention has hitherto been given to the nexus within EU 
studies. Moreover, the fact that the EU combines its normative aspirations towards 
developing countries with ‘superpower temptations’ rooted in its security and market 
interests,27 creates a particularly interesting case to see how potential tensions between 
different role conceptions influence the framing of adaptation in its development 
discourse.  
The next section will first introduce the concept of framing and frame analysis, as well 
as addressing its value for assessing the climate-development nexus. Subsequently, we 
will distinguish between three frames which have been identified in relation to climate 
change: security, growth, and justice/equity. Each of these frames will be discussed 
separately, including insights on how to recognise them in discourse and 
differentiations between top-down and bottom-up variants in terms of the agency of 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 19. 
23 Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, ‘Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change’, 50-75 and Bäckstrand 
& Lövbrand, ‘Climate Governance Beyond 2012’, 123-147. 
24 Dewulf, ‘Contrasting Frames’, 321-330; McEvoy, Fünfgeld & Bosomworth, ‘Resilience and 
adaptation’, 280-293; McGray et al., Weathering the Storm, 17-25. 
25 For a general introduction to the EU’s environmental and climate policies, please consult 
Delreux, Tom, and Sander Happaerts. Environmental Policy and Politics in the European Union. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
26 Bäckstrand & Ëlgstrom, ‘The EU’s role in Climate Negotiations’, 1369-1386. 




actors involved. In light of these frames, an assessment of 36 EU policy documents and 
speeches was made using NVivo software. We will conclude by discussing the 
implications of our findings, as well as providing directions for further research. 
2. Critical frame analysis 
Frame analysis has so far been used mainly in social movement theory and gender 
studies.28 However, its basic underpinnings stretch beyond these topics and can be 
used for other areas as well. Within EU studies, frame analysis has proven to be a 
valuable technique to analyse the discourse surrounding a wide array of policy 
domains.29 It has also been introduced in studies concerning EU development 
cooperation, assessing gender mainstreaming, for example.30 
Framing studies start from the social-constructivist assumption that meaning is never 
a given, but is always socially constructed by actors. Different interpretations can be 
attributed to the same issue, and actors can steer debates and policies through the act 
of framing by providing and reproducing a problem definition (diagnosis) and a set of 
possible solutions (prognosis).31 Critical frame analysis adds to these insights by 
assessing power (im)balances between different actors, paying specific attention to 
discursive biases and inconsistencies within frames, as well as processes of exclusion 
through which certain ideas, solutions and actors are silenced and thus marginalised.32  
This paper also argues that the framing of climate change in development cooperation 
will influence the way it is integrated in development activities. Therefore, this process 
can only be fully grasped by also engaging with the discursive struggle that shapes it. 
Examining the frames that are being used to represent the climate-development nexus 
in discourse is thus necessary, as ‘each framing influences the questions asked, the 
knowledge produced, and the adaptation policies and responses that are prioritized’.33 
                                                          
28 Johnston & Klandermans, the Cultural Analysis of Social Movements, 217-247; Snow & Benford, 
‘Ideology, frame resonance’, 197-217; Lombardo & Meier, ‘Framing Gender Equality’, 101-129 
and Verloo & Lombardo, ‘Contested Gender Equality’, 21-49.  
29 Daviter, ‘Policy Framing in the EU’, 654-666. 
30 Debusscher, ‘Mainstreaming Gender’, 39-49. 
31 Lombardo & Meier, ‘Framing Gender Equality’, 105. 
32 Verloo & Lombardo, ‘Contested Gender Equality’, 27. 




Some authors have rightfully argued that concepts that are used extensively in the 
discourse surrounding the nexus – ‘improving climate resilience’, ‘achieving 
sustainable development’– are essentially empty shells, deriving meaning from the 
context in which they operate.34 Therefore, instead of treating these concepts in 
discourse as a given, research should try to uncover the frames in which they are 
represented, in order to truly grasp what they represent.  
The existing literature on climate governance has already touched upon some 
controversial issues in this context. First of all, studies have focused on the 
securitisation of climate change, pointing out possible implications of a dominant 
climate security framing.35 Other authors have identified a ‘neoliberal’ framing of 
climate change, which renders tackling climate change compatible with pursuing 
growth.36 Third, a justice/equity-centered frame has been advocated in existing 
literature, focusing on the unfair distribution of climate impacts and how to achieve 
equity in this regard, both internationally as well as between different societal 
groups.37 Finally, a distinction can be made between global/top-down and 
local/bottom-up framings of adaptation. While frames within the former category 
highlight the importance of the global climate change regime, including its scientific 
underpinnings and policies, the latter type of frames assign an active role to local 
actors and also incorporate notions of local knowledge regarding adaptation.38 In the 
following paragraphs, we will link these frames to the nexus, while distinguishing 
between top-down and bottom-up variants within every frame.  
 
                                                          
34 Joseph, ‘Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism’, 38-52 and Methman, ‘”Climate Protection” 
as Empty Signifier’, 1-28.  
35 Oels, ‘From Securitisation of Climate Change’, 185-207 and Grove, ‘Insuring “Our Common 
Future”’, 536-563. 
36 Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, ‘Planting Trees’, 52-53 and Oels, ‘Rendering Climate Change 
Governable’, 195-197. 
37 Thomas & Twyman, ‘Equity and Justice’, 115-124. 




3. Security framing 
A constructivist conception of security was introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever (the ‘Copenhagen School’). Their concept of securitisation was a departure 
from the narrow notion of security that focuses exclusively on the military dimension. 
Instead, they proposed a broader conceptualisation of security issues. Their central 
argument is that security policy cannot be seen as a mere reaction to an objective threat. 
Instead, it is socially constructed by speech acts by political actors and communities.39 
Securitisation therefore deals with the discursive strategy of representing issues as 
existential security threats in order to justify extraordinary measures.40 
According to Buzan,41 the shift towards securitising the environment was a result of 
an increased awareness of the impact of humankind’s industrial expansion into 
ecosystems and its potential security implications. Therefore, it was seen by many as 
a force for the good, as it catapulted environmental issues into the realm of ‘high’ 
politics, introducing sustainability to the security debate.42 However, it was also 
problematised by the Copenhagen School and a range of other authors,43 who raised 
concerns about the danger of ‘militarizing the environment and the rise of nationalistic 
attitudes in order to protect the national environment’.44 This is also the case for 
climate change, which rejuvenated this debate after it was sidelined in the early 2000s, 
mostly due to the war on terror and the fact that the link between environmental 
degradation and conflict was no longer seen as credible in academic circles.45 The issue 
regained political salience after climate security was put on the international political 
agendas of the EU and the UN by the end of the 2000s.46 
                                                          
39 Trombetta, ‘Environmental Security and Climate Change’, 585-602. 
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41 Buzan, Rethinking Security, 7. 
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45 Trombetta, ‘Environmental Security’, 589-590. 




Some conceptions of the link between climate change and security are still rooted in 
this environmental conflict discourse, as they advocate a narrow, state-centric version 
in both the diagnosis and the prognosis.47 Within this ‘realist’ security framing, climate 
change is seen as a factor that could negatively influence already poor environmental 
conditions in many developing countries, increasing security risks.48 Climate change 
is thus portrayed as a threat to the security of the state or the international system as a 
whole, through the potential destabilisation of regions and upsurge in climate refugees 
(i.e. ‘diagnosis’).49 Climate adaptation should engage in identifying hotspots of 
environmental insecurity with the highest risk of conflict, and military capacity should 
be built in case such conflicts would come about (i.e. ‘prognosis’).50  
In contrast, a human security framing advocates a different conception of security 
within the nexus. This frame highlights the vulnerability of individuals and local 
communities in the wake of climate change.51 Apart from this overarching emphasis 
on the individual, there is a variety of frames that can be linked to human security. 
First, a ‘narrow’ human security framing engages with the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of climate-related disasters, and the threats they pose to individual 
livelihoods.52 The prognosis is therefore mostly related to mitigating these 
consequences.53 It can be situated within a techno-scientific approach to climate 
change, aimed at reducing the exposure of livelihoods to climate-induced disasters, 
which can be pursued by installing insurance strategies and scientific monitoring 
systems.54 Second, ‘contextual’ human security links the climate vulnerability of local 
actors to a broader range of conditions, like socio-economic well-being and cultural 
and political conditions.55 Contrary to the narrow human security framing, it 
                                                          
47 Barnett, Security and Climate Change, 4-5. 
48 Ibid., 6. 
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introduces a social component to climate change in development, allowing for policy 
responses beyond techno-scientific interventions. 
In relation to the agency of the actors involved, some diversification is possible in both 
the realist and human security frames. Regarding the former, the main referent object 
is the state, whereas individual actors are only relevant as their exposure to 
environmental degradation can trigger violent conflict. However, a realist security 
framing can differ in the extent that an active role is prescribed to the state in dealing 
with these issues. Developing countries can be labeled as ‘fragile’ or ‘under severe 
stress’ of climate change, while denying the possibility that they may be capable of 
determining their own adaptation policy in order to minimize the risk of conflict.56 
Moreover, the capacity of states can be bypassed by elevating the climate 
vulnerabilities of states and regions to the global level, labelling them as international 
security concerns requiring top-down intervention.57  
When considering agency in the context of a human security framing, reducing the 
vulnerability of local entities still does not guarantee their actual emancipation.58 
Defining vulnerability could still be a top-down process, in which the local level is 
treated as a passive victim of forces beyond its control. In contrast, a bottom-up 
security frames starts from the notion of agency and empowerment, either from the 
national or the local level. It highlights the national or local implications of climate 
change and the capacity of the state or local actors to identify and tackle vulnerabilities 
that could lead to climate-related insecurities.59  
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4. Growth framing 
The discursive construction of climate change has been labelled in the literature as 
ecological modernisation, in order to be compatible with growth thinking.60 Central to 
this frame is the argument that capitalism can modernise itself, evolving towards a 
climate-neutral state.61 As a result, ecological degradation is decoupled from the 
current growth model which can be made more climate friendly.62 This is combined 
with a sense of optimism towards technological, economic and political systems and 
their ability to handle the problem.63 In international climate governance, ecological 
modernisation has given leeway to a number of market-based mechanisms in order to 
facilitate emission reductions. Well-known examples are carbon trading, like the EU’s 
Emission Trading System, and carbon offsetting, in which actors can compensate for 
their own emissions by investing in projects aimed at reducing emissions elsewhere.64 
The growth paradigm has profoundly influenced development cooperation over 
recent decades. In the 1980s, a widespread belief in growth through deregulation and 
marketisation culminated in the Washington Consensus, which ended up being 
heavily criticised by developing countries themselves.65 The subsequent Post-
Washington Consensus marked a shift in development thinking, revolving around 
pro-poor growth and poverty reduction.66 In addition, a ‘human development’ 
approach started to gain ground, expanding development to include (among others) 
gender inequality, environmental degradation and climate change.67 Although this is 
generally seen as a departure from the neoliberal, market-centered development 
paradigm of the 1980s, some authors argue that – rather than losing relevance – free 
                                                          
60 See Mol, ‘Ecological Modernisation’, 138-149 and Spaargaren & Mol ‘Sociology, 
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market thinking still dominates current development practices. In their view, issues 
like climate change were merely absorbed in order to fit this paradigm. 68 
Within this frame, the impact of climate change on developing countries is seen as a 
threat to economic growth and poverty reduction efforts. Adaptation in development 
cooperation becomes a matter of economising ecology in order to safeguard growth.69 
In terms of prognosis, a win-win relationship between growth and adaptation is 
instated, as an increase in the welfare of local livelihoods is seen as a major component 
of adaptation.70 This frame therefore re-legitimises the classic notion of development 
as the pursuit of growth and favours market recipes like increased flexibility, cost-
effectiveness and deregulation.  
A strong belief in ecological modernisation can once again lead to a top-down framing 
of adaptation, preaching the dissemination of adaptation technologies through global 
markets. McMichael71 labels this as the “marketisation of development adaptation” 
and argues that the agency of developing countries and local actors is denounced by 
promoting the top-down introduction of technologies from global markets over local 
adaptation strategies. In the agricultural sector for example, this framing could 
eventually undermine local agricultural practices, which become overruled by gene 
patenting from global biotechnological firms.72 A bottom-up frame that links 
adaptation to marketisation and technological optimism would include an element of 
local agency, acknowledging local knowledge on adaptation as a valuable source of 
innovation and entrepreneurship.73  
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5. Justice/equity framing 
A third frame highlights equity and social justice issues in relation to climate 
adaptation. Discussions on historical responsibility for climate change and its 
disproportionate impact on developing countries have dominated international 
negotiations ever since their inception in 1992.74 This frame acknowledges the inequity 
of climate change impacts. It starts from the diagnosis that climate change will hit 
developing countries the hardest, especially considering the fact that their populations 
are still heavily dependent on natural resources in order to generate a living.75 At the 
national and local levels, climate change can aggravate inequality as it impacts 
differently on different sectors in society.76 Therefore, adaptation in development 
becomes a matter of ensuring that its effects do not widen inequality in combination 
with aid activities. In contrast, the adaptation capacity of local actors can be built by 
addressing issues of equity and inequality through development cooperation.77  
Once again, a distinction can be made between top-down and bottom-up forms of 
equity framing, which relates to the distinction between distributive and procedural 
justice.78 Distributive justice framing is solely preoccupied with the distribution of 
climate impacts across countries, groups of people within countries, and across time. 
The only thing that matters is how development policy balances the uneven 
distribution of climate impacts. In other words, only the outcome of development 
cooperation in terms of improving climate equity is important, which corresponds 
with a consequentialist and utilitarian approach to climate justice.79 This again allows 
for top-down adaptation in development, in which equity in terms of mitigating 
climate impacts is defined on the international level or by donors themselves. In 
contrast, procedural justice highlights the importance of stakeholder participation. 
Within this framing, an adaptation strategy can only improve equity “if mechanisms 
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are in place to ensure that those impacted at the sub-national level have their interests 
considered”.80 In this sense, achieving climate justice entails a bottom-up approach 
towards adaptation in development in which all stakeholders affected by adaptation 
policies are included in the policy design.81 For example, donors could support 
community-led natural resource management systems for sectors in which they are 
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Table 6: Summary of three identified frames 










 National or regional 
climate insecurity framed 
as global threats.  
 
 Adaptation to avoid 
conflict + military 
capacity building  
 
 Passive framing of 




 Individual insecurity in the 
wake of climate-disasters 
(narrow)/broader vulnerability 
to potential climate impacts 
(contextual) 
 
 Adaptation to reduce exposure 




 Active framing of local actors 
in reducing exposure/overall 
vulnerability 
Realist 
 National and regional 
insecurity due to climate 
change 
 
 Adaptation to avoid conflict 
+ military capacity building  
 
 Active framing of 
developing countries, state 
can deal with climate-
related insecurities  
 
Human 
 Individual insecurity in the 
wake of climate-disasters 
(narrow)/broader vulnerability 
to potential climate impacts 
(contextual) 
 
 Adaptation to reduce 
exposure to disaster/reduce 
climate vulnerability  
 
 Active framing of local actors 







 Climate change threatens growth and poverty reduction efforts in 
developing countries 
 
 Adaptation through the implementation of market recipes. Win-
win relationship between economic growth and climate resilience 
 
 Importance of international markets in providing technologies for 
adaptation 
 Climate change as a threat to economic growth and poverty 
reduction efforts in developing countries 
 
 Adaptation through the implementation market recipes. Win-win 
relationship between economic growth and climate resilience 
 
 Importance of local knowledge as driver of climate-related 






 Climate change as a driver of inequity in terms of its impact, both 
on the international and national level 
 
 Adaptation in development needs to address inequity and 
injustice to avoid maladaptation 
 
 Distributive justice: equitable distribution of climate-related 
impacts 
 Climate change as a driver of inequity in terms of its impact, both 
on the international as well as the national level 
 
 Adaptation in development needs to address inequity and 
injustice to avoid maladaptation 
 
 Procedural justice: equitable distribution of climate-related 




6. Analysis of framing in EU discourse 
We will now use our typology to delve into the representation of the climate-
development nexus in the discourse of the EU. The EU makes for a unique case in this 
regard, as it combines its self-proclaimed role as largest development aid donor in the 
world with international leadership in the international climate change regime.83 
Moreover, its ‘eternal struggle’ as a global actor between its identity as a normative 
power and its realist interests84 creates an interesting dynamic which could influence 
the use of frames. Regarding its role as a donor, there is already a considerable 
literature on Policy Coherence for Development, which points out the tensions 
between normative aspirations in development and other agendas like trade interests 
and security issues.85 In addition, the literature on EU climate leadership has also 
labeled it a strong advocate of ecological modernisation and a top-down, centralised 
form of climate governance within the global climate regime.86 Therefore, it is 
interesting to see whether and how the three identified frames are represented and 
interact at the intersection of these two policy domains.  
In order to conduct this research, phases of data gathering were alternated with data 
analysis until saturation was reached. In total, 36 documents issued by the European 
Commission have been assessed (for the full list, please consult Appendix 1). NVivo 
11 software was used for systematically coding the data. It proved to be a useful tool 
in determining the prevalence and representation of the frames in EU discourse. 
Analysed documents include transcripts of speeches by the current and previous 
Commissioners in charge of climate change and development, and a range of policy 
documents and press releases elaborating on the link between both. These span 
multiple topics within the nexus in EU aid policies, ranging from climate financing in 
the Global South to disaster risk reduction in the wake of climate change and climate 
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mainstreaming. The time period covered ranged from the early 2000s to the 2015 Paris 
summit.
7. Findings 
First of all, ever since the first communications on the nexus, EU discourse has been 
closely related to the human security frame. Climate change is conceived as a problem 
of the increasing prevalence of natural disasters (e.g. floods, droughts, soil erosion 
etc.), thereby posing a real threat to developing countries and livelihoods. This human 
security frame is often used as an introduction and accompanied by a range of alarmist 
adjectives emphasising the gravity of the situation (e.g. deadly disasters,87 severe and 
irreversible impacts,88 intense storms89). In contrast, a realist security frame is only rarely 
present in the analysed documents. National and international security implications 
of climate change are sometimes mentioned, usually in relation to conflict as a result 
of resource scarcity and an expected increase in climate refugees.90 However, this is 
nowhere near as prominent in EU discourse as the human security framing.  
In line with this prevalence of human security in the diagnosis, the concept of climate 
resilience has entered EU discourse in recent years, becoming heavily emphasised in 
recent EU documents. This discursive representation is in line with the ‘empty shell’ 
argument mentioned earlier. It is included routinely in EU discourse as the 
overarching objective to achieve ‘sustainable, climate-resilient’ development, but this 
is a blank construction provided with a different content depending on the context in 
which it operates. Hence, its meaning fluctuates between a strong techno-scientific 
interpretation of adaptation and a more contextualised one. The following two quotes 
illustrate the difference between the two: 
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“[…] boost local, national and regional capacities and resilience in ways that link 
sustainable development, risk management and adaptation in a “win-win-win” 
situation. It will thus improve regional capacities for climate monitoring, 
modelling, and vulnerability assessments.” 91 
“Adaptation is about building resilience within communities and economies to the 
increased risks resulting from climate change. It is a vast and cross-cutting 
development challenge.” 92 
As apparent in the two quotes, the former type of climate resilience in EU discourse is 
used more in the context of disaster risk reduction and is therefore strongly 
preoccupied with scientific monitoring, disaster risk reduction and risk management. 
In contrast, contextualised notions of resilience also include socio-economic factors 
that could potentially aggravate the impact of climate change. Much in line with 
contextual human security, resilience in this regard goes beyond the mere threat of 
climate-induced disasters and the ability of individuals and communities to withstand 
such events. Besides the framing of climate adaptation as a ‘vast and cross-cutting 
challenge’ for development, other noted examples in EU discourse are the formulated 
need to ‘mainstream climate resilience in development cooperation’93 and the aim to 
also ‘reduce underlying risk factors’94 to potential climate disasters, which is linked to 
rapid urbanisation, inadequate natural resource management, poor health etc. This 
seems to indicate that a multi-sectoral approach is favored as a policy response within 
the nexus.  
Through the constant emphasis on the potentially disastrous impact of climate change 
for developing countries in the diagnosis, the human security frame also includes an 
element of geographical differentiation, which can be linked to a justice/equity frame. 
Almost all EU speech acts recognise the differentiation of climate change impacts – 
emphasising the fact that developing countries are the least responsible, but the most 
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affected by climate change95 – and climate change responsibilities – mentioning the 
need to cooperate based on respective capabilities and specific circumstances of 
developing countries.96 In contrast, there is a clear tendency to frame the prognosis in 
global terms. This is constantly re-emphasised by referring to a global or universal 
partnership in fighting climate change: 
 
“The overall objective of this strategy is to assist EU partner countries in meeting 
the challenges posed by climate change, in particular by supporting them in the 
implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.” 97 
“The Paris conference should agree to assist those countries that need assistance to 
set up emission inventories, monitoring, reporting and verification systems, and 
to develop low emission and climate resilient development strategies with the 
right incentive structures.” 98 
 
Going back to the differentiation between distributive and procedural justice, the 
former thus seems dominant in EU discourse, as climate change as a development 
challenge is consistently framed in relation to the climate change regime and the global 
level. Despite the strong emphasis on the unequal impact of climate change on 
developing countries, there is very little evidence of framing that recognises the 
capacity within developing countries to cope with climate change. We find a similar 
silence regarding the inclusion of NGOs. Only two references were found mentioning 
the inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders such as civil society organisations, 
social institutions, academia, etc. Alternatively, the EU stresses its own importance by 
emphasising its ‘natural alliance’99 with the developing world, mostly based on values 
again related to the multilateral level: 
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“The EU and the Pacific Small Island States are longstanding allies. We share 
a lot of common ground – respect for science, equity, and the multilateral rules 
based approach.” 100 
Therefore, although the prognosis to a certain extent recognises the broader socio-
economic context in fighting climate change, we find no evidence that this is matched 
by an active framing of local actors. 
Not only are the described impacts of climate change linked to natural disasters that 
could lead to calamities in developing countries, there is also almost always the direct 
threat that climate change poses to sustainable development, achieving the MDGs and 
more recently the SDGs. In comes the growth frame, as development outcomes are 
often mentioned in terms of – or even equated with – economic growth. This takes the 
form of emphasising the ‘costly impact’101 of climate change that could ‘hamper 
economic development’ of developing countries.102 In this sense, adaptation in 
development thus becomes a matter of ensuring that the pursuit of economic growth 
can continue unabated.  
There is also a strong element of opportunity with regards to the prognosis, which is 
aimed at starting a transition towards a greener and more sustainable economy, 
thereby leapfrogging the high-carbon phase of development. In relation to adaptation, 
there is a strong emphasis on the necessity of developing countries to create ‘enabling 
environments’103 in order to attract international investments, private climate finance 
and technologies. Considering the agency of actors involved, the main sources of 
innovation and entrepreneurship for climate adaptation are thus placed outside 
developing countries themselves throughout EU discourse. The overarching mantra is 
that help is needed in facilitating these enabling environments to attract investments 
and technologies from the outside, whereas very few accounts mention the potential 
of innovation from the bottom-up. Therefore, it is safe to say that a top-down growth 
frame also dominates in relation to adaptation.  
                                                          
100 European Commission, ‘Speech by Commissioner Miguel Arias Canete’, 1. 
101 European Commission, ‘Q&A on the White Paper’, 4. 
102 European Commission, ‘Pacific Islands and Climate Change’, 1. 




8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This article aimed to unravel the framing of the climate-development nexus within EU 
discourse. First, we found a strong presence of the human security frame, emphasising 
the threat climate change poses to individual livelihoods as a result of an expected 
increase in natural disasters (i.e. diagnosis). This translates to different notions of 
climate resilience, ranging from techno-scientific policies to deal with such disasters to 
more contextualised forms of the concept, focusing on the socio-economic 
vulnerabilities of communities (i.e. prognosis). Second, the growth frame is 
represented by diagnoses of climate change as a threat to growth and sustainable 
development. For adaptation, this relates to striving towards ‘enabling environments’ 
in developing countries in order to attract climate-friendly investments, finance and 
technologies. Third, the justice/equity frame is represented through emphasis of the 
inequitable distribution of climate-related impacts to developing countries and the role 
of development cooperation in tackling this inequity. There is a bias towards a global, 
top-down framing of adaptation, with very little attention given to the agency of 
developing countries, local actors and civil society. 
If we interpret our findings in the context of the EU as a global actor in both the 
international climate change regime and in international development, echoes of its 
normative aspirations can clearly be detected, albeit with a distinct (neo)liberal 
flavour. Although we find strong evidence of the EU framing of climate change as an 
‘existential threat’ to developing countries, this is never used to justify extraordinary 
military measures. Instead, the human security implications of climate change in 
developing countries are emphasised, which Manners104 argues is compatible with a 
normative agenda targeting ‘sustainable peace’. The fact that the EU stresses the 
inequity in terms of climate change impacts in the Global South further adds to this 
point. However, despite the absence of ‘hard’ securitisation in EU discourse, a number 
of critical comments can be formulated which could be the subject of further research. 
Firstly, the policy implications of linking security and climate change in the context of 
development cooperation could be evaluated more thoroughly. Similar research by 
                                                          




Trombetta105 concerning the climate-migration nexus highlighted the securitising 
potential of ‘subtle’ linkages with security in discourse, which can be situated within 
a human security framing. In her view, the absence of a discursive link towards 
exceptional measures does not rule out ‘hard’ securitisation in policy practices. In light 
of the argument made by Manners, which renders human security compatible with 
the EU’s international normative aspirations, future research could engage more with 
this debate. 
Secondly, the strong prevalence of a top-down framing of adaptation in development 
is problematic in different ways. Assuming the EU’s leadership role within the global 
climate change regime, it is logical that it would echo many of the globalist frames 
advocated within this regime in its relationship with developing countries. Only now 
can we mark a shift in international climate governance in which emerging economies 
and developing countries are also becoming more emancipated actors. It is becoming 
clear that the international climate change regime is evolving towards a hybrid system 
of voluntary, country-led cooperation in which Southern actors claim a larger role. 
This is forcing the EU to invest more in diplomatic alliances with the Global South,106 
which could influence its discourse regarding the climate-development nexus in the 
years to come. Since our period of analysis does not include the post-Paris period, the 
overall representation of the frames within the nexus remained fairly consistent over 
time. Further research should examine to what extent this evolving context is 
influencing EU discourse.  
Third, the prevalence of a top-down human security and growth frame can be linked 
to the Foucauldian concept of ‘governmentality’.107 These frames are considered 
discursive strategies for donors and international institutions to develop a centralised 
way of dealing with climate change in development. Implicitly, a geopolitical reality 
of the ‘developed’ Global North and the ‘underdeveloped’ Global South is installed, 
in which Northern donors are responsible for the ‘resilience’ of the passive Southern 
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106 Bäckstrand & Ëlgstrom, ‘The EU’s role in Climate Negotiations’, 1369-1386. 
107 Grove, ‘Insuring Our Common Future?’, 536-563 and Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, ‘Planting 




aid recipients by installing technologies like centralised risk management schemes and 
scientific monitoring systems108. The dominance of resilience thinking is also apparent 
in EU discourse, with the concept becoming omnipresent in more recent 
communications surrounding the nexus. Notable examples are the new EU Global 
Strategy and the updated European Consensus for Development. Authors such as 
Joseph have attributed the concept’s popularity to the fact that it that lacks any deeper 
meaning and serves as a discursive tool for rolling out a neoliberal governmentality 
vis-à-vis the Global South, focused on individualisation and “the disciplining of states, 
governments and elites” into accepting a neoliberal development paradigm.109 This 
fits with our findings regarding the overall prevalence of the three identified frames 
and with the fact that the meaning of resilience in EU discourse surrounding the nexus 
also changes depending on the context. Therefore, the governmentality approach 













                                                          
108 Grove, ‘Insuring Our Common Future?’, 553. 





Agrawala, Shardul, and Maarten Van Aalst. “Adapting Development Cooperation to Adapt 
to Climate  
Change.” Climate Policy 8, no. 2 (2008): 183–193. 
 
Agrawala, Shardul, Arnoldo Matus Kramer, Guillaume Prudent-Richard, Marcus Sainsbury, 
and Victoria Schreitter. “Incorporating Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in 
Environmental Impact Assessments: Opportunities and Challenges.” Climate and Development 
4, no. 1 (2012): 26–39. 
 
Allen, Katrina M. “Community-based Disaster Preparedness and Climate Adaptation.” 
Disasters 30, no. 1 (2006): 81–101. 
 
Aubert, Jean-Eric. Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3554. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005. 
 
Ayers, Jessica-M., and Saleemul Huq. “Supporting Adaptation to Climate Change: What Role 
for Official Development Assistance?” Development Policy Review 27, no. 6 (2009): 675–692. 
 
Bäckstrand, Karin, and Ole Elgström. “The EU’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations: From 
Leader to ‘Leadiator’.” Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 10 (2013): 1369–1386. 
 
Bäckstrand, Karin, and Eva Lövbrand. “Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested 
Discourses of Ecological Modernisation, Green Governmentality and Civic 
Environmentalism.” Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 1 (2006): 50–75. 
 
Bäckstrand, Karin, and Eva Lövbrand. “Climate Governance beyond 2012: Competing 
Discourses of Green Governmentality, Ecological Modernisation and Civic 
Environmentalism.” In The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, 
Discourses, edited by Mary E. Pettenger, 123–147. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007. 
 
Baker, Susan. “Sustainable Development as Symbolic Commitment: Declaratory Politics and 
the  
Seductive Appeal of Ecological Modernisation in the European Union.” Environmental Politics 
16,  
no. 2 (2007): 297–317. 
 
Barnett, Jon. “Security and Climate Change.” Global Environmental Change 13, no. 1 (2003): 7–
17. 
 
Buttel, Frederick H. “Ecological Modernisation as Social Theory.” Geoforum 31, no. 1 (2000): 
57–65. 
 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
 
Cannon, Terry, and Detlef Müller-Mahn. “Vulnerability, Resilience and Development 





Carbone, Maurizio. “Mission Impossible: The European Union and Policy Coherence for 
Development.” European Integration 30, no. 3 (2008): 323–342. 
 
Carbone, Maurizio, and Niels Keijzer. “The European Union and Policy Coherence for 
Development.”  
The European Journal of Development Research 28, no. 1 (2016): 30–43. 
 
Chandler, David. “Resilience and Human Security: The Post-interventionist Paradigm.” 
Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012): 213–229. 
Daviter, Falk. “Policy Framing in the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 14, no. 
4 (2007): 654–666. 
 
Debusscher, Petra. “Mainstreaming Gender in European Commission Development Policy: 
Conservative Europeanness?” Women Studies International Forum 34, no. 1 (2011): 39–49. 
 
Delreux, Tom, and Sander Happaerts. Environmental Policy and Politics in the European Union. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
 
Detraz, Nicole, and Michele M. Betsill. “Climate Change and Environmental Security: For 
Whom the  
Discourse Shifts.” International Studies Perspectives 10, no. 3 (2009): 303–320. 
 
Dewulf, Art. “Contrasting Frames in Policy Debates on Climate Change Adaptation.” Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 4, no. 4 (2013): 321–330. 
 
Doidge, Mathew, and Martin Holland. “A Chronology of European Union Development 
Policy: Theory and Change.” Korea Review of International Studies 17, no. 1 (2015): 59–80. 
 
Duffield, Mark, and Nicholas Waddell. “Securing Humans in a Dangerous World.” 
International Politics 43, no. 1 (2006): 1–23. 
 
Dyer, Hugh. “Environmental Security and International Relations.” Review of International 
Studies 27, no. 3 (2001): 441–450. 
 
Eriksen, Siri H., Andrea J. Nightingale, and Hallie Eakin. “Reframing Adaptation: The Political 
Nature of Climate Change Adaptation.” Global Environmental Change 35 (2015): 523–533. 
 
Fankhauser, Samuel, and Guido Schmidt-Traub. “From Adaptation to Climate-resilient 
Development.” Climate and Development 3, no. 2 (2011): 94–113. 
 
Graeger, Nina. “Environmental Security?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 109–116. 
 
Grove, Kevin J. “Insuring “Our Common Future?” Dangerous Climate Change and the 
Biopolitics of  
Environmental Security.” Geopolitics 15, no. 3 (2010): 536–563. 
 
Huq, Saleemul, and Hannah Reid. “Mainstreaming Adaptation in Development.” IDS Bulletin 
35, no. 3 (2004): 15–21. 
Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans. “The Cultural Analysis of Social Movements.” Social 





Joseph, Jonathan. “Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach.” 
Resilience  
1, no. 1 (2013): 38–52. 
 
Klein, Richard J. T., and Siri E. H. Eriksen, Lars Otto Næss, Anne Hammill, Thomas M. Tanner, 
Carmenza Robledo, and Karen L. O’Brien. “Portfolio Screening to Support the Mainstreaming 
of Adaptation to Climate Change into Development Assistance.” Climatic Change 84, no. 1 
(2007): 23–44. 
 
Klinsky, Sonja, and Hadi Dowlatabadi. “Conceptualisations of Justice in Climate Policy.” 
Climate Policy 9, no. 1 (2009): 88–108. 
 
Kok, Marcel, Bert Metz, Jan Verhagen, and Sascha Van Rooijen. “Integrating Development and 
Climate Policies: National and International Benefits.” Climate Policy 8, no. 2 (2008): 103–118. 
 
Lombardo, Emanuela, and Petra Meier. “Framing Gender Equality in the European Union 
Political  
Discourse.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 15, no. 1 (2008): 101–
129. 
 
Manners, Ian. “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered.” Paper presented at the CIDEL 
Workshop, CiteseerX: Oslo, 2004. 
 
McDonald, Matt. “Securitisation and the Construction of Security.” European Journal of 
International  
Relations 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–587. 
 
McEvoy, Darryn, Hartmut Fünfgeld, and Karyn Bosomworth. “Resilience and Climate 
Change Adaptation: The Importance of Framing.” Planning Practice & Research 28, no. 3 (2013): 
280–293. 
 
McGray, Heather, Anne Hammill, Rob Bradley, E. Lisa Schipper, and Jo-Ellen Parry. 
“Weathering the  
Storm: Options for Framing Adaptation and Development.” World Resources Institute, 
Washington,  
DC 57 (2007): 1–57. 
 
McMichael, Philip. “Contemporary Contradictions of the Global Development Project: 
Geopolitics,  
Global Ecology and the ‘Development Climate’.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2009): 247–
262. 
 
Methmann, Chris Paul. “‘Climate Protection’ as Empty Signifier: A Discourse Theoretical 
Perspective  




Mol, Arthur P. J. “Ecological Modernisation: Industrial Transformations and Environmental 





Newll, Peter. “Climate Change and Development: A Tale of Two Crises.” IDS Bulletin 35, no. 
3 (2004): 120–126. 
 
O'Brien, Geoff, Phil O'Keefe, Joanne Rose, and Ben Wisner. “Climate Change and Disaster 
Management.” Disasters 30, no. 1 (2006): 64–80. 
 
Oels, Angela. “Rendering Climate Change Governable: From Biopower to Advanced Liberal  
Government?” Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 7, no. 3 (2005): 185–207. 
 
Oels, Angela. “From ‘Securitisation’ of Climate Change to ’Climatisation‘ of the Security Field: 
Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives.” In Climate Change, Human Security and Violent 
Conflict, edited by Jurgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans Günter Brauch, Peter Michael 
Link, and Janpeter Schilling, 185–205. Berlin: Springer, 2012. 
 
Okereke, Chukwumerije. “Climate Justice and the International Regime.” Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1, no. 3 (2010): 462–474.16  
 
Orbie, Jan. “The EU’s Role in Development: A Full-fledged Development Actor or Eclipsed by 
Superpower Temptations?" In The EU and Global Development, edited by Stefan Gänzle, Sven 
Grimm, and Davina Makhan, 462. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Paavola, Jouni, and Neil Adger. “Justice and Adaptation to Climate Change.” Tyndall Centre 
Working  
Paper 23 (2002): 1–24. 
 
Persson, Åsa, and Richard J. T. Klein. “Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change into 
Official Development Assistance.” Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Berlin conference 
on the human dimensions of global environmental change, Berlin, 2008. 
 
Schreurs, Miranda A., and Yves Tiberghien. “Multi-level Reinforcement: Explaining European 
Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation.” Global Environmental Politics 7, no. 4 (2007): 
19–46. 
 
Sheppard, Eric, and Helga Leitner. “Quo Vadis Neoliberalism? The Remaking of Global 
Capitalist Governance after the Washington Consensus.” Geoforum 41, no. 2 (2010): 185–194. 
 
Smit, Barry, and Olga Pilifosova. “Adaptation to Climate Change in the Context of Sustainable 
Development and Equity.” Sustainable Development 8, no. 9 (2003): 879–912. 
 
Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization.”  
International Social Movement Research 1, no. 1 (1988): 197–217. 
 
Spaargaren, Gert, and Arthur P. J. Mol. “Sociology, Environment, and Modernity: Ecological 
Modernisation as a Theory of Social Change.” Society & Natural Resources 5, no. 4 (1992): 323–
344. 
 
Stern, Maria, and Joakim Öjendal. “Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, 





Thomas, David S. G., and Chasca Twyman. “Equity and Justice in Climate Change Adaptation 
amongst Natural-Resource-Dependent Societies.” Global Environmental Change 15, no. 2 (2005): 
115–124. 
 
Trombetta, Maria Julia. “Environmental Security and Climate Change.” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 21, no. 4 (2008): 585–602. 
 
Trombetta, Maria Julia. “Linking Climate-induced Migration and Security within the EU.” 
Critical Studies on Security 2, no. 2 (2014): 131–147. 
 
Verloo, Mieke. “Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Europe. A Critical Frame Analysis 
Approach.” The Greek Review of Social Research 117, no. B (2005): 11–34. 
 
Verloo, Mieke, and Emanuela Lombardo. “Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in 
Europe.” In Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality. A Critical Frame Analysis of Gender Policies in 
Europe, edited by Mieke Verloo, 21–49. Budapest: CEU Press, 2007. 
 






































10. Appendix: list of analysed texts 
Policy documents 
1. Council of the European Union. “2215th Council Meeting: Development. 1999. 
2. European Commission. "Africa Climate Briefing." 2014. 
3. European Commission. "COM(2003) 85 - Climate change in the context of 
development cooperation." 2003. 
4. European Commission. “COM(2007) 540 - Building a global climate change alliance 
between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to 
climate change.” 2007. 
5. European Commission. “COM(2009) 84 – EU strategy for supporting disaster risk 
reduction in developing countries.” 2009. 
6. European Commission. “COM(2015) 44 - A Global Partnership for Poverty 
Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015.” 2015. 
7. European Commission. “COM(2015) 81 - The Paris Protocol – A blueprint for tackling 
global climate change beyond 2020.” 2015. 
8. European Commission. “European Union climate funding for developing countries 
in 2013.” 2013. 
9. European Commission. “European Union climate funding for developing countries 
in 2014.” 2014. 
10.  European Commission. “European Union climate funding for developing countries 
in 2015.” 2015. 
11. European Commission. “European Union fast start funding for developing countries: 
2010-2012 Report.” 2012. 
12. European Commission. “Frequently Asked Questions on EU Development policy.” 
2010. 
13. European Commission. “Global Climate Change Alliance: From integrated climate 
strategies to climate finance effectiveness.” 2013. 
14. European Commission. “Global Climate Change Alliance: Using Innovative and 
Effective Approaches to Deliver Climate Change Support to Developing Countries.” 
2011. 
15. European Commission. “Guidelines on the Integration of Environment and Climate 
Change in Development Cooperation.” 2010. 
16. European Commission. “Pacific Islands – EU relations: Focus on Climate Change.” 
2012. 
17. European Commission. “Questions and Answers on the White paper on climate 
change adaptation.” 2015.  
18. European Parliament. “Answers to the European Parliament: Questionnaire to the 
















1. Barosso, José Manuel. "Climate and Environment – factors of peace and development 
in the XXI century.” 2007. 
2. Cañete, Miguel Arias. “Speech by Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete at the 46th 
Pacific Islands Forum Plenary Session.” 2015. 
3. European Commission. “Ahead of Rio+20: Climate change and sustainable 
development to be discussed at the EU-Pacific Islands Forum meeting.” 2012. 
4. European Commission. "Commission Proposes a Global Alliance to Help Developing 
Countries Most Affected by Climate Change." 2007. 
5. European Commission. “Climate Action: Helping the Pacific fight against climate 
change.” 2013. 
6. European Commission. “EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries join forces 
for ambitious global climate deal.” 2015. 
7. European Commission. “Global Climate Change Alliance+ Launch: EU's contribution 
to tackle climate change in developing countries.” 2015.  
8. European Commission. "Pacific Islands and Climate change: Commission takes the 
lead to help with adaptation and fight poverty." 2011. 
9. Hedegaard, Connie. “Europe's view on International Climate Policy.” 2010. 
10. Hedegaard, Connie. "Science is crucial in supporting the low carbon transition". 2012. 
11. Hedegaard, Connie. "Rio Must Get It Right." (2012). Published electronically 
15/06/2012. https://www.euractiv.com/section/sustainable-dev/opinion/rio-must-
get-it-right/. 
12. Hedegaard, Connie. “Climate Change: our common challenge, our common 
opportunity”. 2012. 
13. Hedegaard, Connie. “Acceptance speech for CSR Honor Award”. 2012. 
14. Piebalgs, Andris. “Climate change and access to Energy: a priority for EU development 
policy.” 2012.  
15. Piebalgs, Andris. “Climate change: don't forget the Pacific. For a stronger EU-Pacific 
joint action.” 2011. 
16. Piebalgs, Andris. “Engaging with vulnerable countries through better adaptation and 
resilience action.” 2014.  
17. Piebalgs, Andris. “How to make EU Development policy supportive of inclusive 
growth and sustainable development.” 2010. 
18. Piebalgs, Andris. “Working together to deliver progress in the fight against climate 













Article 3: Governmentality and the climate-
development nexus: the case of the EU Global 
Climate Change Alliance 
 




- Status: Submitted to Global Environmental Change. Currently in review.  
 






















Governmentality and the climate-development nexus: the 
case of the EU Global Climate Change Alliance 
 
Abstract 
This article uses a governmentality perspective to uncover the power effects that 
lie hidden in the functioning of the EU’s Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA). 
Although often represented as a technocratic exercise, integrating climate 
adaptation in development practices is first and foremost a political process. A 
governmentality approach is able to uncover such political underpinnings, by 
looking specifically at the discursive construction of adaptation in a GCCA context 
(rationality), as well as a particular policy techniques that render it governable 
(government). the EU discursively emphasizes the responsibility of partner 
countries to become ‘resilient’ in the wake of climate change consequences, while 
downplaying the transformative potential of adaptation for development. This 
dynamic is further reflected in policy techniques, which invoke self-governance 
effects among partner states in the form of producing quantified knowledge on 
adaptation. This in its turn further guides the allocation of GCCA support and is 
instrumentalized in order to establish a stable identity for the organization.  






















Adapting to the effects of climate change has become a prominent issue in 
development cooperation, leading to donors addressing climate change adaptation in 
their development efforts (Agrawala & Van Aalst 2008; Runhaar et al. 2018). The 
European Union (EU) has committed itself in this regard to mainstream climate change 
in development cooperation since the early 2000s (Adelle et al. 2018). In order to 
pursue this objective, the EU founded a dedicated institution in 2007: the Global 
Climate Change Alliance (GCCA). The initiative aims to facilitate dialogue as well as 
technical and financial support for adaptation, in particular vis-a-vis Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (GCCA 2015a). Since it 
describes itself as “one of the most significant climate change initiatives in the world” 
and claims to offer ambitious and innovative approaches for adaptation in the South 
(European Commission 2015: 3), it can be considered a highly relevant representation 
of what it means to govern the climate-development nexus, both within the EU and 
beyond.  
Within this article, a governmentality approach will be used in order to uncover the 
power effects hidden in the discursive constructions and policy arrangements of the 
GCCA. Despite an increasing scholarly attention to donors’ efforts in targeting 
adaptation in the South (Ayers & Huq 2009; Lauer & Eguavoen 2016), many existing 
studies tend to approach this issue in a technical manner, void of power relations. An 
alternative strand of research tends to go beyond such ‘technocratic’ accounts, 
perceiving the integration of adaptation in development as a distinctly political 
process with real power effects (cf. Eriksen et al. 2015; Dewulf 2013; Methmann 2010).  
A governmentality approach traces such effects by linking the technical, micro-
institutional practices that surround the adaptation-development nexus (government), 
with the overarching discursive formations that render adaptation governable in a 
development context (rationality) (Lemke 2001). Several authors have already 
attempted to use governmentality to shed new light on how power operates in EU 




for different manifestations of power, ranging from strategic interests and domination 
to more subtle forms of governmental management (Lemke 2001). 
Apart from contributing to an emerging body of literature on the political 
underpinnings of adaptation, this article also constitutes one of the very first academic 
inquiries into the workings of the GCCA. Within the limited research into the climate-
development nexus in an EU context (cf. Gupta & van der Grijp 2010; Adelle et al. 
2018), the role of thematic agencies like the GCCA has so far been understudied. Due 
to the fact that the organization can be perceived as small and technocratic, the GCCA 
has received virtually no scholarly attention so far (for a rare exception, see Colebourn 
2011). Yet, this article will show that the GCCA does invoke power effects through its 
operations in terms of creating a particular ‘truth’ on adaptation and how to pursue it, 
as well as how to generate knowledge on the impact of adaptation projects.  
Methodologically, over 40 policy documents were consulted, covering both 
overarching discursive representations of the climate-development nexus, as well as 
technical documents on GCCA functioning. In addition, four targeted semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with policy officials closely involved in the inner workings 
of the GCCA, in order to get a better image of some of the technical aspects of its 
functioning. 
The first part will introduce the GCCA as a site for analysis. Second, I will introduce 
the analytical components of the concept of governmentality and the Foucauldian 
conception of power. This is followed by our actual analysis of power hidden within 
the discursive representations and governance techniques of the GCCA. Finally, I will 







2. The GCCA 
In recent years, the salience of climate change as a challenge for development 
cooperation has grown considerably. It is now well-established that non-industrialized 
countries will be disproportionally impacted by climate change, thereby putting 
additional constraints on their societies and on poverty reduction efforts by donors 
(Agrawala & Van Aalst 2008). Development efforts should therefore take climate 
change into account and assist countries in adapting to its effects. This is by no means 
an easy task, as the linkages between sectoral aid activities and the climate 
vulnerability of countries to climate change are complex and many-sided. Hence, the 
practice of integrating or ‘mainstreaming’ climate change into aid efforts of donors is 
still a policy area with many blank spots and unresolved questions (Lauer & Eguavoen 
2016).  
Within the EU, the increasing salience of adaptation as a development issue led to the 
GCCA being established in 2007 by the European Commission under the Thematic 
Programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources 
(ENRTP). It can be considered a particularly interesting organization for studying the 
climate-development nexus within EU external relations. It is placed at the intersection 
of both policy domains, as it aims to fulfil a bridge function between the EU’s position 
as a climate leader in international climate negotiations (Bäckstrand & Elgström 2013) 
and its support for adaptation on the national and local level vis-à-vis non-
industrialized countries.  
The agency is structured around two support pillars: policy dialogue and technical 
and financial support for the implementation of national adaptation policies. The latter 
pillar is in its turn structured around three priority areas: (i) climate change 
mainstreaming and poverty reduction, (ii) increasing resilience to climate-related 
stresses and shocks and (iii) sector-based adaptation and mitigation strategies 
(GCCA+ 2018). In 2014, the GCCA became the GCCA+ as part of the newly founded 
Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme (GPGC). The new GCCA+ 
programme is said to be adjusted to the post-2015 climate change landscape by 




cooperation with the private sector and civil society and by basing its actions on 
nationally owned adaptation processes (GCCA 2015a). It was also set to include new 
funding modalities apart from grants to government bodies and innovative forms of 
communication and project monitoring.  
The GCCA symbolizes an increasing importance of climate change in the context of 
EU development cooperation. The need for climate-related support was included in 
the baseline documents that guide the EU’s development activities in third countries: 
the European Consensus for Development (2006; 2017a) and the Agenda for Change 
(2011). One of the central GCCA catch phrases is that it operates “from global to local” 
(GCCA+ 2016), which reflects the position of the GCCA as a complementary 
organization to the international climate regime, as well as to the 2030 Agenda on 
Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (GCCA 2015a). This 
complementarity works in two directions: first of all, the organization aims to translate 
the outcomes agreed upon within the UNFCCC-framework to lower levels of 
government (regional, national and local) within the Global South. Within the wake of 
the 2015 Paris Agreement, the GCCA for example assists countries in formulating their 
Nationally Determined Contributions110 (NDCs), as well as national adaptation 
strategies. Second, the GCCA+ also serves as a tool for ‘uploading’ climate-related 
concerns of its partner countries to the international level. The aim is to assist countries 
in determining their negotiation positions before the annual Conferences of the Parties, 





                                                          
110 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) outline the climate action a 
country is willing to take as part of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement. As soon as a country ratifies 
the Paris Protocol, the ‘intended’ is dropped, and an INDC becomes a Nationally Determined 




3. Unpacking governmentality 
The concept of governmentality was first introduced by Michel Foucault as a way of 
tracing an evolving conception of ‘the art of government’ from the Middle Ages 
onwards. This includes ideas of what can be considered good forms of ruling and 
strategies and institutions to pursue this (Foucault 2007; 2008). Governmentality is 
commonly described as ‘the conduct of conduct’, introducing the idea that power does 
not only work through practices of domination or coercion, but also through practices 
of freedom and consent (Dean 2010; Rutherford 2007). In other words, power can also 
be found in the way in which institutions set the boundaries in which actors are able 
to think and act.  
The two main analytical pillars of governmentality are ‘government’ and ‘rationality’ 
(Lemke 2001). First of all, the rationality refers to the power effect captured in 
discourse. Foucauldian epistemology starts from the idea that discourse is constitutive 
to reality: the way in which things are discursively represented, generate a way in 
which they are made visible and the way in which we are inclined to interact with 
them. Thus, discourse crystallizes into particular forms of knowledge around a certain 
topic. A governmentality analysis therefore pays distinct attention to the discursive 
construction of problems in order to become eligible for governmental intervention. 
Often, such mentalities of government are taken for granted by governmental 
practitioners, perceiving them as neutral and apolitical (Dean 2010). Critical analyses 
from a governmentality perspective aim to put into question such overarching 
mentalities, by looking at their underlying assumptions and how they link to existing 
knowledge and belief systems, as well as the actors that are able to determine them. 
Hence, knowledge plays a crucial role in a Foucauldian conception of power. The very 
basis of his work is that truth is always constructed in a certain historic-cultural context 
or episteme, which “determines what counts as knowledge, truth and reality, and 
what is conceivable during a specific period” (Willcocks 2004: 250). In Foucault’s view, 
the evolution of the art of government in the ‘medieval’ sense to the more subtle 
exercise of power in modern forms of governing is related to the increasing importance 




describes the expansion of objects of governing over time (Foucault 2007). As these 
objects became more interrelated and complex, more knowledge had to be created in 
order to render these objects governable. 
Turning to the ‘government’, this relates to the actual policy measures resulting from 
such discursive construction (Lemke 2001). These can be considered the tangible policy 
measures or practices that operationalize a certain ‘truth’ regarding particular issues, 
located specifically on the micro-level and targeting individuals through practices like 
documentation, statistics and surveillance (Merlingen 2006). Such practices have the 
capacity to determine what is considered ‘normal’ and what is aberrant, thereby 
invoking the homogenization of populations (Schmidt 2015). 
In the Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault provided a contemporary account of the ‘art of 
government’, which he described as essentially neoliberal (Foucault 2008). Neoliberal 
governmentality bases subjectivities on economic principles of market functioning and 
competition, which then become the foundations of individual action (Dilts 2011). 
Through these subjectivities, “a homo economicus is actively constructed, not as a 
citizen who obeys rules, pursues common goods, and addresses problems it shares 
with others, but as a rational and calculating entrepreneur who is not only capable of, 
but also responsible for caring for him or herself” (Brown as cited in Hamann 2009: 43-
44). This is a powerful tool for depolitization and individualization: personal success 
or failure are to be attributed to the individual, while collective or governmental 
responsibility for the factors that might lead to success or failure become diluted (ibid.; 
Foucault 2008). 
However, instead of approaching governmentality as a synonym for neoliberalism or 
advanced liberal government, I consider it an ‘analytics of government’ (cf. Oels 2005; 
Dean 2010) aimed at uncovering a complex interplay of different forms of power in an 
empirical setting. By doing this, I will adhere to Foucault’s own conception of a 
‘triangle’ of three forms of power: sovereignty, discipline and governmental 
management (Foucault as cited in Rosenow 2009). Sovereign power operates in the 
‘classical’ sense, through law and violence over a given territory and its subjects 




confined settings by employing “surveillance and normalizing techniques to produce 
useful, calculable subjects” (ibid.: 10). Finally, governmental management refers to the 
conduct of conduct, or the exercise of power through actions of freedom. The concept 
of governmentality thus incorporates both power in the ‘classic’ sense and power 
through freedom and self-government. Hence, there is more to the concept than 
merely ‘the conduct of conduct’ or advanced liberal government.  
In terms of methods, a governmentality approach requires a combination of (i) textual 
analysis in order to uncover underlying rationalities of government and (ii) a thorough 
insight into the micro-political practices which are deployed in order to deal with a 
certain issue. As I will show in our analysis of the GCCA, the merits of a 
governmentality approach lie in the description, connection and problematization of 
specific expressions of political rationalities, systems of knowledge and micro-
practices. 
4. Governmentality within the GCCA 
4.1 The GCCA as a case for governmentality analysis 
Despite a growing corpus of literature on the subject, our knowledge of what exactly 
constitutes the integration of adaptation in development is still in its infancy. Research 
by Ireland (2012) has done a good job of mapping out this lack of clarity surrounding 
the nexus, discovering a plethora of different interpretations and examples of 
adaptation within development cooperation among interviewed respondents. This 
has led him to conclude that “what happens in the name of adaptation is not yet set” 
(Ireland 2012: 107), an insight that also returns elsewhere: a lack of knowledge among 
development practitioners is a frequently cited obstacle in climate mainstreaming 
efforts by donors (e.g. Persson & Klein 2008), while the academic literature is also 
increasingly aimed at gathering empirical evidence of what works in terms of 
integrating environmental and climate objectives in aid activities (Runhaar et al. 2018).  
Although this knowledge gap has sparked valuable research on the climate-
development nexus, the bulk of literature in this regard can be considered 
depoliticized in nature. It is aimed at finding new and innovative ways of pursuing 




related concerns in the institutional architecture of donors. However, such studies tend 
to approach this integration process as a neutral exercise, and donor agencies pursuing 
it as ‘honest brokers’ in this regard (Opperman 2011).  
This technocratic way of looking at the nexus can also be found in the discourse 
surrounding the GCCA. The organization often describes itself as ‘state of the art’ and 
able to explore new and innovative paths in order to facilitate adaptation in 
development (GCCA 2015a). The integration process is however portrayed routinely 
as a mere administrative innovation. Alternatively, the integration of adaptation in 
development can also be perceived as fundamentally political. If we consider the nexus 
between both policy domains as yet to be settled and therefore contingent, we have to 
perceive governance on this ‘frontier’ of policy making as inherent acts of creation and 
interpretation (Opperman 2011: 73). The framings provided and the policy choices 
made within the climate-development nexus are never neutral, as they determine how 
adaptation is perceived, what knowledge is considered eligible to inform adaptation 
trajectories, what range of policy options is rendered possible and which options are 
excluded. Agencies like the GCCA are not ‘honest brokers’ that merely provide 
adaptation assistance to developing countries. They shape the way adaptation is 
rendered governable and should therefore be considered political organizations, and 
their actions as having real power effects. 
The following parts will critically engage with the power effects rooted in the 
discursive constructions and concrete policy techniques surrounding the GCCA. In 
line with a similar analysis by Kurki (2011) of the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights, this article aims to trace the power configurations that lie hidden 
in the institutional setup of the GCCA. This does not include the implementation of 






4.2 The discursive rationalities of adaptation  
In the following paragraphs, I will argue that the discursive construction of adaptation 
in the context of the GCCA can be summarized as follows. First, it showcases a strong 
focus on the consequences of climate change in partner countries, mostly related to 
stability, security and growth. Second, this problem definition is met with a techno-
scientific framing of adaptation assistance, focused on building resilience to such 
impacts through management schemes and gathering scientific knowledge. This 
particular discursive construction generates power effects by (i) responsibilizing 
partner countries for generating capacity in order to become resilient and withstand 
climate change impacts and (ii) downplay the transformative impact adaptation could 
have on the activities of the GCCA itself.  
First of all, the GCCA discourse on adaptation strongly emphasizes the impact and 
consequences of climate change. The need to adapt to climate change in the context of 
development activities is often pictured against a background of ‘catastrophic’ climate 
change. A grim prospect of future climate change is painted, with numerous references 
to climate-related disasters and their security implications, such as the destabilization 
of entire regions and increasing tensions and conflict. Some communications also 
mention the potential for climate change to increase irregular migration to the EU 
(European Commission 2017b) and even link it to terrorism and radicalization 
(European Union 2017). Finally, the idea of climate change as a threat to economic 
growth is also established in GCCA discourse. Within this particular framing, climate 
change is mostly considered problematic in the sense that it hampers economic activity 
and the growth mantra that is ubiquitously present in development circles. 
This problem definition of adaptation in terms of its potential consequences in terms 
of stability, security and growth is met with an intervention logic revolving around the 






“the ability of an individual, household, community, country or region to 
withstand, adapt to, and quickly recover from, stresses and shocks. Building 
resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance and in 
the context of climate change is linked to disaster risk reduction and management” 
(GCCA 2015b: 4). 
The concept of resilience in GCCA discourse defines adaptation in terms of mitigating 
climate risk and disaster risk reduction. It is for example stated that “the GCCA+ will 
help vulnerable countries to prepare for climate-related natural hazards, reduce risks 
and minimize impacts by integrating multi-sector risk management approaches in 
national development planning” (GCCA 2015a: 9). Examples in this regard are 
plentiful, often technocratic and for example linked to capacity building in improving 
climate science, introducing risk assessment models, enhancing measuring, and 
reporting and verification (MRV) schemes (GCCA 2016). This conceptualization as 
support for adaptation in terms of implementing technocratic and scientific methods 
is often placed under the banner of ‘climate-smart development’ (e.g. GCCA 2015a: 8).  
This points at a scientific way of managing climate risk, something also apparent in 
the central role of knowledge creation on adaptation in GCCA discourse. Adaptation in 
this regard is framed in terms of “understanding the key drivers of risk and 
components of risk assessment” (GCCA 2016: 4). This “requires observing the 
phenomenon, producing relevant data to be used by decision-makers and learning 
from existing experience and best practices to design robust actions” (GCCA 2015b: 
28). Knowledge on the risk associated with climate change needs to be produced on a 
scientific basis, and needs to serve as a blueprint for adaptation assistance. Although 
there are some minor references for the use of alternative forms of knowledge (e.g. 
indigenous knowledge), it is clear that the production of such knowledge is first and 
foremost based on scientific techniques. This is also explicitly recognized in the GCCA 
concept note, which states that “the best available scientific knowledge will inform 
GCCA+ actions and choices, including the possibility of developing and transferring 





Also in relation to climate change as a threat to economic growth and security, GCCA 
discourse mostly emphasizes the need to mitigate this effect in order to safeguard 
growth and stability. Regarding the former, this is for example apparent in the 
discourse regarding agricultural support, in which adapting to climate change is still 
framed within the perimeters of boosting productivity and growth (e.g. GCCA 2015b: 
vii). The increasing emphasis on public-private partnerships and attracting private 
investments for adaptation, also hints at a market-based approach to adaptation begin 
pursued through the GCCA. Indeed, one of the aspired improvements in the switch 
from GCCA to GCCA+ was a stronger involvement of the private sector (GCCA 2015a: 
11). In discourse, this translates into an increasing emphasis on public-private 
partnerships and building an enabling environment for attracting private investments 
for financing adaptation (e.g. GCCA 2012a; 2015b). Regarding the latter, discourse 
mentions “to use the GCCA to support and strengthen partner countries' capacities to 
identify, manage and mitigate security threats posed by climate change” (European 
Parliament 2008: 7). 
In sum, the discursive construction of climate change in the context of the GCCA is 
mostly focused on its – potentially catastrophic – consequences in terms of stability, 
security and growth. As a result, building ‘resilience’ via adaptation mainly translates 
into responsibilizing capacity in partner countries in order to deal with and withstand 
to such consequences. From a governmentality perspective, two main power effects 
can be identified based on this framing. First of all, it shifts the limelight of providing 
security, stability and growth squarely towards partner countries themselves. At the 
same time, the GCCA reduces itself to an actor that assists in technical interventions 
in order to build resilience in partner countries. As such, this representation of 
adaptation tends to neglect the impact adaptation has on the providers of aid 
assistance themselves.  
Indeed, it is frequently argued that adaptation could have a potentially transformative 
effect on development efforts (cf. Ireland 2011; Gupta 2010), by targeting the 
underlying drivers that render societies vulnerable to such climate impacts in the first 




activities in the context of power relations that have hampered development efforts 
over the past 40 years” (Cannon & Müller-Mahn 2010: 633). Indeed, as an alternative 
to economic growth, security and technological/scientific progress as the main pillars 
of reducing vulnerability, thus perpetuating the historic drivers of development 
cooperation, adaptation could shift the limelight towards power imbalances and socio-
economic inequalities that leave people vulnerable in the first place. Rather than 
focusing on techno-scientific fixes, it could imply an increasing focus on “the social 
and political systems that within which vulnerability is created and sustained” 
(Nagoda 2015: 570). 
Within the GCCA discourse, there are no traces of such transformative 
conceptualization. Adaptation is mostly instrumentalized to perpetuate existing 
development paradigms, instead of serving as a vector for change in this regard. The 
very notion of ‘finding win-win approaches’ (e.g. GCCA+ 2015a: 10; 2015b: 4) – 
something that is at the basis of the GCCAs approach towards adaptation assistance – 
implies that adaptation solutions are to be found within existing assumptions that 
guide development activities. 
4.3 The government: policy techniques 
This discursive emphasis on developing countries’ responsibility in adaptation, while 
downplaying transformative policies by the EU, is also reflected in policy techniques 
invoking self-governance effects in partner countries. In the following paragraphs, I 
will shed further light on (i) what self-governance effects can be identified in GCCA 
functioning and (ii) how these feed back into the reproduction of the GCCAs identity 
as a ‘state of the art’ organization.  
Our research shows that the GCCA exports self-governance techniques that within the 
development cooperation literature have been linked to neoliberal governmentality 
(cf. Krever 2013; Merry & Conley 2011) and within the literature on the international 
climate regime to ‘green governmentality’ (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006; Rutherford 
2007). Arguably, the two are closely related, as they both encapsulate forms of 
governance that replace the political with the technocratic (Welsh 2014). Neoliberal 




developing countries into producing standardized and quantified knowledge on 
complex social phenomena, that in turn guides decision-making on foreign aid (Merry 
& Conley 2011). The literature on green governmentality in its turn describes the 
process of expanding such techniques of management and scientific inquiry into the 
realm of environmental- and climate change policy (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006). 
This results in partner countries accepting a certain ‘truth’ on adaptation as intended 
by the Commission. Hence, “the process of measurement produces the phenomenon 
it claims to measure” (Merry & Conley 2011: 84) as GCCA partner countries provide 
the knowledge needed to legitimize a certain conception of adaptation. 
The criteria for receiving GCCA support already hint at such self-governance effects. 
First of all, the GCCA explicitly describes the political commitment of partner 
countries as a condition in this regard. This criterion is defined in the GCCA+ concept 
note as being “engaged in the National Adaptation Planning (NAP) and Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) processes; demonstrate an interest in 
deeper cooperation with the EU on climate change, a willingness to assume ownership 
and a desire to scale up successful pilot and research projects from other regions 
and/or sectors, adapting them to the local context” (GCCA 2015a: 10). In addition, the 
2008 GCCA implementation framework describes potentially eligible countries for 
support as “preferably politically active in the UNFCCC negotiations, and in this sense 
serving as a model for other countries in its group/region” (European Commission 
2008: 23). 
These criteria for receiving GCCA support explicitly define the agency’s role in terms 
of creating “model states” within the broader international climate change regime. The 
question then remains what techniques are used in this regard. First of all, the GCCA+ 
index for the measurement and quantification of vulnerability aims to establish a clear-
cut definition of climate ‘vulnerability’, in order to compare potential partner countries 
on this basis. This ‘ranking’ of countries based on their vulnerabilities is then used as 
one of the conditions to determine the eligibility of project proposals to receive GCCA 
funding. If a project is situated in a country more vulnerable to climate change 




assistance (Interview 1). Third parties need to specify their ‘score’ on this index, 
thereby marking their vulnerability to climate change according to a definition of the 
concept completely determined by the Commission (GCCA+ 2017b). This legitimizes 
a particular conception of what constitutes ‘climate vulnerability’ and perpetuates it 
in every project proposal that is submitted with the GCCA+.  
Apart from this index, every project also has to live up to some requirements in terms 
of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). It needs to be initiated by creating an 
identification fiche and a logical framework (log frame), consisting of a number of 
indicators in order to measure its impact and outcome. These indicators can be taken 
from EU-based sources, such as the GCCA+ specific log frame and the GCCA+ index 
(cf. supra). In addition, a project design can also include indicators from non-EU 
sources, such as the SDG framework or country-specific frameworks. Although 
partner country governments are the main partners for GCCA-projects (Interview 2), 
local stakeholders (research centers, universities etc.) are consulted in order to generate 
knowledge on concrete projects, based on the selected indicators. 
Although GCCA partners have some freedom in selecting their own indicators for a 
project that they would like to implement, the knowledge management strategy within 
the GCCA does strive towards some commonality in terms of M&E across projects. 
Actors are encouraged to use indicators from Commission-based sources (such as the 
dedicated log frame and the GCCA+ index) in order to generate some level of 
comparability between projects and to come to a more general understanding of ‘good’ 
adaptation practices in the field. Although most of these aspects of knowledge 
management are described in ‘soft’ terms – aimed at encouraging, rather than 
demanding this type of knowledge generation – it is clear that the quantification and 
streamlining of knowledge is an essential part of technical assistance through the 
GCCA. Sticking to the example of M&E schemes, these are not only an obligation for 
GCCA supported projects, their diffusion is also a goal in itself. One study explicitly 
scored GCCA partner countries on the quality of their M&E schemes and logical 
frameworks for programmes, as well as on their ability to effectively manage climate 




such techniques is thus actively promoted and monitored through the GCCA. In 
addition, more ‘direct’ power effects in this regard can be observed in budget support 
modalities. As is the case in GCCA activities in Bhutan for example, improving the 
quality of statistical data and sectoral monitoring systems can effectively become a 
criterion for receiving additional tranches of budget support (GCCA 2015b :37). 
This focus on quantification and statistical data is further perpetuated through the 
emphasis on upscaling, which allows for comparison between countries based on their 
performance in projects, as measured through the described techniques. This “scaling-
up” exercise is part of the evolution from GCCA to GCCA+ and aims to elevate GCCA 
support from launching pilot projects towards supporting projects with a potential 
‘multiplier’ effect, hence generating more impact with only limited funding. For 
example, upscaling could imply a continued or enhanced support for previously 
successful projects or the replication of a successful project template in a different 
setting (e.g. from the local to the national or regional level). In terms of implications 
for the partner country itself, the emphasis on scaling-up clearly gives the edge 
towards administrations having the capacity to “implement programmes with larger 
funding allocations” (GCCA 2015a: 10). Partners having a larger capacity – which, once 
again, is strongly connected to installing the right kind of monitoring systems – or 
having demonstrated their ability to successfully implement projects, inevitably score 
higher on this criterion for receiving GCCA support. In contrast, smaller states with 
less capacity are to be assisted through the implementation of larger regional projects, 
albeit adapted to the local context. 
When bringing together these three instances of GCCA support criteria, it is evident 
that their combination forms a strong mechanism for invoking self-governance among 
partner countries. These seem to have no choice but to co-opt the policy techniques 
instated by the Commission, as they effectively function as criteria for receiving GCCA 
support. In their turn, these techniques determine the meaning of climate 
vulnerability, the meaning of a ‘successful’ adaptation project and the capacity needed 
to produce knowledge in this regard. In addition, if countries have successfully 




envisioned by the Commission, they are more likely to receive further GCCA 
assistance in order to ‘scale-up’ their projects.  
Apart from invoking self-governance effects within partner countries, I also find that 
this production of knowledge is used for identity-building within the GCCA itself. 
This is already clearly reflected in the language used in the context of knowledge 
management. The need for a ‘consistent identity’ and a ‘branding’ of the GCCA is for 
example strongly articulated in a dedicated strategy on communication and 
knowledge management (2012: 3). Take for instance the overarching objectives of the 
strategy: 
I. Foster knowledge building (learning from experience) and exchange 
between and amongst the stakeholders, to improve their ability to 
contribute to successful GCCA outcomes and overall impact.  
II. Promote the visibility and a positive perception of the GCCA initiative, 
notably by building on the knowledge acquired in the field during 
implementation. 
 
These priorities clearly show that the knowledge building exercise is mainly framed in 
function of establishing the GCCA initiative as an established center of expertise, and 
that the knowledge management and communication objectives are closely 
intertwined. The strategy goes on saying that “for the GCCA, communication and 
knowledge management are closely linked and feed into each other. Knowledge 
building based on achievements and results is at the core of GCCA communication, 
which aims to base its credibility on implementation results, and also to increase its 
impact through the use of thorough and evidence-based communication” (GCCA 
2012b: 6).  
In the same vein, the creation of a GCCA+ index for quantifying vulnerability not only 
puts the power of defining what vulnerability constitutes squarely within the EU itself, 
it also serves as a tool for establishing and reproducing the social relevance of the 
organization as a whole. One example in this regard is the dedicated annex in the 
GCCA orientation package – which serves as a crash course in how the GCCA 




includes guidelines for actors to communicate success stories and even mentions the 
‘legal obligation’ of this communication exercise (GCCA+ 2017c). 
Hence, the power that lies in the knowledge production techniques used within the 
GCCA are not only reductionist and capable of invoking self-governance in partner 
countries, but organizations like the GCCA themselves have also become bound by 
the power of these systems and define their added value within its parameters in order 
to establish a stable identity (Freistein 2015). This is not only the case in relation to 
other organizations, but even in relation to its added value within the EU itself. Ever 
since its inception, EU member states have been reluctant in channeling climate-
related aid through the GCCA. Especially bigger member states like Germany and 
France have been known to rather channel their funding through other – bigger – 
organizations like the World Bank (Colebourn 2011: 4). Thus, also vis-à-vis EU member 
states, this knowledge management objective aims to establish the GCCA as an added 
value in terms of climate financing (GCCA 2012b). 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This article aimed to critically engage with assistance to adaptation within EU 
development cooperation through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA). By 
using a governmentality approach, I showed that power is inherently present in both 
the discourse that renders adaptation governable through the GCCA and the policy 
techniques that shape its functioning. This is apparent in discursive elements that 
pointed at a technocratic and consequence-based conception of adaptation assistance, 
thereby reducing its transformative potential. In contrast, the responsibility of partner 
countries themselves is highlighted in this regard, by centralizing the concept of 
resilience in terms of maintaining economic growth, stability and security.  
Within the policy techniques, this responsibilization of partner countries is again 
reflected in the criteria for receiving GCCA support. These effectively strive for 
modelling partner countries in accepting and perpetuating a certain conception of 
adaptation, based on M&E schemes and quantifiable knowledge products. The ability 
to determine what qualifies as knowledge on adaptation is infused with power 




be approached in policy making. This reality seems to be inescapable for partner 
countries, and bears the risk of repressing alternative or local epistemologies and 
practices that might display a different vision on adaptive practices (cf. Fogel 2004). 
Although the GCCA by no means neglects the local level in its operations, its assistance 
here is also mostly defined in terms of enhancing resilience, planning, observing and 
installing M&E schemes (GCCA 2015b).  
Many of our findings relate back to the literature on neoliberal governmentality within 
development cooperation and – related to that – the work on ‘green governmentality’ 
within the international climate regime. What both of these have in common is their 
identification of self-governance techniques through monitoring systems 
substantiated with quantifiable indicators, which are in their turn legitimized based 
on scientific credentials. From this perspective, mainstreaming adaptation in 
development cooperation can again be perceived as an extension of these techniques 
into the realm of potentially transformative new policy challenges, in order to render 
them governable through roughly the same modus operandi.  
The scientific and technocratic basis of adaptation assistance through the GCCA is not 
inherently problematic, but becomes so when used to reinforce existing development 
paradigms (such as growth and security) and to responsibilize partner countries in 
accepting a certain truth on adaptation and climate change in general. In this 
conception, the notion of ‘green governmentality’ is therefore a logical consequence of 
what post-development thinkers like Escobar have dubbed the self-perpetuating 
functions of development cooperation (Escobar 1995). This article thus reiterates many 
of the power effects observed in similar scholarly work, while adding additional 
insights into how discourse and policy techniques interact and produce such self-
governance effects.  
Within the GCCA, self-governance techniques are not only apparent in the 
relationship vis-à-vis partner countries, but also in the goal of creating a stable identity 
through gathering the knowledge products that these techniques are ultimately aimed 
at creating. In other words, the self-perpetuating dynamic lies precisely in the fact that 




by these self-governance techniques. In order to show their added value as an 
adaptation-centered development agency, they need to prove their worth based on 
existing policy techniques within the development regime, thus transposing them to 
the creation of knowledge regarding adaptation. This is an interesting dynamic, which 
this article touches upon but could potentially spur further research.  
Given these insights provided on the power effects rooted in GCCA discourse and 
policy techniques, I would like to advocate a more symmetric approach towards 
adaptation assistance. Adaptation is by any means a local phenomenon, and more can 
be done within the GCCA to find a balance between technocratic/scientific 
perspectives one the one hand and alternative perspectives on adaptation on the other 
hand. Indeed, although the importance of local knowledge is to a certain extent 
acknowledged within the GCCA, the setup of institutional arrangements and policy 
techniques clearly reinforce self-governance techniques that promote the scientific and 
the quantifiable. In other words, although alternative or local epistemologies might 
play a role in GCCA functioning, it is vividly clear that the frames of reference in which 
knowledge in this regard needs to be fitted is determined by the GCCA itself.  
Finally, the GCCA can be considered an extension of EU climate leadership within 
international climate negotiations. Through its adaptation assistance, centered around 
a notion of resilience and techno-managerial interventions, it is implied that non-
industrialized countries need to adapt to a future world in which the impacts of 
climate change are inevitable. The discursive introduction and use of resilience in the 
framing of adaptation in non-industrialized countries erases any alternative 
geopolitical future in which climate change is timely halted, and a present in which 
the inevitability of the outcomes of climate change remain contestable (Methmann & 
Oels 2015: 64). Although I do not contest the necessity of adaptation assistance, I do 
call for scholars’ need to remain vigilant when it comes to such discursive 
constructions. Resilience can become a vector through which the margins of the 
climate change debate are slowly moved away from pursuing ambitious mitigation 
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This PhD project aimed to provide a multi-faceted understanding of the climate-
development nexus within the European Union. Through the course of this 
dissertation, the use of different theoretical perspectives for studying different 
empirical dimensions of the nexus allowed me to generate a detailed picture of what 
exactly happens in the name of adaptation mainstreaming within EU development 
cooperation, as well as the power effects that are generated through this 
mainstreaming rationale.  
What drove this research was the observation that the international development 
community has been increasingly trying to take climate change adaptation into 
account. Due to the many ways in which climate change is able to affect societies in 
the Global South and thus influence development efforts, this mainstreaming process 
is by no means a straightforward exercise. Yet, our understanding of how 
mainstreaming is pursued and what its implications are for practitioners in both donor 
and partner countries is still in its infancy. In addition, adaptation can also be 
perceived as a new ‘frontier’ for development cooperation. Because of its complex 
interlinkages with development cooperation, the process of mainstreaming also 
implies providing meaning to adaptation within aid activities.  
In the course of the last two decades, the salience of mainstreaming climate change has 
also grown considerably within EU development cooperation. The EU is an uniquely 
interesting actor in this regard, as it is often perceived – and also perceives itself – as a 
leading actor within international development cooperation and climate change 
governance. However, much remains to be known about how this integration process 
unfolds within the context of the EU. This leads to the overarching research question 
that underpinned this dissertation: how can the climate-development nexus within 




The dissertation was built around two separate theoretical perspectives. First of all, the 
institutionalist approach towards the nexus focused on the – among others – 
organizational and procedural adjustments to aid activities in order to take climate 
change into account. I based myself on two main gaps in this literature: a general lack 
of empirical knowledge on the implementation of this ‘mainstreaming’ rationale in the 
field by aid donors (what works, what does not?) and the lack of knowledge in this 
regard on EU development cooperation in particular. Article 1 was dedicated to filling 
this knowledge gap by looking at the mainstreaming of adaptation in the development 
activities of the European Commission in the current aid cycle (2014-2020).  
The second perspective can be placed under the header of a critical approach towards 
the nexus. It was based on the assumption that pursuing adaptation in the context of 
development cooperation is a political process, rather than a neutral or technocratic 
one. The production of knowledge on what adaptation mainstreaming entails also 
implies that a particular conception of adaptation in development cooperation is 
presented as legitimate and a certain set of potential policy solutions as feasible. This 
process inevitably also excludes alternative conceptions of the integration process, and 
the possibility of governing it in a different manner. Hence, this approach allowed me 
to look for the power effects encapsulated in the way in which adaptation 
mainstreaming is being represented in EU development discourse and the way in 
which adaptation is rendered governable in development activities. Article 2 looked 
at the discourse of the Commission regarding the nexus, using a critical frame 
approach. Article 3 aimed at approaching a specific thematic EU agency situated 
within the nexus – the Global Climate Change Alliance – from a governmentality 
perspective. 
The following sections serve as general conclusions to the overall research project. I 
will start by discussing the main findings presented within the different articles 
constituting this dissertation, as well as how they interrelate. Subsequently, I will 
reflect on the broader implications of my research in light of some of the debates that 
I have touched upon in the course of my PhD trajectory. Third, I will explore the limits 




PhD dissertation will be dedicated to the policy implications and recommendations 
that can be distilled from this research project.  
2. Main findings 
This section is aimed at formulating overarching conclusions that can be drawn from 
the three research articles that constitute this dissertation. First of all, I will reconstruct 
the main findings for each of the three papers individually and identify the common 
thread that runs through all of them: the fact that adaptation is retrofitted in 
development cooperation, rather than invoking any transformation or system change 
in this regard. Second, I will argue that the two theoretical perspectives used within 
this dissertation represent two distinct layers of understanding the climate-
development nexus within the EU, with the political underpinnings of adaptation 
mainstreaming influencing the institutional setup that has been erected in this regard.  
2.1 Retrofitting adaptation in development cooperation 
As said in the introduction, the different articles presented in this dissertation are 
based on two overarching theoretical perspectives. Combining the individual findings 
of the three articles therefore provides an integrated and multi-faceted answer to the 
question as to how the EU climate-development nexus can be understood. Within the 
following paragraphs, I will further elaborate on how the provided insights 
throughout the different articles connect and interlock, and how their combination 
enhances our understanding of the climate-development nexus. I argue that the 
common thread throughout the different articles is twofold: on the one hand, all three 
articles point to a retrofitting of adaptation in development. In short, adaptation is 
encapsulated within existing development ideas and structures, instead of serving as 
a transformative concept in this regard. Second, all articles clearly point to a top-down 
conception of adaptation mainstreaming.  
On an institutionalist level, I found that mainstreaming efforts within this current aid 
cycle are high. Linking back to the analytical framework used in article 1, the 
Commission’s mainstreaming efforts were described in terms of ‘harmonization’. This 
refers to a win-win approach in which adaptation is strongly incorporated in focal 




investigated country contexts. The link between adaptation and such sectoral aid 
activities was already strongly embedded in the agenda-setting for the current policy 
cycle, for instance by explicitly referring to these interlinkages in the instruction notes 
sent to EU delegations prior to the formulation of their respective NIPs. 
Mainstreaming efforts for these specific focal sectors generally remains upheld 
throughout the policy cycle. In contrast, mainstreaming levels for other focal sectors 
showed more fluctuations, both among countries as well as throughout different 
phases of the policy cycle.  
This high level of mainstreaming was linked to the growing salience and political will 
regarding adaptation mainstreaming within the Commission. This is for example 
evident in terms of financial incentives for mainstreaming, of which the 20% norm for 
climate-compatible financing in the current MFF is the main manifestation. Moreover, 
the commitment to mainstream climate change in aid activities is also persistently 
included in all overarching documents that guide EU development activities, such as 
the Agenda for Change (2011) and both the old and new European Consensus for 
Development (2006; 2017). On the level of EU delegations, article 1 pointed at the 
important role of dedicated focal persons for pushing the mainstreaming rationale 
within their respective delegations. 
Hence, the institutionalist approach to the nexus identified an integration rationale 
which has reached a point of self-evidence among many EU delegations. Yet, the 
influence of adaptation on development efforts is still confined in terms of ambition 
and scope. Indeed, little or no evidence of prioritizing climate change adaptation in 
development activities was found. In other words, the characterization of EU 
mainstreaming efforts as ‘harmonization’ points at finding win-win approaches for 
adaptation in the context of aid activities, but not at adaptation invoking any system 
change in aid activities.  
Institutionalist explanations for this observation pointed at various mainstreaming 
barriers in this regard. For one, the effectiveness of procedural tools and organizational 
adjustments as intended by HQ-agencies within the Commission is hampered by a 




within many delegations. This was mostly apparent for procedural requirements such 
as country environmental profiles (which are either non-existent or grossly outdated) 
and climate risk assessments (which are often unknown). Hence, stronger 
mainstreaming efforts are mostly hampered by a persistent limitation in terms of in-
house capacity.  
The critical approach to the nexus pointed out that adaptation to climate change in a 
development context is primarily framed in terms of the potentially catastrophic 
consequences climate change might harbor for developing countries. Article 2 looked 
at the discourse linking development efforts with climate change in EU policy 
documents, and found framings of climate change as a threat to human security and 
growth. Regarding the former, climate change is depicted as a threat to individual 
livelihoods resulting from an expected increase in natural disasters. This is to be 
countered by building resilience in developing countries, with the meaning of 
resilience fluctuating between purely techno-scientific and more contextualized, 
vulnerability-based conceptions. Regarding the latter, the growth frame constructs 
developing countries as having to build enabling environments for attracting climate-
related investments and technologies. In addition, both the human security and 
growth frame were identified as conceptualized based on a top-down perspective, 
showcasing very little attention to local agency.  
Article 3 reiterated many of these discursive constructions in the context of the GCCA, 
while also sharpening some insights provided in article 2. First of all, the importance 
of resilience was reconfirmed as central in EU discourse on the nexus, and was more 
clearly linked to a techno-scientific conception of adaptation with a strong emphasis 
on scientific knowledge production. Second, securitizing tendencies were also 
apparent with regards to the GCCA and also more ‘realist’ in nature, pointing at 
potential climate change-induced destabilizations and conflicts on a regional scale, 
while also directly linking it to EU security interests. In addition, article 3 connected 
these discursive constructions to concrete policy techniques employed by the agency, 
in order to uncover power effects that stem from it. By using the concept of 




accepting and implementing an EU-determined vision on climate resilience, while the 
potential for adaptation to alter EU development efforts is mostly silenced. Indeed, the 
power effects hidden within the GCCAs functioning create what could provocatively 
be called a strait-jacket of knowledge production. Partner countries are bound by pre-
defined notions of climate vulnerability, climate adaptation and desirable adaptation 
outcomes.  
What binds the institutionalist and critical perspectives together is the absence of 
transformativity in this integration exercise. Adaptation could potentially invoke a 
system change in development, operating as a vector for aid activities re-engaging 
themselves with the power relations that influence people’s access to – among other 
things – resources and decision-making structures, which in the end co-determine 
their adaptive capacity. Moreover, it could even serve some emancipatory purpose by 
incorporating alternative epistemologies on adaptation to climate change, rooted in 
the context in which they ought to be implemented. Yet, evidence of such 
transformative approaches are largely absent in both the institutionalist as well as the 
critical understanding provided in this dissertation. First of all, both perspectives point 
to a mainstreaming exercise in which adaptation is retrofitted into existing 
development rationales, instead of serving as a real vector for change in this regard. 
Institutionally, the focus lies predominantly on finding win-win approaches between 
adaptation and sectoral activities. Hence, mainstreaming efforts are confined to 
sectoral activities which are most evidently linked to climate change and climate 
vulnerability. Yet, even within these sectors, climate change is never treated as a 
priority with the potential of redefining sectoral intervention strategies altogether. 
Discursively, climate change adaptation is framed within the parameters of existing 
development rationales like growth and security.  
Second, both perspectives point at a predominantly top-down mainstreaming 
rationale. Institutionally, mainstreaming climate change adaptation is pursued 
through the creation of a mainstreaming ‘toolbox’ with dedicated procedures by the 
Commission, as well as by altering the financial incentive structure on the highest level 




GCCA also showed that the meaning of adaptation and climate vulnerability in the 
context of development cooperation is constituted by the Commission and then 
translated into policy tools in which this meaning is transposed to and perpetuated by 
GCCA partner countries. These have no choice but to adopt the meaning contained 
within these techniques in order to become eligible for assistance.  
2.2 Different layers of understanding 
Apart from the fact that parallel conclusions can be drawn from both theoretical 
perspectives underpinning this dissertation, they also represent different ‘layers’ of 
understanding the integration of adaptation in EU aid activities. These layers range 
from more ‘shallow’ institutionalist explanations for current mainstreaming efforts in 
EU development cooperation, to more fundamental explanations based on the political 
inclinations that underpin mainstreaming efforts. In the introduction, I described this 
dissertation in terms of combining positivist and interpretivist epistemologies. This 
implies that I depart from the ontological premise of a shared, yet inter-subjective 
reality. As to fully understand this reality, one needs to combine both a factual 
understanding of a certain institutional reality with an understanding of the subjective 
or political understandings that determined how these particular institutions came to 
be. As I have indicated several times in the course of this dissertation, the two 
overarching perspectives used within this PhD thesis represent these two layers of 
understanding.  
I argue that the way in which adaptation is ‘imagined’ as a development issue 
influences the institutional reality that is created in order to implement it within EU 
development cooperation. The previous section made clear that there are no signs of 
any transformative impact of adaptation in the context of EU development 
cooperation. Existing development paradigms such as growth and security are used 
to provide meaning to adaptation as a development challenge, and the responsibility 
for ‘change’ is almost entirely projected upon EU partner countries in the Global South. 
Combining this with the fact that adaptation mainstreaming is pursued in an almost 
purely top-down fashion, it is of no surprise that the institutional structures erected 




of adaptation in concrete aid activities. In other words, the way in which adaptation is 
imagined as a development challenge within the Commission generates an 
institutional reality which leaves very little room for it to invoke a system change in 
development cooperation.  
This lack of transformativity is thus also implicitly recognizable in the institutional 
aspects of mainstreaming as described in article 1. Aid practitioners in EU delegations 
are expected to generate a sense of climate awareness through a series of procedural 
and organizational requirements, which feed the perception of adaptation as ‘just 
another requirement’ and mainstreaming it in sectoral activities as a way of ‘keeping 
Brussels happy’. Climate focal persons in individual delegations can play an important 
role, but their relevance and contribution to the overall mainstreaming effort is not 
structural, as it is strongly dependent on personal motivations in this regard. Apart 
from these requirements, very little additional capacity is created in order to integrate 
adaptation in aid activities in a more fundamental fashion. 
The GCCA seems to be the most promising development in this regard, something 
which was also indicated in article 1. However, not only is its funding still rather 
limited in light of the scale of climate finance that is needed, article 3 also showed that 
this self-declared ‘innovative’ agency does not add any real substance to the 
Commission’s overall mainstreaming rationale. For one, GCCA discourse echoes 
many of the discursive constructions identified in the overall Commission discourse 
on the climate-development nexus. Moreover, the discursive constructions and policy 
techniques identified in the context of the GCCA are mainly preoccupied with the 
responsibility of partner countries in evoking change, and far less so with change 
within EU development cooperation itself.  
In sum, the three papers presented within this dissertation are mutually connected and 
provide a coherent and layered understanding of the climate-development nexus 
within the EU. On the most fundamental level, the political understanding of 
adaptation mainstreaming in development fails to imagine it as a transformative issue 
for aid activities. This translates into an institutional reality within the Commission in 




requirement for practitioners in delegations to be taken into account through 
procedural requirements and organizational innovations. However, this institutional 
context, despite the presence of self-proclaimed innovative agencies like the GCCA, 
lacks any substantial capacity in order to fundamentally alter existing development 
paradigms. 
3. Further reflections 
In this section, I will further elaborate on a range of overarching debates that 
correspond with the findings presented within this dissertation. Although the subjects 
of these debates were not directly targeted through the conducted research, the results 
of this PhD research do indirectly touch upon them. More specifically, I will highlight 
three different aspects that I feel are important to further elaborate upon. First of all, I 
will discuss the implications of this research for our understanding of the EU as a 
leading international actor on both climate change and development cooperation, as 
these role conceptions were the main arguments for rendering the EU an interesting 
case for investigating climate mainstreaming. Second, I will further explore the 
complex relationship between ‘scientific’ and ‘local knowledge for climate change 
adaptation, building on my problematization of quantified and scientific forms of 
knowledge production in article 3. Third, I will elaborate on the persistence of a ‘grey 
zone’ between Official Development Assistance and climate financing, an observation 
that is also implicitly confirmed through this research and is needed in order to 
provide a truly comprehensive picture of climate change mainstreaming in EU 
development cooperation.  
3.1 Implications for the EU as an international climate actor 
From the onset, the idea of the EU being considered a leading actor within both the 
international climate change regime and the international development regime was 
one of the main legitimizations of investigating the climate-development nexus within 
this context. Hence, this section is dedicated to further exploring how the findings 
presented in this dissertation impact these role conceptions and how they provide a 
contribution to the literature in this regard. First of all, I will elaborate on the relevance 




climate change leader. Subsequently, I will engage with the literature on the EU as an 
international development actor, and discuss the research findings in light of the 
debate on the securitization of EU aid and some of the recent evolutions in EU 
development policy.  
3.1.1 The EU as an international climate leader 
Although this dissertation is focused on a very specific part of EU external climate 
action, the findings presented throughout this research are certainly relevant within 
this overarching policy domain as well. The literature on EU external climate change 
policies has always revolved strongly around the concept of EU climate leadership (cf. 
Gupta & Ringius 2001; Bäckstrand & Elgström 2013). Because of its history of strong 
directional leadership by implementing innovative and ambitious internal climate 
policies, the expectation was that I would find traces of this ambitious stance towards 
climate governance in its external policies as well. 
What I found is a development policy that is indeed increasingly taking climate change 
adaptation into account. Moreover, when comparing the assessment of climate 
mainstreaming in this PhD to earlier ones (e.g. European Court of Auditors 2006), it is 
also clear that mainstreaming efforts have improved in the current aid cycle. For 
example, whereas many country strategies in the previous cycle did not even mention 
climate change as a cross-cutting issue for EU development work, the assessed NIPs 
in article 1 show that all delegations at least to some extent take climate change 
adaptation into account. This rise in the salience of climate change as a development 
issue also corresponds with the ‘leadiator’ role conception as put forward by 
Bäckstrand & Elgström (2013), as this implies an increasing attention towards 
establishing stronger relations with developing countries.  
However, when incorporating the insights provided by the more critical investigations 
into the EU’s mainstreaming rationale, I can also shed some new light on this 
leadership role. The fact that the EU provides meaning to adaptation in the context of 
existing development paradigms and downplays the transformative potential of 
adaptation on its development efforts, already nuances its ambitions in terms of 




‘prioritization’ in mainstreaming activities within different EU delegations. Hence, it 
is safe to conclude that EU directional leadership in this regard is not pursued to the 
extent that adaptation becomes a game changer for development cooperation.  
Moreover, the omnipresence of the resilience concept in EU external climate policies 
also has some implications for EU climate leadership. As was already stated in article 
3 on the GCCA, resilience effectively erases power imbalances that are at the core of 
the problematique of international climate change: the fact that industrialized 
countries are responsible for causing climate change due to their historical emissions 
record gives them the prime responsibility to mitigate its further reinforcement and to 
assist developing countries in adapting to its effects. Both for mitigation and 
adaptation, the concept of resilience generates remarkable power effects. Regarding 
mitigation, the contingency and dismal worldview that is projected through the 
concept, implies that developing countries need to adapt to a future world in which 
the impacts of climate change are inevitable. Regarding adaptation, the concept shifts 
the responsibility for building adaptive capacity squarely to countries vulnerable to 
the effects of climate change, while again silencing the role of industrialized countries 
in this regard. This was also one of the main conclusions of article 3.  
The constant and ubiquitous use of resilience within the EU’s external climate change 
discourse is thus problematic from the viewpoint of EU climate leadership. It causes a 
fundamental inconsistency in its stance regarding climate change. On the one hand, 
the pursuit of directional leadership in climate mitigation and the EU’s constant re-
affirmation of its own ambitions in this regard suggest that mitigation remains the 
prime objective within the international climate change regime. Further climate 
change needs to be avoided at all cost, and industrialized countries – of which quite a 
few are EU member states – need to do whatever they can to fulfil their responsibilities 
in this regard. On the other hand, the central role of resilience in EU external climate 
policies – and EU foreign policy in general – depoliticizes this mitigation responsibility 
of industrialized countries. One could argue that a sensible climate strategy needs to 
have both mitigation targets as well as a resilience strategy. Yet, in light of a growing 




(e.g. Rueter & Russel 2017; van der Heijden 2017), I argue that the centrality of 
resilience in EU external climate policies can be considered problematic due to its 
depoliticizing effects in this regard. It diminishes the continuous responsibility the EU 
and other historical polluters have in maintaining ambitious and stringent mitigation 
targets. Article 2 and 3 provided a detailed account of how these mechanisms for 
shifting responsibilities from the EU to partner countries in the Global South manifest 
themselves both in discourse and concrete policy techniques.  
3.1.2 The EU as an international development actor 
One of the main findings within this dissertation is the observation that adaptation is 
retrofitted in existing development paradigms, which I have described as revolving 
mainly around notions of security and growth. In order to fully grasp the implications 
of this finding, it is important to get a good image of how these paradigms evolved in 
recent years. Within the following paragraphs, I will therefore first elaborate on the 
debate regarding the securitization of EU development cooperation and the increasing 
importance of strategic considerations in EU development cooperation. Subsequently, 
I will outline recent evolutions within the growth-paradigm, focusing specifically on 
a growing importance of the private sector as a source of development assistance. 
First of all, the literature on the EU as an international development actor contains a 
long-standing preoccupation with the securitization of EU development cooperation 
(cf. Bagoyoko & Gibert 2009; Gänzle 2012; Keukeleire & Raube 2013). In short, while 
some authors have recommended the linking of security and development concerns 
in order to come to a more coherent development policy towards potentially unstable 
countries, others have warned for the subordination of the development agenda to 
donor-related security concerns (Chandler 2007: 363). Hence, securitization of 
development cooperation bears the risk of a primacy of security concerns over poverty 
reduction efforts (Del Biondo et al. 2012: 129). Within the context of EU development 
cooperation, scholars have looked for manifestations of securitization in discourse, 
institutional architecture and concrete policy instruments (cf. Keukeleire & Raube 




development- and security concerns within the EU over the years, both institutionally 
and discursively.  
Institutionally, the entanglement of security concerns with development cooperation 
became strongly apparent after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which erased 
the pillar structure of EU external policies and created the EEAS as the new central 
locus in this regard. The fact that the post-Lisbon institutional setup of EU external 
action granted the EEAS a foothold in the programming of development aid was seen 
by some as a formalization of what was already a creeping securitization within EU 
development cooperation (Furness & Gänzle 2016; Keukeleire & Raube 2013). 
Discursively, the literature also identifies a clear link between development and 
security in discourse represented within important documents such as the Consensus 
for Development, once again reiterating the risk that development objectives may be 
compromised in favor of security concerns.  
The insights provided in this dissertation, especially in article 2 and 3, further add to 
these observations. Institutionally, this dissertation identified traces of securitization 
through the increasing interlinkage of the EEAS and relevant Commission agencies 
like DG DEVCO and DG CLIMA. The most important manifestation of this link is the 
Green Diplomacy Network (GDN), which was already formally established in 2003, 
but received renewed impetus with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, its 
subsequent integration in the EEAS and the EU’s switch to a leadiator role in the run-
up to Paris (Torney & Cross 2018; Youngs 2014). With a network that is integrated 
within both national representations and EU Delegations in third countries, the GDN 
is mostly focused on promoting the EU position on climate- and environmental issues, 
as well as on gathering intelligence on the stances of third countries in this regard 
(Ujvari 2016). Apart from diplomacy, security interests also play a more prominent 
role in the GDN in recent years. One example in this regard is the fact that the EEAS 
organizes regular trainings for foreign policy officials on the link between security and 
climate change and commissioned numerous studies in this regard (Youngs 2014: 5). 
Furthermore, this increasing attention towards security also trickles down in the EU’s 




that was implemented in the initiation of the new GCCA+ phase – suggests that 
development cooperation is also envisioned as a tool for pursuing foreign policy 
objectives related to climate change.  
Regarding discursive securitization, article 2 and 3 clearly indicated the presence of 
both human- and realist security frames within the discourse of the Commission in 
general, and the GCCA in particular. The peculiar functioning of climate resilience 
within these security frames is particularly interesting. Arguably, its discursive 
construction within EU development cooperation incorporates notions of both human 
security and realist security. Regarding the former, resilience mostly operates in the 
context of disaster risk reduction. Hence, building resilience in this regard means the 
capacity of communities to withstand to the impacts of climate change. Regarding the 
latter, building resilience is seen as needed in light of the potential destabilization and 
violent conflict that could erupt as a result of climate change, and which could also 
affect the EU through increased migration, terrorism and other potential security 
threats. 
Hence, climate resilience operates as a truly versatile discursive construction, binding 
these human and realist security concerns together in one worldview. Arguably, 
resilience can be conceived as the pinnacle of securitization on a discursive level, as it 
elevates a permanent state of insecurity to become the very basis on which problem 
definitions and policy solutions are imagined and created (Bourbeau 2015). As such, it 
depoliticizes securitization: the introduction of security arguments within the climate-
development sphere is no longer labelled a conscious policy decision, but is depicted 
as a natural, apolitical reaction to a world which is increasingly contingent and unsafe. 
Moreover, the question always comes up as to which interests are served through such 
forms of securitization. Once again, resilience might very well shift the limelight from 
the security of people affected by climate change to the security of the EU itself and 
further depoliticize the historical responsibility of industrialized countries in causing 
climate change in the first place.  
As such, the seemingly growing entanglement of adaptation with security interests, 




development for the literature dealing with the securitization of EU development aid. 
However, as this dissertation did not engage with policy practices, I did not identify 
any concrete signs of securitization in this regard. Hence, I am not able to claim that 
current adaptation assistance by the EU is already primarily aimed at serving EU 
security interests. According to Youngs (2014), securitization has not been transposed 
yet from the discursive to the governance level, due to constant interference of short-
term crises that garner attention. Yet, the fact remains that early signs of this are indeed 
manifesting themselves in EU discourse. The persistence of such discursive 
legitimizations for adaptation in the Global South by pointing at EU security interests 
could very well render such linkages “normal” in the long term, and generate a spill-
over in EU development practices.  
This securitization dynamic is symptomatic of the current evolutions noticeable in EU 
development cooperation in general. The launch of the new EU Global Strategy in 2016 
has further strengthened the image of EU foreign policy, EU strategic objectives and 
EU development policy as communicating vessels. Currently, the negotiations on the 
new Multi-annual Financial Framework again reveal that the main drivers behind 
development cooperation are not the SDGs, but perceived threats of instability, 
insecurity and a changing geopolitical landscape (Sherrif & Di Ciommo 2018). 
However, even the renewed European Consensus for Development (2017), which is 
explicitly embedded within the SDG framework, has been criticized for propagating a 
development rationale that is mainly instrumentalized for tackling security interests 
and irregular migration (Osborn 2017). The fact that the new Consensus also heavily 
relies on the concept of resilience, further adds to this point. Also in practice, examples 
such as allowing expenditures related to hosting refugees within European member 
states to be classified as ODA point out that the purpose of providing ODA is 
increasingly becoming diluted. Moreover, the aim to simplify the structures of EU 
external spending further invoke concern among NGOs that development assistance 





At the same time, the presence of a growth frame within the discourse surrounding 
the nexus can be placed within the overarching evolution of development cooperation 
being increasingly left to the private sector. Public-private constructions such as 
blending mechanisms for attracting private investments for development purposes in 
the Global South have been around for years. However, in recent years, private 
financing for development is increasingly being perceived as a silver bullet for 
financing development projects (Brachet & Romero 2018). Once again, the new 
European Consensus for Development echoes strongly this belief in the power of 
climate financing, advocating an increase in the use of private and blended ODA 
within EU aid activities (Osborn 2017; European Commission 2017). In practice, the 
current expansion of the European External Investment Plan to the realm of 
development cooperation through the European Fund for Sustainable Development, 
which is also mainly aimed at stimulating private investments in the Global South, is 
a clear sign that this evolution is in fact taking place (ibid.; Chadwick 2017). Once 
again, questions can be raised whether diminishing ODA numbers within the EU can 
be replaced by increasing private investments, given the fact that commercial interests 
will always be to a certain extent at odds with the rationale behind the provision of 
ODA.  
I would argue that wicked problems like climate change can give new impetus to the 
relevance of development cooperation within the EU. The continuous emphasis on 
adaptation being able to invoke a system change in development throughout this 
dissertation implies that climate change could serve as a way for the development 
community to reinvent itself, focusing more on structural factors that leave people 
poor and vulnerable to climate change in the first place. This includes problems related 
to inequality, injustice and lack of agency, ranging from the international to the local 
level. In practice, recent evolutions on both the international (e.g. the SDGs) and the 
European level (the 20% norm for climate compatible financing) have shown that 
climate change has the potential to provide development cooperation with such a new 
sense of relevance. Future evolutions will have to determine whether it will play this 
role even more strongly in the future, or whether it will also succumb to the expanding 




3.2 ‘Scientific’ vs. ‘indigenous’ knowledge 
A second issue on which I would like to elaborate further in this concluding chapter, 
is the link between adaptation assistance in the context of development cooperation 
and the dominance of scientific or technocratic approaches in this regard. I realize that 
combining post-structuralist theories like governmentality with a problematization of 
scientific approaches towards adaptation assistance by the EU might evoke an image 
of a relativistic stance towards science. Indeed, arguments linked to problematizing 
science or based on notions of ‘scientism’ (Boudry & Pigliucci 2018) are vulnerable to 
criticisms. They are easily accused of rejecting the idea of scientific inquiry altogether, 
labelling it simply one way to come to a particular truth on a particular issue. As 
Marcel Kuntz (2012) rhetorically puts it: “If all truths are equal, who cares what science 
has to say?”  
I do not want to engage with the whole postmodernism vs. post-positivism debate. 
Yet, as I do problematize the scientific approach towards adaptation assistance within 
EU external action as reproducing a certain ‘truth’ on adaptation, thus invoking real 
power effects, I do feel that I need to reflect on it in order to fully clarify what I mean 
by this. First of all, this PhD research is by no means an endorsement for post-
structuralist ontology. The fact that I combine positivist and post-positivist 
epistemologies throughout this PhD thesis, proves that this research is still rooted in a 
sense of a shared reality. From the onset, I considered the critical- and post-
structuralist approaches towards the nexus mainly as a source of inspiration in order 
to shed a new and innovative light on CPI in the context of EU development 
cooperation. Thus, their ontological implications were of no direct importance in the 
course of this research.  
My problematization of the technocratic and scientific approach towards adaptation 
assistance thus does not lie in questioning the ontological basis of scientific inquiry, 
rejecting the fact that it can lead to objective truth. What I do contest is the idea that 
invoking scientific credentials in the context of policy making automatically renders 
such policies objective and ideologically neutral. What is considered science-based 




ideological biases. In this case, I found that the scientific underpinnings of adaptation 
assistance in the context of the GCCA (i) requires partner countries to define their 
vulnerability to climate change in quantified terms, based on the EU’s understanding 
of the concept; (ii) streamlines the creation of knowledge on adaptation through the 
active promotion and implementation of Monitoring & Evaluation systems and (iii) 
rewards countries with greater capacity and greater potential to implement such forms 
of adaptation through the system of upscaling.  
What could alternative conceptions of adaptation assistance in the context of 
development cooperation consist of? Often, studies advocate a reappraisal of local or 
‘indigenous’ knowledge in this regard (Nyong et al. 2007; Anik & Khan 2012). Put 
simply, such arguments start from the idea that local communities have developed 
their own ways of coping with climate- and weather variabilities, and that this is an 
important resource that should not be ignored in the context of designing adaptation 
projects and creating knowledge on what constitutes ‘good’ adaptational practices. 
Although often departing from a genuine will to emancipate marginalized 
perspectives on climate vulnerability and adaptation, such problematizations carry in 
themselves a number of risks. Most importantly, they perpetuate the limitation of such 
forms of knowledge to the ‘local’ or the ‘traditional’. This seems to suggest that local 
communities are intellectually and spatially confined, without access to any forms of 
exchange or contact with other groups who might uphold different epistemologies in 
this regard (Agrawal 1995; Cameron 2012). Therefore, such critical and problematizing 
accounts can in themselves be criticized for perpetuating power imbalances, as they 
are at risk of depicting the knowledge of local communities to be limited to this local 
and traditional realm, as opposed to the universal, modern and scientific nature of 
‘Western’ knowledge. Indeed, any knowledge, including what is commonly placed 
under the denominator of Western or scientific knowledge, can be considered local (cf. 
Cruikshank 2014). Therefore, the act of creating knowledge on climate change 
adaptation should not be based on a senseless promotion of the local or the traditional, 
but should rather be preoccupied with questions of how to merge different forms of 
‘localized’ knowledge into hybrid systems of inquiry for the sake of governance. Such 




dialogue, and move away from the idea that local communities are spatially and 
intellectually confined. 
As a way of escaping this power imbalance, academics and policy makers alike need 
to perceive concepts like vulnerability, now often giving rise to technocratic 
approaches to adaptation assistance, as fundamentally embedded in social relations, 
cultural provisions and historical evolutions (Bankoff & Hilhorst 2004). Indeed, in 
contrast to notions of risk and disaster giving rise to techno-scientific fixes in order to 
prevent or mitigate climate impacts, one needs to recognize that “A disaster is a 
historical event, and the aftermath of a disaster is a process of coming to grips with 
history” (Oliver-Smith as cited in Bankoff & Hilhorst 2004: 4). Hence, building 
knowledge on adaptation needs to be based on a strong sense of co-creation, in order 
to come to a holistic conception of both the drivers of vulnerability and the possible 
options for adaptation. This equality needs to be pursued both discursively as well as 
in practice, in order to escape power imbalances rooted in dichotomies of the Western 
vs. the local.  
Linking back to the research conducted in this dissertation, it is clear that these broader 
and more inclusive conceptions of vulnerability and adaptation are still a blind spot 
within the nexus between adaptation and EU development cooperation. Although the 
mission statement of the GCCA is based on a notion of innovative policy making 
within the nexus, it is clear that there is still much room for creating a more balanced 
approach towards knowledge creation in this regard. Although a small thematic 
agency, the GCCA could make a real difference here and therefore serve as a source of 
inspiration towards other organizations, both within as well as outside the EU. 
Regarding the former, the GCCA is in multiple ways connected with EU delegations 
and can also provide technical assistance for adaptation mainstreaming in this context. 
Hence, it could fulfil a central role in climate mainstreaming in terms of promoting 
such alternative paradigms throughout the geographical component of EU 
development cooperation as well. Regarding the latter, it could provide inspiration to 
other, non-EU donor organizations and NGOs through its extensive (and increasing) 




3.3 Climate financing and ODA 
This PhD dissertation was entirely dedicated to the integration of climate change 
adaptation in EU development cooperation. This was based on the observation that 
linkages between adaptation and aid activities are diverse and multi-layered, and that 
adaptation thus can have a fundamental impact on the way development cooperation 
is perceived and pursued. However, although I argued at various points in this 
dissertation that adaptation and development cannot be separated conceptually, I 
would also argue that they should be separated financially. For one, development aid 
is primarily motivated by a sense of international solidarity, while climate financing 
should be a direct compensation for the historical responsibility of industrialized 
countries for causing climate change. An elephant in the room in this approach to the 
nexus is therefore the grey area that persists between adaptation aid (in the sense of 
ODA) on the one hand, and adaptation financing on the other (Betzold & Weiler 2018). 
The conceptual overlap between both development and adaptation cannot be an 
excuse for diverting existing ODA streams to provide adaptation assistance. Hence, in 
order to provide a complete picture on how adaptation mainstreaming is pursued 
within EU development cooperation, I will also elaborate on the findings provided 
within this dissertation regarding this financial dimension. Institutionally, this links 
up with the importance of Rio Markers in the EU’s mainstreaming exercise and the 
fact that many of the institutional innovations in recent years, such as the 20% norm 
and the GCCA, are funded with ODA. From a critical perspective, I will argue that 
agencies like the GCCA perpetuate the current complexity of the climate financing 
landscape vis-à-vis their partner countries.  
One of the pillars of the international climate regime is the idea that compensatory 
resources for developing countries in order to assist them in both mitigation and 
adaptation should be new and additional (UNCTAD 2015). In short, the idea of 
additionality thus calls for donors not to reconvert their ODA streams in order to 
provide financing for climate-related assistance in developing countries. Yet, 
additionality of climate financing in relation to ODA remains an ongoing debate until 
this day, sparking many interpretations on how it should be perceived (cf. Brown et 




their ODA and climate financing streams, resulting in a field of tension between both 
forms of financing.  
It is of course not possible to settle the discussion on additionality in this concluding 
chapter, as this is still one of the main outstanding issues dominating international 
climate negotiations in the post-Paris era. Also within the EU, it is clear that finding a 
workable operationalization of the additionality principle is still a distant dream. 
Although not directly investigated throughout this dissertation, I did find strong 
evidence pointing at the persistence of this ‘grey’ area in EU development cooperation 
as well. For one, the research conducted for article 1 showed that monitoring climate-
related financial assistance in EU development cooperation is mainly done through 
the use of Rio Markers111, as is the case in most donor countries (Adelle et al. 2018). In 
short, this tool allows for marking development projects in light of their contribution 
to climate change mitigation or adaptation. Projects are Rio Marked ‘1’ if mitigation or 
adaptation is a significant objective of a project, or marked ‘2’ if it is the principal 
objective (Brown et al. 2010). In recent years, the use of the Rio Marker methodology 
has been subjected to increased criticism. The used categories (significant and 
principal) are open for interpretation among different donor agencies, which makes it 
difficult to compare them in terms of provided climate financing (Brown et al. 2010). 
It is therefore perfectly possible for aid projects having little or no link to climate 
change to be Rio marked as significantly contributing to mitigation or adaptation. 
Furthermore, the relation between the Rio Markers and additionality of climate 
financing is also ill-defined, once again leaving too much space for interpretation by 
the donor agencies using them. Finally, the methodology also allows for projects being 
marked as addressing several of the Rio Markers simultaneously, allowing for the 
same financial pledge to be counted up to four times as contributing to different Rio 
conventions (Roberts & Weikman 2017).  
 
                                                          
111 This methodology for tracing climate-related aid towards developing countries originates 




Second, the imposed norm for climate compatible financing within the 2014-2020 
multi-annual financial framework earmarks 20% of the EU development cooperation 
budget for climate-related expenditures. Although highlighted in article 1 as a major 
incentive for climate mainstreaming among EU delegations, it does not imply 
additional financial capacity for tackling climate change in EU development 
cooperation. Therefore, it could be criticized as diverting ODA within the EU for the 
sake of providing climate financing. Finally, the GCCA is also dubiously positioned in 
this grey area, as it receives most of its financing from EU development programmes 
such as the EDF and the DCI.  
Regardless of how one defines additionality, there is a widespread consensus that 
more climate financing is needed fast. Not only is climate finance crucial in light of the 
enormous financial pressure climate change will put on countries in the Global South, 
it is also needed to prevent additional strain on already diminishing ODA numbers 
flowing to the world’s poorest countries (Kwakkenbos 2018). The international 
community has agreed to strive towards an annual capacity for climate financing of 
100 billion USD by 2020. However, the massive proliferation of both public and private 
funding agencies for providing climate financing has created a notoriously complex 
and fragmented institutional landscape. While the Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
established in 2011, was created for the purpose of bringing a central locus in this 
chaotic whole, it has to this day not managed to live up to its expectations in this regard 
(Kumar 2015; Eckstein 2017). Hence, developing countries are still forced to turn to a 
plethora of different agencies in order to receive climate financing, each employing 
their own bureaucratic procedures and conditions. Agencies like the GCCA can be 
considered part of this proliferation, and even play a role in perpetuating this 
fragmented landscape. Indeed, the fact GCCA engages in capacity building in partner 
countries for the sake of attracting public and private climate financing can be 
problematized from this angle. Once again, it shifts responsibilities in this regard to 
developing countries themselves, as they need to build their own capacity in order to 
‘attract’ funding that is entitled to them in the first place. Thus, such capacity building 
efforts can be considered a form of socialization in order for such countries to accept 




exploration of the GCCAs activities has clearly shown that within these agencies, 
power effects are always a fundamental part of their functioning.  
In sum, a lot of work remains to be done in order to create a fair and equitable climate 
financing system in which (i) both ODA and climate financing are ensured and do not 
compete with each other for scarce funding; (ii) developing countries can easily access 
climate financing, without having to engage in building capacity in order to attract 
investments from a lop-sided international system and (iii) a transparent and fair 
methodology is created in order to track climate financing, both from public and 
private sources. For the EU specifically, I would argue that it could do much more 
given the fact that it also perceives itself as a climate leader in this regard. For one, it 
could push for more stringent and streamlined rules in terms of additionality, both at 
the UNFCCC level and vis-à-vis its own member states. Furthermore, it could also 
pursue stronger directional leadership by providing clarity on how it pursues 
additionality within its own climate-related assistance vis-à-vis partner countries. 
4. Avenues for future research 
Although this dissertation has provided new and thought-provoking empirical and 
theoretical insights into the climate-development nexus in the context of the EU, it is 
not without its flaws and limitations. Therefore, this section is dedicated to 
formulating a future research agenda that builds upon this research project and its 
inevitable imperfections. Within the following paragraphs, I will therefore outline a 
selection of potential avenues for further research. These are (i) field-based studies in 
order to advance our understanding of the institutional as well as political 
underpinnings of climate change mainstreaming; (ii) an inquiry into the climate-
development nexus starting from the concept of EU external perception and (iii) a 





4.1 Field-based methods for the study of the climate-development 
nexus 
First of all, the research conducted throughout this PhD project remains to a certain 
extent overarching, as it does not look into the implementation of EU development 
policy at the micro-level. This is related to a dominance of desk-based methods and 
the absence of field work as a form of data inquiry. Several practical reasons can be 
formulated to explain this absence of field work in this PhD project. Regarding the 
analysis of climate mainstreaming in EU delegations, field work was practically 
unfeasible. My aim here was to create a broad overview of mainstreaming efforts 
throughout different EU delegations in Sub-Saharan African countries. Face-to-face 
interviews with officials from nine different countries would have been too much of 
an endeavor, and an in-depth case study of mainstreaming efforts in one or two EU 
delegations would have severely altered the goal of article 1. In the end, I am convinced 
that maintaining the broad scope of data inquiry in 9 different EU delegations and the 
choice for interviews via telephone/Skype was the right one. It allowed me to make 
broader claims about the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of certain approaches towards 
climate change mainstreaming as intended by the Commission, which is the main 
strength of article 1. I would not have been able to uphold the ability to formulate 
broad policy-relevant conclusions with data from only one or two case studies. 
Regarding governmentality, my decision to switch to Foucauldian research happened 
at quite a late stage of the overall PhD project. Therefore, extensive field work in this 
phase of the PhD would have once again been too ambitious. Aside from the time 
invested in order to fully understand the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of 
governmentality, finding good case studies for a governmentality analysis would have 
also taken a lot of preparation. In addition, in order to gather a sufficient amount of 
data in order to fully explore governmentality in such local settings, an extensive 
period of field work would also have been required. Hence, I chose to pursue what 
could be considered a ‘governmentality light’ analysis in my study of the GCCA. 
Inspired by a similar study conducted by Kurki (2011) on the European Instrument for 




design and policy architecture of the GCCA, without delving into the concrete 
implementation of GCCA-supported projects.  
Future research could take this to the next level by engaging with the micro-level of 
this integration process, looking specifically at its implementation in the field. From 
an institutionalist perspective, this could for instance lead to an inquiry into how the 
perceived harmonization of aid activities with climate change adaptation (cf. article 1) 
translates into concrete development projects. This could provide a better insight in 
how mainstreaming ‘travels’ throughout different stages of the policy cycle. Is the 
observed high level of climate mainstreaming in the early stages of the policy cycle 
upheld in the actual implementation of such projects? Or is climate change adaptation 
at risk of becoming diluted further down the policy cycle? Furthermore, fieldwork 
could also provide the literature with a better insight in the enabling and constraining 
factors that influence mainstreaming efforts within executive agencies like EU 
delegations. Examples of potentially interesting topics in this regard are the 
importance of leadership within individual delegations, the existence of 
organizational routines in order to further implement the mainstreaming rationale and 
the cooperation and the relationship with relevant administrations within the partner 
country. Especially in the latter case, field research could really generate added value. 
This is because the importance of the partner country context in determining climate 
mainstreaming levels is still a ‘black box’ within the literature.  
In addition, the analytical potential of the governmentality concept could also be 
further excavated using field-based methods. As I explain in more detail in article 3 
and the Annex to this dissertation, governmentality research relies on a detailed 
knowledge of a particular micro-empirical setting, in order to identify a complex 
interplay of power relations. Hence, major empirical contributions could be provided 
through this governmentality-field research tandem. For one, they could engage with 
the ‘dialogue’ on climate change between EU delegations and their partner country 
counterparts. This could provide us with a better image on how the EU positions itself 
vis-à-vis partner countries and how power relations are interwoven in this climate-




between EU development practice and the local level, possibly approaching this topic 
through the perspective of ‘merging’ knowledge systems, as sketched out in the 
previous section. Do local communities have agency in terms of ascribing meaning to 
adaptation in their own specific setting? Are there concrete attempts at coming to 
‘hybrid’ forms of knowledge on vulnerability and adaptation? Finally, future research 
could also engage with the notion of counter-conduct in this regard, looking 
specifically at how dominant perspectives of climate adaptation assistance – through 
notions of growth, security and techno-scientific interventions – are resisted and 
potentially altered through the interaction with the local settings in which projects are 
implemented.  
4.2 EU external perception 
A second observation is that this dissertation predominantly looked at the nexus from 
the perspective of the EU itself. Alternatively, the empirical field of the EU climate-
development nexus could be approached from the perspective of EU partner 
countries, possibly departing from the concept of EU external perception (cf. Larsen 
2014; Lucarelli 2014; Keuleers 2015). Specifically within the field of EU external climate 
policy, some pioneer work has been done in this regard by Torney (2014), who 
specifically looks at the perception of EU climate leadership in UNFCCC negotiations 
with other major actors in this context. Yet, this specific body of literature is still in its 
infancy and could greatly benefit from additional empirical investigations into the 
different sub-domains of EU external climate action. This could further provide a 
counterweight against the dominant narratives of the EU as a normatively driven 
climate leader on the international stage.  
Considering the EU climate-development nexus, future research could for example 
look at how the EU is perceived by third countries as a provider of climate financing 
and support. Do EU partner countries evaluate its assistance in this regard as rather 
positive or negative? How does this link up with their conceptualization of 
international climate governance in general, and the provision of climate finance and 
climate-related support in particular? Such research could thus not only expand our 




sessions, but also better inform us of alternative conceptualizations of the international 
climate change regime in non-Western settings.  
4.3 EU climate diplomacy 
Although not directly targeted in this research, the EU’s Green Diplomacy Network 
(GDN) was a recurring topic throughout the interviews conducted for this 
dissertation. Much like the GCCA, the GDN and the concept of ‘green diplomacy’ 
within the EU have so far only received very limited attention, although scholarly 
work in this regard is starting to grow (e.g. Torney & Cross 2018; Minas & Ntousas 
2018). Climate diplomacy has been a vital part of EU external climate governance for 
years, and has for example played quite a substantial role in the negotiations leading 
up to the Paris climate agreement (Torney & Cross 2018).  
Hence, in order to get a good image on how the EU tries to exert its climate leadership 
on the international stage, a good understanding of its climate diplomacy endeavors 
seems vital. Moreover, its institutional hybridity, being embedded within the EEAS, 
DG DEVCO and DG CLIMA at HQ-level and within EU delegations at the field level, 
make it interesting to see how interinstitutional links influence EU external climate 
policy. This links up with some of the issues raised in section 3.2 on the future of EU 
development cooperation: to what extent will the growing importance of climate 
change as a foreign policy objective within the EU generate spill-over effects in other 
domains like development cooperation? And will this lead to EU interests like 
containing climate-induced migration and ensuring security along the EU borders 
trickling down into aid assistance?  
4.4 Transdisciplinarity in the study of CPI as a policy outcome 
Finally, I would like to link back to the conceptualization outlined in the introduction 
distinguishing between climate policy integration as a policy principle, a policy 
process or a policy outcome. Within this dissertation, I have limited myself to the 
former two conceptualizations of CPI. The rationale behind this delineation stems 
from the fact that measuring the impact of CPI measures on the track record of assisted 
actors in terms of adaptation and/or mitigation is a highly complex and 




transdisciplinary perspectives on the integration of climate change in EU development 
cooperation. Combining policy analyses of mainstreaming efforts with inquiries 
rooted in environmental sciences and possibly even ethnographic studies involving 
local communities could greatly enhance our knowledge of how mainstreaming is 
pursued, how effective it is and how it could be improved.  
Possibilities in terms of empirical combinations in this regard are almost endless. 
Researchers could for example investigate the link between ecosystem management 
measures pursued by donors (e.g. in the area of forestry or sustainable agriculture) 
and the actual impact in terms of strengthening local ecosystems. As a concrete 
empirical case, researchers could put global market mechanisms (such as REDD+) to 
the test, and cross-check management approaches in this regard in light of their impact 
on biodiversity and ecosystem values. Moreover, combining such research with 
ethnographic studies could also inform us on how such mainstreaming measures 
influence local communities in terms of social relationships and adaptive capacity. 
This could potentially introduce a whole new dimension to the EPI and CPI literature 
and could provide a much needed bridge between the social- and the environmental 
sciences, which is arguably one of the main challenges in climate change research 
today.  
5.  Policy recommendations 
This section is dedicated to translating the research results presented in this 
dissertation into policy-relevant recommendations. These can be categorized as top-
down and bottom-up oriented. Regarding the former, I will further elaborate on the 
current context of the Paris Agreement and the SDGs, and how the climate 
mainstreaming rationale within the EU could benefit from these overarching 
frameworks. Regarding the latter, I argue that the EU should aspire to better 





5.1 Top-down: adaptation mainstreaming in an evolving international 
context 
First of all, this PhD thesis was written in the midst of two crucial international 
developments: the entering into force of the Paris climate agreement and the 
replacement of the MDGs with a new set of SDGs. Based on the insights provided in 
this dissertation, it is safe to say that this new international context contains both 
promises and pitfalls for climate mainstreaming in an EU context. The most important 
pitfall being the extremely broad scope of the SDGs as a framework for aid activities, 
which could very well put a crippling weight on what are in many cases already 
overburdened aid practitioners in EU delegations. Due to their scope, the SDGs evoke 
a sense of mainstreaming in which “everything should be integrated within everything 
else” (Jones 2018). The implementation of the SDGs within EU development 
cooperation could therefore even strengthen the sense of ‘mainstreaming fatigue’ 
among delegations, when not met with adequate vision and resources.  
Alternatively, the combination of the Paris Agreement becoming operational on the 
one hand, and the implementation of the SDGs on the other hand also provide a 
unique window of opportunity for further pushing the mainstreaming of climate 
change to higher levels of salience. Regarding the former, the establishment of NDCs 
has created a platform for all the signatory parties to the Paris Agreement to formulate 
their efforts in order to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of climate change. 
Although the first generation of INDCs showed wide fluctuations in terms of quality 
and ambition, the five year pledge and review cycle inscribed within the Paris 
Agreement should ensure a regular update and improvement of the NDCs in this 
regard. Specifically for adaptation mainstreaming, these NDCs could serve as 
blueprints for donors in order properly identify entry points for adaptation assistance 
in developing countries. Regarding the latter, the SDGs are now in the process of being 
implemented, which implies countries translating this internationally agreed set of 
targets to their own respective national contexts, set clear priorities within the broad 




There is international consensus that both processes cannot be perceived and 
implemented separately. Climate change is a pivotal challenge for successfully 
implementing the SDGs, while the NDCs should also be embedded within national 
and local development strategies in order to be fully effective (cf. Northrop et al. 2016; 
UNDP 2017). Therefore, the two international agendas are fundamentally interlocked, 
and acknowledging this among country administrations and donor agencies alike 
could provide additional impetus to the climate mainstreaming agenda. Aligning the 
NDCs and the SDGs could very well produce new and high quality mitigation- and 
adaptation strategies that are also fully embedded in national development planning.  
This dissertation made clear that, through various channels, the EU is strongly 
involved in assisting partner countries carving out and implementing their mitigation 
and adaptation policies. Given the insights provided within this dissertation, assisting 
such countries in aligning the NDCs and the SDGs could prove to be beneficial for 
mainstreaming as well. Not only would it help in building additional expertise on 
climate mainstreaming by further carving out the complex interplay between climate 
vulnerability and sustainable development, it could also replace many of the 
procedural tools that are currently rendered ineffective or unknown within EU 
delegations. For one, a detailed NDC could already replace the often outdated or even 
nonexistent country environmental profiles, while a dedicated strategy on adaptation 
priorities within the context of the SDGs could make general guidelines like the sector 
scripts obsolete. This is in essence nothing more than basic subsidiarity, as it makes 
much more sense to organize such procedural aspects of climate mainstreaming on a 
higher level. Not only could this evoke an administrative simplification for EU 
delegations, it could also strengthen exchange of knowledge and experience among 
donor agencies and country administrations. Of course, not all procedures can be 
replaced by such overarching frameworks. Project-specific procedures like EIAs and 
climate risk assessments will still have to be conducted by each individual donor 
agency on a project-by-project basis. Yet, these could also benefit from a better 
understanding of the impact of climate change on sustainable development in 




However, the above reflections only account for ‘more’ mainstreaming, but do not yet 
reflect the potential of adaptation to invoke a system change in aid activities. 
Regarding this notion of transformativity, I would argue that the SDGs could further 
facilitate such a quantum leap in the EU’s mainstreaming rationale as well. This belief 
is based on some innovative principles that are in the process of becoming ‘injected’ in 
the 2030 agenda and the SDGs. The most well-known of these principles is the idea of 
‘Planetary Boundaries’ (cf. Steffen et al. 2015; Wijkman & Rockström 2013). Based on 
rigorous scientific inquiry, this concept sets out limits to economic and industrial 
development based on their impact on climate change, environmental degradation, 
loss of biodiversity etc. As such, the concept explicitly advocates a development 
paradigm in which the idea of unabated economic growth – something which I also 
identified in relation to adaptation – is replaced by a sense of development within 
certain ecological limits (Hajer et al. 2015). 
Second, the idea of a ‘Safe and Just Operating Space’ is an extension of the idea of 
planetary boundaries. It represents the argument that, in order to operate within these 
boundaries, we do not only need efficiency driving our use of natural resources, but 
also strive towards an equitable distribution of these resources from the international 
to the local level (Hajer et al. 2015). Hence, this principle connects the emphasis of 
sustainable development within planetary boundaries to a sense of social justice and 
equity. This connects strongly with the description of transformative adaptation 
mainstreaming as described throughout this dissertation, as this also implies a 
stronger preoccupancy with power relations that determine the access to resources by 
individual or community actors in the Global South.  
Finally, the 2030 agenda for sustainable development also echoes a renewed sense of 
bottom-up engagement with non-governmental actors. Coined by Hajer et al. (2015) 
as the ‘Energetic Society’, the SDGs should harbor space for participation by civil 
society organizations, citizens, farmers etc. in coming to new and innovative 
conceptions of sustainable development. Once again, this relates strongly to my 




section, I will further elaborate on how bottom-up perspectives could find entrance in 
EU climate mainstreaming efforts. 
In sum, the international context of the potentially compatible SDGs and NDCs creates 
a window of opportunity for further pushing the mainstreaming agenda. Not only 
does this evolving international context provide an opportunity for further 
strengthening the current mainstreaming rationale within the European Commission, 
it could also serve as a catalyst for re-imaging adaptation as a transformative issue for 
development cooperation. This is the result of some innovative concepts that are 
increasingly being linked to the SDG-agenda, and which correspond strongly with the 
description of transformativity provided throughout this dissertation.  
However, this can only work on two conditions. First of all, using this international 
context as a window of opportunity for strengthening mainstreaming efforts requires 
strong political will. Arguably, the profoundly holistic scope of the SDGs also creates 
the risk of development a la carte, in which donors link their existing aid activities to a 
range of individual SDGs that fit these activities best, without really altering the 
underlying paradigms that drive their development efforts. Hence, in order to fully 
unleash the ‘radical potential’ of the SDG agenda (cf. Death & Gabay 2015), donors 
need to imagine and implement this agenda starting from the conviction that it is in 
fact holistic and transformative.  
Second, the rising salience on the international level and within EU headquarters has 
to be met with adequate resources for officials responsible for implementing them. The 
modest rise in the norm for climate compatible financing from 20% in the current MFF 
to 25% in the latest proposals for the new MFF (entering into force in 2021, cf. Climate 
Action Network 2018), seem to suggest that financial incentives for climate 
mainstreaming seems to be stalling. This is worrisome, given the importance of the 
20% norm for current mainstreaming efforts (cf. article 1). In terms of human resources, 
this dissertation points at the lasting need for adequate mainstreaming trainings and 
investments in building expertise within delegations. Dedicated staff clearly makes all 




delegations. Therefore, the importance of continuous support from agencies situated 
at headquarters level in this regard cannot be overemphasized. 
5.2 Bottom-up: incorporating climate justice and knowledge co-
creation 
Second, the critical perspective on the nexus revealed a largely top-down 
mainstreaming exercise within the EU. As argued in article 3, agencies like the GCCA 
are very much in the driver’s seat when it comes to defining vulnerability to climate 
change, adaptation, relevant knowledge for adaptation and strategies for monitoring 
and evaluation. Through various policy techniques, potential partner countries are 
socialized into accepting particular truths on these matters, thereby reproducing them. 
Many examples were provided in the course of this dissertation: among others, partner 
countries need to become resilient to climate impacts by safeguarding economic 
growth, maintaining safety and stability and building capacity in order to gather 
knowledge and financial assistance. To directly quote EU discourse: they need to 
become ‘model states’ in the wake of climate change, thereby accepting certain 
premises on what the problem is and how it can be tackled.  
In order for the EU to be a truly innovative and directional actor in climate assistance, 
it should operate as a counterweight in this regard. Climate change adaptation is 
quintessentially a phenomenon that requires a bottom-up and localized response 
(Rayner 2010). Although the importance of combining top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives is to a certain extent acknowledged within the EU and the GCCA in 
particular, the insights provided in this dissertation suggest that there is still 
considerable margin for further tilting the balance towards bottom-up forms of 
adaptation assistance. In discourse, this could for example imply a shift towards a 
greater emphasis on climate justice, which was identified in article 2 as only a minor 
frame in EU discourse on the climate-development nexus.  
Although a broad concept, a climate-justice inspired conception of adaptation could 
further centralize the inequality-dimension of adaptation, both in terms of the unequal 
distribution of climate vulnerabilities within and between societies, as well as in terms 




Collins 2014). Furthermore, it could also re-introduce a sense of politicization and 
power in the EU conception of adaptation, shifting its emphasis on the responsibility 
of partner countries in becoming ‘resilient’ towards a renewed sense of reciprocity in 
responsibilities. In other words, adaptation should create a joint effort targeting 
inequalities and injustices influencing climate vulnerability from the international to 
the local level. This could thus also have repercussions for the EU-side of the equation, 
creating the need for an introspective exercise vis-à-vis its own policies as an 
international actor and their influence on the vulnerability of partner countries. For 
example, some authors have dubbed migration to be a legitimate and effective 
adaptation strategy of local communities (cf. McLeman & Smit 2006; Scheffran et al. 
2012), creating the question whether a formal acknowledgement and strategy 
regarding climate-induced migration should be pursued in light of EU external 
adaptation assistance. Moreover, as already discussed in a previous section, the EU 
should also step up its game in terms of providing adequate climate financing and in 
ensuring that this financial assistance is new and additional. In sum, acknowledging 
reciprocity in responsibilities for enhancing climate change adaptation in developing 
countries is key to a balanced discourse in this regard. 
Also in terms of concrete policy techniques, more can be done to generate a balanced 
approach towards adaptation in the context of development. Regarding the GCCA, 
policy evaluations of its previous phase already revealed that the agency was little 
engaged with local actors and civil society. While the renewed GCCA+ is pledged to 
be more open to local actors and concrete strategies in this regard have been 
announced, they have yet to be issued and implemented. Based on the analysis 
provided in article 3 and the reflections provided above on the relation between 
‘scientific’ and ‘local’ knowledge, it is safe to say that the GCCA could benefit from a 
more ‘hybrid’ approach towards adaptation assistance and knowledge production, 
incorporating alternative forms of meaning on vulnerability and adaptation. Indeed, 
the discursive notion of constructing a ‘shared vision’ towards climate change 
adaptation should result in more emphasis on knowledge co-creation within EU 
policies. This would imply the EU, through agencies like the GCCA, going against the 




evaluation and scaling-up best practices. To propose concrete methods of knowledge 
co-creation is however still a state-of-the-art topic in academic and policy research 
alike (for a good introduction, consult Klenk et al. 2017), and therefore far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Yet, agencies like the GCCA aspiring innovative approaches 
towards adaptation assistance can be pioneers in this regard, and punch above their 
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On Foucault and Foreign Policy: the merits of 
governmentality for the study of EU external relations 
 
Abstract 
This paper demonstrates the merits of governmentality as a tool for studying EU 
external relations. Existing research tends to fall into the trap of reifying the 
dichotomy between realist and ideational conceptions of EU external action. 
Governmentality can serve as a hybrid between these two strands of research, 
incorporating the preoccupancy with power of the former with the ethical 
considerations of the latter. It can open up our understanding of power operating 
in and through the EU ’ s external relations, by looking at the discursive 
constructions rendering issues governable and the micro-political practices that 
follow from it. We provide an overview of existing applications of 
governmentality in EU external relations and construct a framework allowing 
researchers to use governmentality to its full analytical potential. 




















The European Union (EU) has a wide range of external policies112. For its input, it 
entails a balancing act between EU actors: from the European Commission, over the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), to the European Parliament and the 
Member States. The output, among others, is to provide development aid, to set the 
rules in trade or to combat climate change. For several decades now, scholarship has 
attempted to address the fundamental question of what kind of power the EU is in the 
world. Roughly two major strands of literature have developed in this regard: first, 
classic International Relations (IR) perspectives approached power within EU external 
relations in a realist or material sense. They focus mainly on the EU’s (in)ability to 
exercise state-like power on the international stage, focusing on coherence between 
member states, EU presence and actorness in international organizations (cf. Niemann 
& Bretherton 2013; Thomas 2012). Alternatively, an ideational or value-based 
conception of the EU as an international actor developed over the years. Most famous 
in this regard are the role conceptions of the EU as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power 
(Duchêne 1972; Manners 2002). These concepts focus on the EU’s ability to shape ‘the 
normal’ on the world stage.  
However, this dialectic struggle of interests versus ideas is reaching a dead end as it 
does not add to our understanding of the EU’s external action. As a first contribution, 
this paper advocates the potential of alternative perspectives to overcome this 
perpetual distinction. More specifically, we shift the limelight to post-structuralist 
studies building upon Michel Foucault’s views on power and modes of government. 
By looking specifically at ‘the art of government’ Foucault identified evolving 
conceptions on what can be considered good forms of governing, as well as strategies 
and institutions to pursue this. He labeled these conceptions as mentalities of 
government or ‘governmentalities’ and accounted for a more subtle and indirect 
exercise of power by government in modern society. In short, Foucault described a 
                                                          
112 We aim to be consistent in our use of the terms ‘external policies’ or ‘external relations’ in 
order to make clear we discuss a wide range of EU policies with an external dimension. This 
includes EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, but also, for example, external trade, 




notion of power that is capillary, relational and productive. Power in a Foucauldian 
sense is not only capable of operating through coercion or discipline, but also through 
practices of freedom and self-management (Foucault 1990; 2008). Within EU external 
relations, governmentality research could function as a ‘synthesis’ of the ethical 
considerations rooted in the Normative Power Europe (NPE) approach, and the 
preoccupation with power of more ‘realist’ scholarly work. 
The second contribution of this paper takes the form of a structured overview of how 
governmentality has found its entrance in the literature on EU external relations (i.a. 
Merlingen 2006; 2011; Kurki 2011; Joseph 2014). These studies are promising in terms 
of rising above the dichotomy of norms versus interests. As we will demonstrate, they 
re-investigate power in and of role conceptions through a Foucauldian lens, criticize 
the technicality of EU external governance, and problematize many of the taken-for-
granted approaches and concepts in EU external policies. However, we identify 
several mishaps that make that, in our view, the concept of governmentality has not 
yet reached its full analytical potential in terms of carving out the power effects rooted 
in EU governance in third countries. Existing scholarly work resorts too much to 
‘grand’ concepts such as neoliberalism and take this as the starting point, while being 
less engaged with identifying the intricate and complex interplay of power relations 
on a truly micro-level scale.  
As a third contribution, this paper provides an analytical framework for using 
governmentality in research in order to give new impetus to its application in the EU 
external relations literature. At the same time, we want to convince governmentality 
scholars of the research potential of EU external policies as a site of modern 
government. Hence, this paper does not provide a new empirical application of 
governmentality in the context of EU external relations. Rather, we want to stimulate 
a future research agenda that provides bottom-up analyses of EU external policies. We 
aim to provide researchers interested in making such empirical contributions with the 





We will start the next section by briefly introducing the conceptual building blocks of 
governmentality. Subsequently, we will present a concise overview of the existing 
scholarship on the EU’s external relations, structuring it along the lines of a ‘normative’ 
and ‘realist’ angle in the existing body of work. Third, we will provide a review of the 
current state of governmentality applications that engage with the EU’s external 
policies. Finally, we will present an analytical framework and a research strategy for 
governmentality applications, in order to motivate a more comprehensive use of 
governmentality.  
2. Unpacking governmentality  
In this part, we will first discuss the conceptual building blocks of governmentality. 
These are (1) a broad definition of what is understood as ‘government’, (2) overarching 
discursive constructions or rationalities of that government and (3) the translation of 
these rationalities into concrete micro-practices of governing. Contemporary forms of 
governmentality are commonly understood as ‘the conduct of conduct’. They go 
beyond both the traditional conception of power as exertion of coercion or force, as 
well as the traditional tracing of power by looking solely at formal institutions.  
Governmentality firstly understands government as a plurality of activities aimed at 
shaping, directing and ‘improving’ the conduct of others (Rose 1999) and ultimately 
capable of inducing self-control. By structuring the field of possible action of the 
governed, there is no need for coercion or violence to exercise power over the 
individual. If a government is able to define the boundaries in which this individual 
perceives his or her own possible actions or behavior, he/she will very likely behave 
in ways that fit the overarching rationality. Governmentality is thus about the indirect 
exercise of power through determining the ‘box’ within which individuals believe to 
have the freedom to think and act (Dean, 2010). Governmentality echoes the 
Foucauldian conception of power that is diffuse, and produces rather than then 
represses. It is diffuse because it is widely shared by different societal actors. It is 
productive because it is constitutive to truth and to knowledge, which are the basis of 
our day-to-day functioning (Shiner 1982). Hence, the Foucauldian notion of power is 




‘possessed’ by an actor and exerted over another, with or without this actor’s consent 
(ibid.). 
However, this ‘box’ of governmentality is not infinitely fixed. The diffuse character of 
power also implies that the act of ‘government’ cannot be a one-way project. 
Governmentality emphasizes the agency of governed subjects through resistance or 
counter-conduct. Resistance is not a reaction to power being exerted on an actor, but 
an essential element resulting from the relational nature of power within society. As 
power circulates among societal actors, different forms of it will always well up and 
influence each other. According to Heller (1996: 99) power and resistance are therefore 
two different names given to the same capacity, namely the capacity to create social 
change. They are merely two forms of power influencing each other in what could be 
considered a dialectical relationship (ibid.). This relational nature of power and 
resistance generates a notion of government which can be understood as a project of 
continuous translating and reshaping of governing when met with resistance. 
Governmentality reflects a conception of power in which rationalities of government 
and governmental (micro-) techniques are engaged in constant interplay. As a second 
feature of governmentality there are the rationalities of government that make 
governing thinkable and therefore possible. They manifest themselves within a 
discursive framework that renders specific practices meaningful and constructs what 
and who needs to be governed how (Joseph 2010: 223). This on the one hand creates 
an intelligible field for intervention. On the other hand, this constitutes a process of 
problematization, aimed at identifying and describing problems to be rectified while 
at the same time formulating the appropriated solutions. After the Second World War, 
Foucault identifies the rise of a neoliberal governmentality, expanding the economic 
sphere into the social sphere. Rules that applied within economics became the 
blueprint of human action and even existence itself (Foucault 2008: 242). In contrast to 
classical liberalism, neoliberal governmentality is not related to reducing state 
intervention, but to reshaping the state in order to function based on market 
mechanisms (Joseph 2014; Işleyen 2015b: 675-676). The rationality of market 




providing the legal and regulatory conditions for these economic principles to become 
the very foundation of individual practices and thought. 
The third feature of governmentality is then how it brings together the rationality of 
government with specific governing techniques putting it into action. They are the 
material sites of the ideas and discourses discussed above (Merlingen 2006; 2011). Such 
micro-practices can for example be observed in the way in which people are described, 
targeted, and divided with numbers and statistics in order to substantiate the field for 
intervention. They can also be identified in practices that turn specific elements of life, 
such as water or clean air into items for market exchange (cf. Nevins & Peluso 2008). 
Finally, neoliberal governmentality can also be found in ‘improvement’ projects built 
on capacity building of local communities as these become the site for governance 
(Rose 1999; Li 2011). What these techniques have in common is their technical, 
depoliticized appearance.  
In sum, the act of government can be characterized by a symbiotic relationship 
between micro-governance techniques and overarching rationalities. On the one hand, 
governance techniques generate meaning that crystallizes into overarching knowledge 
systems, representing particular truths or mentalities on how to govern. At the same 
time, these overarching rationalities legitimize, reproduce and thus perpetuate these 
particular forms of governmental conduct. Hence, this relationship represents a 
particularly capillary conception of power. It represents the very fabric of society, 
originating in the infinitesimal mechanisms of government and clustering into truths 
that become self-evident and steer governmental action and individual conduct. 
3. The EU external relations scholarship  
After we have introduced the building blocks of governmentality, we direct our 
attention to how governmentality research can form a bridge between two strands in 
the literature that are occupied with the question of what power the EU is or can be in 
the world. Moreover, we bring structure into the body of literature that studies EU 





3.1 Realist vs. normative power 
Although a relatively young discipline, the EU scholarship has produced excellent 
work to help us understand, explain and evaluate its external policies. Much of the 
existing scholarly work revolves around the question of precisely what kind of power 
the EU is on the international stage. First of all, the ‘classic’ International Relations (IR) 
perspectives that dominated the early days of the EU external relations literature, 
interpreted power in a realist or materialist sense. Tracing this line of research back to 
Bull’s (1982) argument for further military integration, these perspectives over the 
years evolved beyond their initial focus on military power. Scholarly work started to 
focus on concepts that investigate the conditions for or evaluate the EU’s material 
power. Examples include EU presence (Allen & Smith 1990), actorness (Niemann & 
Bretherton 2013) and coherence (Thomas 2012). In addition, Hill (1993) explained the 
gap between what is expected of the EU in terms of power in the more traditional sense 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its capabilities. Alternatively, 
Toje (2008) explained the EU’s ‘ineffective’ foreign policy via the concept of a 
consensus-expectations gap. Arguably, these concepts have a narrow interpretation of 
power, approaching it from a positivist epistemological position and looking 
specifically at its institutional sources and material outcomes. 
In parallel, different role conceptions emerged challenging these realist interpretations 
of power. They perceived the EU not as a weaker actor on the international stage, but 
as a different actor based on values. The idea launched by Duchêne (1972) of a Civilian 
Power Europe, and more recently Manners’ (2002; 2008) notion of a Normative Power 
Europe generated increasing attention towards the EU’s “ability to shape conceptions 
of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners, 2002, p. 239). The ‘normal’ here is 
shaped by the EU’s identity, based on norms such as rule of law, human rights and 
democracy. The main contribution of the work by Duchêne and Manners has been to 
introduce an ideational dimension to the study of the EU external policies; at the time 





However, the NPE argument got more fuzzy through re-interpretation and its 
theoretical underpinnings overlooked. It became a vehicle for – albeit very good and 
rigorous – empirical work on policy actions and outcomes, evaluating the EU as 
conflicted in balancing said norms and material interests (cf. Meunier & Nicolaïdis 
2006). EU actors themselves have even justified newly acquired power capabilities by 
relating them to role concepts such as NPE (Aggestam 2008). Despite the much 
appreciated focus on the ideational dimension of NPE, what remains under-
investigated is the power element: what is ‘power’ in normative power (Sjursen 2006: 
238), and how does it operate? It can be an enabling power, altering circumstances for 
the better. However, normative power can just as well be interpreted as a mechanism 
for the subordination of others, allowing an arbitrary interpretation of ‘the normal’ 
(Merlingen 2007). Moreover, even though Manners also aimed to evaluate the norms 
the EU is projecting, the relationship with power in the transfer of these norms is not 
fully elaborated.  
As an alternative approach to this dichotomy between material and ideational 
conceptions of EU power, the external governance literature developed as an attempt 
to pinpoint the EU’s ability to include third countries into common systems of 
governing and rule without using the ‘carrot’ of membership (Lavenex & 
Schimmelfenig 2009). It distances itself from ‘realist’ notions of the EU as an external 
actor by swapping the underlying projection of a unitary state model for a more 
complexity-sensitive, institutionalist view of policy diffusion and norm transfer 
beyond EU borders. Hence the focus of much of the literature in this regard is on more 
gray areas of EU partnerships, such as the European Neighborhood Policy (Lavenex 
2008), development cooperation (Slocum-Bradley & Bradley 2010) and democracy 
promotion (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011). These empirical settings are scrutinized 
for their different modes of external governance and the effectiveness of such modes 
in transferring roles and policy norms.  
Although power does play a role in this literature, it is approached only as a condition 
influencing the effectiveness of EU external governance. In contrast, power effects 




In the following section, we will look into some existing scholarly work that has used 
a governmentality approach in order to overcome the ‘doomed’ dichotomy between 
realism and ideationalism in EU external relations. A governmentality approach can 
preserve the ethical considerations that are embedded in the NPE concept, while 
acknowledging the preoccupation of more ‘realist’ studies with the power effects of 
EU external policies. The fact that governmentality is based on a Foucauldian concept 
of power allows for determining how the micro-governance techniques of EU external 
action crystallize into particular truths and knowledge on how to govern certain issues 
within EU partner countries. As such, it allows for a critical examination of the EU’s 
external policies, focused on problematizing some of the inherent power elements 
within seemingly value-based EU actions abroad (see for example Diez 2005). 
3.2 Governmentality in EU external relations: state of the debate 
Although the current body of literature on the EU’s external relations from a 
governmentality perspective is rather modest in quantity, it is high on quality and 
already shows promising elements of its added value in terms of rising above the 
dichotomy between realist and ideational accounts of EU external action.  
First of all, a segment of governmentality-inspired studies have tried to pursue this by 
engaging with the forms of knowledge that emerge as a result of the overarching role 
conceptions of EU external action, and how these generate real power effects. 
Merlingen (2007) has proposed the study of the micro-processes in the EU’s external 
policies as a way of problematizing both the norms and power in Normative Power. 
He advocates a study of the details of a reality usually overlooked by variable-
oriented, large-n research (p. 443). For Merlingen said norms can constitute an 
improvement of life, yet they are also aimed at ‘technologizing’ life, as they are 
translated to forms of good governance on the micro-level. Moreover, discourses 
surrounding these norms hold a risk of epistemic violence with hierarchies of knowing 
and othering (cf. Diez 2005; Said 1978). This means that the identity of normative 
power is constructed as a ‘self’ which at the same time requires an ‘other’. This ‘other’ 
is presented as different, inferior or even dangerous, and legitimizes an intervention. 




circumstances for the better. However, normative power can just as well be interpreted 
as a mechanism for the subordination of others, allowing an arbitrary interpretation of 
‘the normal’. Are the norms put forward by the EU universal, or rather a reflection of 
a Eurocentric view on how the world should be? This is how a governmentality 
perspective helps to preserve ethical considerations in the study of the EU’s external 
policy, while also critically engaging with power elements reflected in it.  
In addition to such overarching questions, research has also used the notion of 
governmentality to problematize taken-for-granted concepts used in EU external 
governance, thereby re-inserting the element of power in this branch of the literature. 
Indeed, governmentality approaches in this regard have done important work in 
lifting the veil of seemingly neutral, technical and a-political external governance 
programmes by the Commission. One the one hand, some authors have used a 
governmentality approach to problematize the broader instances of EU external 
action, such as EU development cooperation (Hout 2010) and the Common Security 
and Defense Policy (Merlingen 2011). One the other hand, a growing strand of 
literature also aims at problematizing more concrete policy concepts within these 
overarching frameworks, such as EU democracy promotion in third countries (Kurki 
2011; Malmvig 2014; Tagma et al. 2013), EU twinning projects (Işleyen 2015b) and EU 
resilience-building (Joseph 2014). 
Despite each of these studies focusing on particular empirical manifestations of EU 
external action, the power effects that they identify are often very similar. First of all, 
the local context is redefined as a “problem area in need of rule and improvement” 
(Işleyen 2015b: 686) that justifies EU intervention. For example, Joseph (2013; 2014) 
argues that the concept of resilience reflects a world view that highlights contingency, 
disaster and complexity. Non-resilient countries are expected to suffer more from 
external shocks, related to ever-growing ‘wicked’ problems like climate change, 
environmental degradation, conflict etc. More importantly however, a lack of 
resilience within particular countries is not understood as caused by worsening 
external conditions, but rather as the result of internal governance issues. Similarly, in 




identifies that the necessity of twinning is also constructed by identifying a ‘problem 
sphere’ of lack of economic and social growth. This is then linked to internal 
governance issues, which ultimately renders capacity building through twinning as 
the logical form of EU intervention.  
Second, a range of policy techniques is promoted by the EU, which although technical 
in nature, promote a particular kind of conduct among actors in partner countries. In 
terms of concrete examples of policy techniques that are problematized, many of the 
cited studies focus on policies such as benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation 
schemes, competition-based techniques such as peer review and funding applications, 
and sharing of information and good practices. In short, such techniques are focused 
at promoting a form of governance that is calculable, quantifiable and introduces 
practices of self-monitoring and accountability among targeted actors. The conduct 
that these policy techniques (re)produce can in most cases be summarized as 
entrepreneurial, responsible, self-monitoring and overall conducive to EU norms and 
interests (Kurki 2011; Tagma et al. 2013: 388).  
Conceptually, the link to neoliberalism seems almost a given in existing studies, given 
the apparent dominance of a market logic and responsibilization techniques in EU 
external governance schemes towards third actors. For example, in her analysis of EU 
democracy promotion towards the Arab World, Kurki (2011) convincingly shows how 
EU democracy promotion encourages civil society organizations to pitch themselves 
as entrepreneurial actors in defense of fundamental freedoms. This matches a 
competitive market logic and puts the responsibility to reach these goals with civil 
society organizations themselves. The funding mechanism of the EIDHR is developed 
accordingly, yet structured and specified by the EU. This puts forward a narrow 
interpretation of what are considered to be appropriate activities in building 
democracy. In his analysis of EU assistance for policing in Macedonia, Merlingen 
(2011) discusses how problems and solutions are constructed through fact-finding 
missions. These missions overestimate both the available space for reform and the 
shortfalls of Macedonian policing, while idealizing European best practices. In 




governance, as mentees are socialized into a rational-entrepreneurial mindset and self-
identify as human capital. 
Apart from these ‘neoliberal’ forms of conduct, EU policy techniques can also have 
depoliticizing effects for partner actors in targeted countries. A prime example in this 
regard is the study by Işleyen (2015a) on the EU’s seemingly technical and 
depoliticized approach towards civil society promotion in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Labeled by previous studies on the matter as soft and 
insignificant (p. 268), Işleyen reinserts a notion of power in the EU’s support for civil 
society organisations in this context. Her research points out that, through micro-
governance techniques such as project application and selection and funding 
conditionalities, the EU limits the possibility for engagement of civil society 
organizations in political questions that are central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Hence, it rules out any kind of transformative role of civil society in conflict reduction 
and replaces it with a framework of depoliticized activities in which civil societies are 
expected to operate. In addition, Joseph (2014) points out the depoliticizing tendencies 
of resilience-building in the context of food crises in the Horn of Africa. As said before, 
the strong focus on internal governance issues that stand in the way of societies 
becoming resilient shifts the limelight away from the – often external – causes of 
problems that leave societies vulnerable to external shocks in the first place. Hence, 
structural and aggregated causes of external shocks – in which the EU itself also bears 
responsibility – are erased from the problem definition, and techniques are introduced 
which make non-resilient countries accountable for their own governance ‘failures’ in 
this regard. 
In sum, the existing literature showcases a lot of potential in governmentality 
applications in the study of EU external relations. However, we argue that – despite 
being very valuable in their own right – the majority of these studies do not utilize the 
concept of governmentality to its full analytical potential. Theoretically, the dominance 
of neoliberal governmentality as analytical framework in existing scholarly work 
generates the risk of it becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Empirically, we clearly 




external relations (e.g. EU democracy promotion) and certain regions (e.g. the Arab 
world), leaving a lot of unexcavated ground for governmentality research in this 
context. In the following section, we will therefore further pinpoint some of the issues 
that exist within the current body of scholarly work, as well as introduce an analytical 
framework that takes these into account and could inspire future work.  
4. A framework for governmentality research in EU external 
policies 
Above we outlined the contours of governmentality and welcomed it to the study of 
the external policies of the EU, as it can serve as a bridge between realist and ethical 
conceptions. Now, we deal with the question of how governmentality research is 
conducted. To this end we present a framework of guiding questions that highlight 
the bottom-up, micro-level focused approach that is a governmentality analysis. 
Moreover, we pay particular attention to what we consider appropriate points of entry 
and source material while highlighting several good examples.  
We would like to argue that transparency on methodological considerations is 
essential to avoid common misconceptions about governmentality. First, a 
governmentality analysis does not equal a study of speech or rhetoric. 
Governmentality scholars have an interest for policy papers or official publications to 
study not just what is being said, but to investigate how it is possible for this to be said 
(Foucault as cited in Bacchi & Goodwin 2016: 44). In line with Foucault’s own 
understanding of discourse as the production of knowledge, governmentality analysis 
thus concerns “bottom-up, micro and fluid relations of truth, power and agency” 
(Hamilton 2014: 136). Second, researchers should be weary of equating 
governmentality with neoliberal governance. Otherwise, studies are at risk of 
becoming a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, in which empirical findings are fitted into pre-
constructed subcategories of neoliberalism in order to prove their prevalence (cf. Rothe 
2011). Indeed, many existing studies using governmentality in the context of EU 
external relations base their analysis on a notion of (neo)liberal governmentality (e.g. 
Işleyen 2015b; Kurki 2011; Tagma et.al. 2013). By limiting themselves conceptually to 




turning a blind eye to other forms of power that might be exported and perpetuated 
through seemingly technical EU external policies. In other words, a study set out to 
uncover the neoliberal nature of the EU will most likely do just that and will not engage 
with other ‘hidden’ effects of EU foreign policy.  
In contrast, governmentality research is based on the idea of an ‘ascending analysis’ 
building up from the singularity of a detailed case study to more generalizable forms 
of knowledge (Bröckling et al. 2010: 12; Dean as cited in Oels 2005). This corresponds 
with the concept of power itself in a Foucauldian sense, which also originates in the 
infinitesimal mechanisms of government, before crystallizing into specific forms of 
truth and knowledge which in their turn inform governmental and individual 
conduct. Hence, a governmentality analysis should have as a starting point the 
assessment and problematization of these micro-elements in order to provide useful 
insights on the power effects they generate. We consider the micro-level to be where 
actors are encouraged or restrained in their actions and decisions. It is the level where 
Ukrainian civil society actors write funding applications, Ugandan women partake in 
a workshop on nutrition, or Indonesian forestry officials are at the receiving end of a 
capacity building project. Governmentality research is thus essentially about mapping 
a ‘grid’ of power relations and analyzing power in all its complexity (Death 2013). 
Ideally, such analyses do not only look into how power operates through practices of 
freedom – which is usually linked to (neo)liberal governmentality – but look at 
governmentality as a ‘triangle’ of three forms of power: sovereignty, discipline113 and 
governmental management (Foucault as cited in Rosenow 2009). 
The guiding questions presented in table 1 inform a comprehensive framework with 
three main elements: first, we include the idea of a genealogy that represents a form of 
historical awareness that “denaturalizes norms and ways of life by suggesting that 
they actually arose out of contingent historical processes” (Bevir 2010: 429). A 
genealogy of a phenomenon allows for sketching out its historical context in such a 
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way that its particularity is exposed, in order to de-mystify it as an inevitable 
evolution. In other words, it approaches the genesis of a particular issue as the product 
of specific historic ideas and values, thereby revealing its contingency and 
contestability (ibid.: 431). From a Foucauldian perspective, every part of political life 
is the product of a historical struggle and social constructions, and should thus be 
approached a such. It provides a tool for problematizing commonly used concepts in 
EU external policy discourse, as it requires not only a detailed knowledge of the 
trajectory that led up to a certain form of governance, but also a problematization of 
the regimes of practices that shape it. It views such concepts not as technical solutions 
to technical problems (e.g. resilience) or the natural endpoint of a historical trajectory 
(e.g. ownership), but the product of (changing) mentalities that inform them.  
Second, we also build upon the analytics of government approach as developed by 
Angela Oels (2005). This represents a series of guiding questions that could prove to 
be beneficial for researchers in their analysis of power effects in both discursive and 
technical aspects of governance. This particular analytical lens includes questions that 
are naturally linked to framing and discourse analysis (what problems are formulated? 
Which elements are obscured in discourse?) as well as questions that touch upon the 
core of the governmentality concept. These include the formation of identities (what 
forms and transformations of the self are promoted?), forms of knowledge (which 
ideas are promoted?) and technical aspects of governance (which instruments, 
procedures etc. are installed?) (Oels 2005: 189). Merlingen (2011) paid exemplary 
attention to such questions as he studies what is institutionally considered a powerless 
actor as the spokesperson for common objectives and projects, and the power that lies 
therein (p. 162-164). In the same vein, we argue that such constellations of discursive 
constructions and governance techniques should be perceived as dynamic, constantly 
changing as a response to changes in their environment.  
This is why, thirdly, we also include the analytics of protest as developed by Carl Death 
(2010). What Death brings to the table are the important, yet understudied notions of 
counter-conduct and resistance. Although diffuse and difficult to grasp – much like the 




to a form in which it can be used for analytical purposes. In his own words, his 
analytics of protest aims to show “how protest and government are mutually 
constitutive, and thus how forms of resistance have the potential to reinforce and 
bolster, as well as and at the same time as, undermining and challenging dominant 
forms of global governance” (p. 236). It include roughly the same elements as the 
analytics of government by Oels, such as the fields of visibility, political identities, 
subjectivities and governance techniques. The main aim of analyzing forms of 
resistance and counter-conduct is to assess to what extent they bring to the fore new 
forms of knowledge, truth and conduct, and to what extent they reinforce existing 
practices and mentalities of government (p. 247). As such, analytics of government and 
protest are two sides of the same coin, complementary parts of a broader 
governmentality approach that aims to expose the complexity of power relations in a 
particular political setting.  
However, despite being analytically valuable, Death still conceptualizes resistance 
mostly in the intuitive sense, based on what would commonly be understood under 
the idea of ‘protest’ against a particular order. Hence, it is important to reiterate that 
resistance originates in the relational conception of power in the works of Foucault. 
Therefore, resistance can also be found in actions that are not explicitly rallying 
‘against’ a particular mode of governance, but instead instrumentalize some of the 
existing mentalities and techniques of governance in order to oppose them. Malmvig 
(2014) provides the example of political reform in the context of EU democracy 
promotion towards the Arab World. Drawing on Baudrillard’s insights on simulated 
reality, she argues that Arab countries subverted the logic of political reform by the 
EU by simulating it to the point where real reform could no longer be distinguished 
from the simulated variant. This is just one example of a form of counter-conduct 
which is much more subtle and indirect in its attempts to direct social change away 
from dominant political mentalities and governance techniques. Hence, although 
analytically challenging, researchers should also attempt at identifying these more 




Finally, we also include the principle of an ascending analysis in our analytical 
framework. As we have explained above, this is needed to prevent researchers from 
putting the cart before the horse and basing their analytical delineation of 
governmentality on an – often narrow – notion of (neo)liberal governmentality. 
Importantly, this does not mean that traces of neoliberal governmentality cannot be 
the result of a governmentality analysis. However “by constituting an external and 
supposedly omnipresent neoliberalism, we neglect internal constitution, local 
variability, and the role that ‘the social’ and individual agency play in (re)producing, 
facilitating, and circulating neoliberalism” (Springer 2012: 135). Moreover, researchers 
should avoid searching only for traces of neoliberal governmentality in order not to 










Table 7: Four analytical dimensions of governmentality analysis (dimension 2 is based on Dean 2010 & Oels 2005: 189; dimension 3 is based on Death 2010) 
No. ANALYTICAL 
DIMENSION 




























Fields of visibility 
 
What is illuminated, what obscured? 
What problems are to be solved? 
 
Forms of knowledge 
 
Which forms of thought arise from and inform the activity of governing? 
 
 
Formation of identities 
 
What forms of self are presupposed by practices of government? 















 Analytics of 
protest 
 
Fields of visibility 
What is illuminated, what obscured? 
How does this contest/reinforce power effects rooted in dominant mentalities 
and governmental conduct?  
 
 
Forms of knowledge 
Which forms of thought arise from and inform the activity of dissent/protest? 
How does this contest/reinforce power effects rooted in dominant mentalities 
and governmental conduct?  
 
Formation of identities 
What new identities/subjectivities emerge from the observed activities of 
dissent/protest.  
How does this contest/reinforce power effects rooted in dominant mentalities 
and governmental conduct?  
 
Technical aspects 
What techniques are employed by the observed activities of dissent/protest?  
How does this contest/reinforce power effects rooted in dominant mentalities 











To which overarching concepts can this local manifestation of governmentality 





A governmentality study combines textual analysis of constituting discourses with an 
intimate knowledge of micro-political arrangements, while also connecting the dots 
between them. Firstly, discourse should be approached as capable of shaping, 
supporting and reproducing local power constellations around a certain form of 
governance. Textual analysis – looking specifically at emphases, fabrications and 
interpretations – of ‘practical texts’ such as policy documents or action programmes 
can be used in order to uncover such overarching rationalities of government (Walters 
& Haahr 2005: 7). This should however not be stand-alone project. Secondly, micro-
level case studies through a thorough document analysis, process-tracing and 
field/ethnographic work reveal the material effects of governmental techniques and 
micro-practices, and take an interest in the attempts to contest or escape these. For 
example, participatory observation in an EU institution reveals the mundane and the 
day-to-day of governing, while it also allows to investigate the shapes of counter-
conduct. Malmvig (2014) is a good example of the diversity in source material going 
from public documents, including speeches and Web sites, to interviews and direct 
involvement in multilateral initiatives in her study of EU democracy promotion in the 
Arab world and the resistance it faces. In sum, a thorough governmentality analysis 
generates a detailed and complex understanding of the project of government in a 
specific micro-setting, paying particular attention to the mutual interdependence of 
power, freedom and resistance (Death 2010: 239). 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
This paper demonstrated the merits of a governmentality approach in order to escape 
the dichotomy between realist and ideational perspectives on EU external relations. 
Governmentality can preserve the ethical and critical underpinnings of the work on 
NPE, while also maintaining the sensitivity for power that is apparent in much of the 
realist-inspired literature. Through its focus on how power operates through technical 
aspects of governance, it can also re-insert a notion of power in the EU external 
governance literature. Existing scholarly work in this regard already demonstrates that 
using governmentality to problematize some of the discursive constructions and 




and interesting insights. However, the existing literature is still limited and the 
analytical potential of using a governmentality approach in this regard has not yet 
reached its full potential. By providing an analytical framework and some inspiration 
for further research, we hope to invoke new scholarly work in order to strengthen 
governmentality research as a fully-fledged alternative for studying EU external 
relations.  
We also want to emphasize that empirical instances within the realm of EU external 
relations are highly interesting sites for research for governmentality scholars, as they 
have the potential to move the concept into new and uncharted territory. Using 
governmentality for the study of EU external relations can move its use beyond the 
European nation state, as was the main delineation in Foucault’s own work. 
Governmentality in Foucault’s writings is a way of tracing different mentalities of 
government from the Middle Ages onwards, arriving at the then contemporary forms 
of neoliberal governmentality. Arguably, the governing forms apparent in different 
domains of EU governance provide new and interesting cases to see how different 
forms of power interrelate in sui generis international organisations that operate 
beyond the nation state, combining complex forms of supranational and 
intergovernmental policy making.  
Moreover, as the external governance literature rightfully argues, the EUs way of 
exporting its norms and rules beyond its own borders without dangling the ‘carrot’ of 
membership is in itself an interesting research topic. It can be considered a 
contemporary form of ‘international governmentality’, targeting the conduct of 
conduct of partner states and (non-)governmental actors within them. While some 
have questioned the usefulness of governmentality on an international scale (cf. Joseph 
2009), we argue that the rise of transnational, complex and ‘wicked’ problems like 
climate change and environmental degradation increasingly lift ‘the art of governing’ 
to the international and transnational level. Hence, governmentality research should 
follow suit, attempting to understand these new international mentalities of 
government. There is no doubt that the study of EU external relations would be a 




Finally, governmentality research could also function as a much needed lever for 
promoting interdisciplinary research within EU studies. Due to its strong 
preoccupation with power encapsulated in the technical aspects of governing, 
governmentality research requires empirical data that could potentially be highly 
specialized and opaque for non-specialized scholars. For example, EU scholars 
interested in studying governmentality within the EUs external environmental 
governance could more easily delve into the empirics when collaborating with 
scholars specialized in the technical aspects of environmental management. 
Governmentality research could thus invoke new and interesting research 
collaborations, which in their turn could greatly enhance our knowledge of the micro-
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